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SYNOPSIS 
As a point of departure in this inherently interdisciplinary 
endeavour, the concept "Holistic Multidisciplinary Management" 
("HMM") is introduced a.s a macrocosmic adaption of principles of 
project management. In line with HMM, a number of submissions 
regarding terminology and definitions in the interdisciplinary 
context of medicine (and particularly clinical psychiatry) and 
law, are made, and the foundations of medical malpractice are 
examined. 
Building on the various foundations laid, specific types of 
conduct that can constitute clinical-psychiatric malpractice, are 
addressed. A common theme that emerges in the various contexts 
covered, is that the psychiatrist must negotiate various 
proverbial tightropes, involving inter alia tensions between 
restraint and freedom, excessive and insufficient medication, 
becoming too involved and not being involved enough with clients, 
as well as client confidentiality and the duty to warn third 
parties. 
It is concluded that law and medicine. must work harmoniously 
together to establish appropriate balance. This can be achieved 
only if mutual understanding and integrated functioning are 
promoted and translated into practice. 
Key terms: 
Holistic Multidisciplinary Management (HMM); clinical psychiatry; 
forensic psychiatry; medical malpractice; medical law; 
psychiatric malpractice; iniuria; grounds of justification; 
negligence; pharmacotherapy; psychotherapy; abandonment; undue 
familiarity; client confidentiality; duty to warn. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: SCOPE, AIMS AND APPROACH 
1 Scope of the Dissertation 
Conscientious analysis of any specific matter-demands perspective 
on its broader context. This dissertation launches an investi-
gation into the matter of clinical psychiatric malpractice. This 
has its home in the broader context of the interface between law 
and psychiatry. It is important, then, for the scope of the 
dissertation to provide an adequate introduction to this broader 
context, before focussing on the specific matter in question. The 
dissertation progresses from sketching broad context, expounding 
the general methodology, to narrower context, elucidating some 
of the foundations of the law of malpractice liability. The 
focus then narrows to various app.lications of malpractice law in 
the context of clinical psychiatry. 
Accordingly, the dissertation first deals with the here proposed 
holistic multidisciplinary management (HMM) approach, which 
constitutes the gen~ral orientation of the investigation. This 
discussion provides the framework for the entire dissertation -
it is the approach followed throughout. As will appear from the 
discussion of the HMM approach, the orientation of this 
dissertation is to integrate knowledge across disciplines 
relevant to the particular matter in question. Accordingly, 
particular attention is given to conceptual and terminological 
interdisciplinary iptegration. Indeed, psychiatric malpractice 
is an area that creates tremendous scope for multidisciplinary 
interaction. As will be discussed, the most relevant disciplines 
are management, medicine, psychplogy and, of course, various 
areas of law. 1 
'.Perspective on the general interactions between these 
disciplines is provided in the introductory discussion; hence 
these disciplines feature wherever relevant, at intervals 
2 
After the general introductory discussion of HMM, the elements 
in the interface between law and psychiatry are illuminated, 
highlighting the pla8e and scope of psychiatric malpractice law, 
as part of medical law. Medical law is inevitably infused with 
the general principles of certain other areas of law, 
. particularly the law of delict, criminal law and the law of 
contract. Although the general principles of especially the law 
of delict and criminal law go to the very core of malpractice 
liability, the scope of this dissertation does not allow for a 
comprehensive analysis of those principles. These will be 
featured as they are applied to the specific matter in question. 
Knowledge of the general principles of the law of delict, 
criminal law and the law of contract must therefore, of 
necessity, be assumed. 2 
The laws and legal literature of other countries, especially the 
United States, are referred to extensively, with particular 
sensitivity to possible application in South African law. 3 
throughout the dissertation. 
-rt is unfortunate that scope does not allow for a 
comprehensive analysis of the general principles underlying 
malpractice liability, since it would be most desirable to 
provide full perspective on those principles before applying them 
to the matter of psychiatric malpractice. In step with the HMM 
approach, attention should be given to the d~rective that 
principles that are shared, for instance by the law of delict, 
criminal law and medical law, must be harmonious. To address 
these and other issues, it is hoped that this dissertation will 
be followed by a doctoral thesis, whose scope will allow for the 
aforementioned extensive analysis. The proposed title is: "The 
Interfaces of Law, Medicine and Psychology: An Holistic 
Multidisciplinary Management Approach". 
''The specific matter of the law regarding psychiatric 
malpractice has not as of yet been extensively explored in South 
African legal literature. This necessitates a heavy reliance on 
foreign sources. Although there are some existing directly 
relevant South African sources, these are rather limited. In a 
fairly recent South African text, Allan A The Law for 
Psychotherapists and Counsellors Somerset West: Inter-Ed ( 1997), 
which is described as "a practical workbook, not a definitive 
authority on the relative [sic] aspects of law". Allan himself 
undertakes his overview of malpractice in the South African 
context with reference to general principles and case law from 
3 
The final chapter ( 11 c;:onclusion 11 ) provides a synoptic perspective 
on the conclusions and recommendations of the dissertation, 
innervated, as it were, by comparative analysis and an holistic 
multidisciplinary management approach. 4 
2 An Holistic Multidisciplinary Management (HMM) Approach 
2.1 Introduction 
2. 1.1 The Need for Holistic Multidisciplinary Management 
The emergence of so many fields of expertise in the complex 
society that humankind has created, has necessitated 
collaboration between various specialists in their respective 
fields. 5 In this regard, the interface between law and 
the United States. He states: "As no case has been reported in 
South Africa to date in which a psychologist or a psychiatrist 
has been sued for malpractice (not that such cases have not 
occurred) little guidance can be found in [South African] case 
law"; see ibid 42. It should be noted that the South African case 
Rompel v Botha (TPD, 1953), though unreported, has been discussed 
by judges and jurists (see discussion infra chapter IV, 2.4.1); 
see, for instance: Neser Jin Castell v De Greet 1994 (4) SA 408 
(C) (see Neethling J, Potgieter JM & Scott TJ Case Book on the 
Law of Delict ( 3 ed) Juta ( 2000) 196; Esterhuizen v 
Administrator, Transvaal 1957 (3) SA 710 (T) 719; Snyman JL Die 
Siviele Opneming van Geestesonges.teldes: Regte en Regsbeskerming 
van die Betrokkene (LLD thesis, Unisa, 1981) 562; Van Costen FFW 
The Doctrine of Informed Consent in Medical Law (LLD thesis, 
Unisa, 1990) 47; Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law: a 
Selection of Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: Van Schaik (1991) 
10. In line with the approach of promoting refinement through 
comparing systems of law, this dissertation aims inter alia to 
enrich existing South African law by detailed comparative 
analysis involving countries more advanced in this area. 
Suggestions regarding the application of principles developed in 
other systems, feature throughout. 
4This approach actually incorporates comparative legal 
analysis, as discussed under 2.5 infra. 
In the context of mental health care, Lucas M, Pefile L, 
Goldstein M, Van Straten M and Allwood C "Multidisciplinary Teams 
- Do They Work?" The South African Journal of Psychiatry (1999) 
4 
psychiatry, is a prime example. 6 Al though all practitioners 
involved in cases where various disciplines interact cannot be 
expected to be experts in the terminology and underlying 
philosophy of each field7 , professionals who specialise in 
Vol 5 No 4, allude to the importance of a multidisciplinary 
perspective. These authors assert that "the concept of the 
multidisciplinary team has become so intrinsically associated 
with mental health, that it is difficult to think of psychiatric 
treatment in any other terms". These particular teams (MDTs) 
would typically involve a combination of input from the fields 
of nursing, medicine, psychology,· occupational therapy and social 
work. Specifically in the context of medical law, Strauss 
acknowledges that the development of that area of law is not 
exclusively the task of those in the field of law, but that a 
multidisciplinary approach is essential; see Strauss SA 
11 Geneesheer, Pasient en die Reg: ~n Delikate Driehoek" TSAR 1987 
1-11. The importance.of knowledge and skills in management in the 
heal th-care setting was firmly demonstrated to the present author 
when sitting in on meetings (at the John Connelly Psychiatric 
Wing at Ealing, London) where a psychiatrist, social workers, a 
psychologist, psychiatric nurses, the client, and his or her 
family, deliberate. At these meetings, the psychiatrist clearly 
assumed a role akin to that of the project manager. He 
coordinated the meeting, and integrated the input from various 
"functions" (ie social work, psychological assessment, etc) into 
an holistic strategy to deal with the particular client's 
situation. The principles of management can clearly find fruitful 
application in the multidisciplinary-team context. 
'In expressing the need for psychiatrists to learn more 
about the law and for lawyers to develop a better understanding 
of psychiatry, Alan Stone is quoted as stating: "The psychiatrist 
will find the law intruding on everyday practice, and the future 
will bring more rather than less intrusion. The psychiatrist has 
no choice but to become familiar with the important structures 
of law and psychiatry. A new generation of forensic 
psychiatrists, schooled in the broad constitutional questions 
that have added so much complexity to the field, must be 
developed. Most impqrtant, psychiatrists must develop working 
relationships with lawyers who are sensitive to the special 
problems attendant on the provision of mental heal th care .. ". See 
Maggio E The Psychiatry-Law Dilemma: Mental Health versus Human 
Rights. New York: Vantage Press (1981). 
The terms "field" and "discipline" will consistently be 
used as synonyms in this dissertation. The various areas of 
specialisation within a field or discipline, are then described 
as "sectors" within that discipline. The Encarta World English 
Dictionary defines a sector as "a component of an integrated 
system ... "; see Rooney K (Ed) The Encarta World English 
Dictionary London: Bloomsbury (1999) at 1696. The 'word "sector" 
is derived from the Latin "secare", which means "to cut up". 
5 
interdisciplinary areas should make it their task to promote 
precise conceptual and terminological integration. If strategic 
multidisciplinary perspective is maintained, the process of 
refining concepts within a discipline not only benefits that 
discipline, but also potentially benefits all other disciplines 
with which it interacts. Moreover, proper perspective and 
integration improve these interactions, and produce better 
results. 
2.1.2 Introducing HMM as a Macrocosmic Application of the 
Principles of Project Management 
The discipline that especially has the capacity to arch across 
all other disciplines, and is particularly relevant where various 
disciplines interact, is management. 8 "Holistic Multidisciplinary 
Since every broad .discipline itself is, in principle, an 
integrated system, it can be described as consisting of various 
sectors, for example criminal law within law and clinical 
psychology within psychology. A 11 field 11 / 11 discipline 11 would then 
be the superordinate areas of study and practice, eg (mainstream) 
medicine, psychology, law, management, economic sciences, 
environmental sciences, engineering, and linguistics. When 
exactly an area of expertise would constitute a "separate" 
discipline or a sector of a larger discipline is a relative 
matter - it would depend on which view is most practical and 
realistic. 
hThe general underlying theory relevant in this regard is 
the systems theory, which, according to Kerzner, is "a management 
approach that attempts to integrate and unify scientific 
information across many fields of knowledge. 11 ; see Kerzner H 
Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling, 
and Controlling (7 ed) New York: John Wiley & Sons (2001) 47. In 
exploring the origins of this approach, Kerzner refers to the 
work of a biologist, Dr Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who describes 
systems of the human body as subsystems of the total system. 
According to Kerzner, Bertalanffy's contribution is important in 
that he "identified .how specialists in each subsystem could be 
integrated so as to get a better understanding of the 
interrelationships, thereby contributing to the overall knowledge 
of the operations of the system" (ibid 48). It is here, Kerzner 
contends, that the foundation was laid for the evolution of 
project management. Therefrom actually also emerges an 
application of HMM. The biological sciences enrichingly impacted 
on the managerial sciences. A basic concept of biology was 
6 
Management" ("HMM") is the term here suggested to describe this 
particular application ·of management. Accordingly, it may be 
defined as "an application of adapted and refined principles of 
management, tailored to promote effective and efficient9 
interaction between various disciplines10 in a manner which 
enriches all those involved, and identifies and implements 
integrative, holistic solutions".' There are indeed many problems 
that inherently cannot be addressed in isolation but must be seen 
in their broader multidisciplinary context. Although this 
necessity presents the ideal opportunity for multilateral 
enrichment for all involved, there is also, unfortunately, the 
potential for disparity, miscommunication and incoordination. 
Sound HMM can obviate this negative potential. 
The concept underlying HMM is akin to project management within 
an organisation. 11 HMM amounts to a macrocosmic12 application of 
adapted and developed to become a fundamental philosophy 
underlying management: systems thinking. Today, systems thinking 
innervates successful management of any kind. 
'.·The concepts "effective" and "efficient" are defined and 
discussed under 2.3 infra. 
1
"It is particularly in the interaction between various 
disciplines that management has a crucial role to fulfil. At the 
heart of management lies the optimised coordination of various 
activities and processes. Correctly applied, relevant principles 
of management can promote collaboration between various disci-
plines to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency. 
11Kerzner H Project Management: A Systems Approach to 
Planning, Scheduling, and Controlling (7 ed) New York: John Wiley 
& Sons (2001) at 4, furnishes the following definition of project 
management: 11 ••• the planning, organising, directing, and 
controlling of company resources for a relatively short-term 
objective that has been established to complete specific goals 
and objectives. Furthermore, project management utilises the 
systems approach to management by having functional personnel 
(vertical hierarchy) assigned to a specific project (the 
horizontal hierarchy)." · 
~-The word 11 macrocosm 11 is here used in the sense of "a 
larger copy of a smaller system 11 • Similarly, the Encarta World 
English Dictionary defines a 11 mic.rocosm 11 as "a miniature copy of 
something, especially when it represents ... a larger whole 11 ; see 
Rooney K (Ed) The Encarta World English Dictionary London: 
7 
adapted principles of project management, which are generally 
applied to smaller systems, viz specific organisations. In a 
iarge organisation, there are numerous functional units, each 
performing specialised tasks. It is a firm principle of 
management that these functional units should not function in 
isolation, but should be harmoniously integrated with the rest 
of the whole organisation. There must be both vertical harmony 
(ie sound communication and collaboration from top management 
down to every employee, and vice versa) and horizontal harmony 
(ie sound communication between, and integrated functioning of, 
all the various specialised units within the organisation). 13 
HMM is a superimposition of this imperative (ie sound systemic 
communication and integration) on the interaction between 
specialists from various disciplines. Whereas in an organisation 
there is invariably an appointed coordinator (manager) or group 
of coordinators to facilitate vertical and horizontal 
integration, collaboration between various independent specia-
lists addressing issues of common concern is often initiated and 
coordinated by the specialists th~msel ves. Many of these ventures 
lack the formal structure of an organisation (with the 
accompanying management structures). This is all the more reason 
for professionals to have a basic understanding of the general 
concepts and principles of management. 14 HMM aims to facilitate 
accessibility to the most relevant concepts and principles of 
management precisely for the purpose of integrating the efforts 
of independent specialists from diverse backgrounds. 
Bloomsbury (1999) 1193. 
1 
'Figure 1 (next page), adapted from Kerzner H Project 
Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling, and 
Controlling (7 ed) New York: John Wiley & Sobs (2001) 4, 
illustrates the operational islands that are created if sound 
communication and integration are lacking. It is trite that the 
manifestation of such isolated and dislocated operational islands 
precludes the smooth functioning of the organisation, and can 
eventually have a crippling effect. Figure 2 (on the next page) 
will be referred to in fn 17 infra. 
:~See the discussion under 2. 2 infra. 
/-:=:-\ + 
L 
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9 
HMM is here suggested to be the way that any ventµre should be 
managed: with full regard to the relevant elements of every 
discipline that impacts on that venture, in a manner aimed at 
multilateral enrichment and refinement. 15 The more diverse the 
disciplines involved in a particular venture, the more pronounced 
the need for HMM. In the following discussion, it will be argued 
that refinement within fields and refinement between fields 
should, in a mutually reinforcing manner, promote effective 
multidisciplinary understanding and application, and provide the 
best solutions. 
2. 1. 3 Multidisciplinary Management and the Law 
It is submitted that the law is inevitably a constant facet of 
HMM, since the law invariably interacts with numerous other 
fields. The impact of the law on a multitude of disciplines is 
unavoidable - the law, in principle, reaches every corner of 
society. In turn, the impact of a.multitude of disciplines on the 
law is also unavoidable - the field of law alone is not equipped 
to deal effectively and efficiently with the myriad of matters 
which it is compelled to encompass. Moreover, the law must allow 
itself to be enriched by all relevant fields in order not to 
stifle its development and threaten its legitimacy. HMM thus 
compels all disciplines to have regard to relevant law, and 
compels the law to have regard to the relevant aspects of all 
disciplines with which it interacts. 
A potential enriching impact that the field of law could have on 
other fields, is that practitioners in other fields should be 
able to consult legal works (or practitioners) foe guidance as 
to how to refine the articulation of concepts within them, since 
the field of law should be exemplary in the manner in which it 
10 In this way, "microcosmic" project management ( ie within 
the various functions of an organisation) should, in turn, have 
regard for HMM by considering potentially vital multidisciplinary 
perspective when managing specific ventures. 
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is punctuated with sound definitions and formulations. Those in 
the field of law should be experts at formulation and 
interpretation. Language and the .law are intimately intertwined: 
law gains its existence only through language, and there is 
understandably a great premium on precision in the use of 
language. However, the opportunity that the nature and contents 
of the field of law provide for exemplifying what sound 
formulation and interpretation are, is not currently being 
sufficiently utilised. Instead, the field of law is regrettably 
not without a certain degree of prolixity and obscurity. 
Accordingly, those in the field of law should pay careful 
attention to their use of language in defining, interpreting and 
conveying the law. 16 
2 .1. 4 The Illustrative Example of Psychology 
The example of psychology is convenient to use to illustrate the 
HMM approach, due to its marked connection to management17 and to 
1 ~See further the discussion under 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 infra. 
17Kerzner, for instance, states that "[the] ideal project 
manager would probably have doctorates in engineering, business, 
and psychology ... ". An understanding of organisational psychology 
is indeed absolutely essential for sound business management; see 
Kerzner H Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, 
Scheduling, and Controlling (7 ed) New York: John Wiley & Sons 
(2001) 169. Figure 2 (supra) illustrates the fact that the 
utilisation of human skills is incrementally important in top-
management positions (ibid 127). Not only does industrial 
psychology, as such, play a major role in management within an 
organisation, but other areas of psychology, such as heal th 
psychology, can also play a significant role. Health psychology 
is "the subfield of psychology concerned with the dynamic 
interrelationship of behaviour and psychological states with 
physical health"; see Bishop GD Health Psychology: Integrating 
Mind and Body Needham Heights: Allyn and Bacon (1994) 3. It goes 
without saying that the health of individuals within an 
organisation affects its productivity - a healthier workforce is 
a more productive workforce. The conditions under which people 
work, in turn, can also significantly affect their health. Thus, 
on the one hand the personal health context can have a 
significant bearing on the work context, and, on the other hand, 
management within the work context can have a significant impact 
on the personal heal th context. Regarding the latter, for 
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the law. After the general HMM approach has been discussed, 
psychology will be integrated into an illustration of HMM (figure 
3) 18 , where it is brought in relationship to (mainstream) 
medicine so as to demonstrate the application of HMM to those two 
specific interactive fields (medicine and psychology) . This 
illustration, then, . is but one example of an extract of an 
application of HMM, but particularly apt in the light of the 
topic of this dissertation. 
2.2 The Ubiquitous Roles of Law and Management 
2.2.1 The Impact of Law on Management within Various Fields 
It is readily evident that the interaction of law with other 
professional disciplines is, in most cases, unavoidable. The law 
governs all professional endeavours where persons' interests are 
involved. It is submitted that most professionals, in whatever 
field they may operate, should ideally have knowledge of the 
essentials of the law that applies to that field. The more fully 
professionals understand the law that applies to them, the more 
e~ficiently compliant therewith they could be in practice. 
From a management point of view, the cost of legal non-compliance 
can have a grave negative impact on the productivity and 
instance, Ogden J Health Psychology: A Textbook (2 ed) 
Buckingham: Open University Press (2000) 315, refers to a model 
developed by Karasek and Theorell (1990) that argues that 
personal control over job stress and other stressors is an 
important element in predicting coronary heart disease (CHD). 
According to the model, there are two aspects of "job strain": 
job demands, which reflect conditions that require performance, 
and job autonomy, which reflects the control over the decisions 
made within the job. The organisational climate (partially 
created by management) is obviously intimately related to these 
aspects. The hypothesis suggests that high job demands with low 
job autonomy can predict CHD. This is a clear example of how the 
managerial styles within organisations can impact on the health 
of its employees. 
>Infra under 2.6.3. 
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profitability of the business of a particular professional or 
industry. It follows that sound management within any field would 
thus incorporate compliance with the law. The law, then, has an 
inevitable role to play in the management of any endeavour within 
most professional areas. Managing one's practice in clinical 
psychiatry is no exception. 
2.2.2 The Impact of Management on the Law 
If the law is successfully to fulfil its function of regulating 
a particular field, efficiently managed compliance is required. 
The proper functioning of the law applied to a f>rofession is 
indeed dependant upon the well-managed legal compliance of 
professionals to whom that area of law applies. The 
administration of the law, itself, could also be greatly enriched 
by an integrative application of the principles of management. 
Legal process, like any process that requires planning and 
execution, can be improved by applying relevant principles of 
management. 
2.2.3 The Impact of Management on All Fields 
An understanding of context-appropriate principles of management, 
within the framework of HMM, will invariably enrich endeavours 
within any field. Professionals in any field should thus ideally 
have a sound knowledge of the principles of management that are 
most relevant to their particular field. Of ,course, some 
principles of management will indeed be equally applicable to all 
fields. For instance, the principle of continuous improvement19 
would most obviously equally. apply to all fields. If 
professionals in all fields were to foster an orientation of 
striving for continuous improvement, it would be to the benefit 
not only of that field but also potentially all others. 
1 ~This concept means basically what it states: every process 
in a system is endeavoured to be improved continuously, according 
to internal and external feedback; see Knod EM & Schonberger RJ 
Operations Management: Meeting Customers' Demands ( 7 ed) New 
York: McGraw Hill (2001) 65-71. 
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Two central concepts of management, which are also applicable to 
endeavours in all fields, are efficiency and effectiveness. 20 
Efficiency and effectiveness would be promoted by good management 
in any context. Efficiency refers to the manner in which and the 
time within which a task is performed. Effectiveness refers to 
the end-result of the task, regardless of the cost or time of its 
performance. 21 It is submitted that "effectiveness" can be 
generally defined as "achieving the required result", and 
"efficiency" as "achieving a result in the most appropriate 
manner, maximising output and minimising expenditure of resources 
(including time and effort)". It is evident that in the case of 
effectiveness the emphasis is on "what" is achieved, whereas in 
the case of efficiency the emphasis is on "how" and "when" 
something is achieved. It is self~evident that effectiveness and 
efficiency should be promoted in any venture in any field of 
practice. 
~ 0The meanings of these terms, as they are used in the 
general field of management, basically accord with their ordinary 
dictionary definitions. The Encarta World English Dictionary 
states that "effective" involves "having or producing the desired 
effect", while "efficient" involves "means or resources used in 
achieving a result in an economical manner"; see Rooney K (Ed) 
The Encarta World English Dictionary London: Bloomsbury (1999) 
at 600. These ordinary meanings have also acquired some technical 
guises in specific applications in management, however. See, for 
instance, Knod EM & Schonberger RJ Operations Management: Meeting 
Customers' Demands (7 ed) New York: McGraw Hill (2001) at 687, 
where efficiency is defined as "standard time div~ded by actual 
time or actual output (units) divided by standard output 
(units)". It is clear that this specific guise nevertheless still 
involves the manner in which results are achieved. General 
definitions of effectiveness and efficiency are furnished statim 
infra. 
~ 1 For example, where a medical team removes a cancerous part 
of a patient's descending colon, using an outdated lengthy and 
costly procedure, the procedure is nonetheless effective when it 
is evident that they eventually have successfully removed all the 
cancer. However, t:qeir procedure would not have been very 
efficient at all, given the time and other costs. On the other 
hand, if, using the cheapest and most accurate equipment and 
techniques available, they perform the procedure in record time 
and with remarkable accuracy, only to find that they had most 
accurately removed the section of the ascending instead of the 
descending colon, the procedure, as such, shall have been 
extremely efficient, but obviously not at all effective. 
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2.2.4 The Impact of Other Fields on Management 
In the same way that the field of management can enrich other 
fields, it can also be enriched by them. Some examples in this 
regard have already been mentioned.u 
2.2.5 Conclusion: Management and Law, and Other Disciplines 
As has been illustrated, not only do law and management have a 
reciprocal relationship, but each of them also interacts with all 
professional fields. Both management and law have an impact not 
only on the internal workings 6f various fields, but also on 
their interactions. The roles of management and law should thus 
be borne closely in mind in any endeavour. 
Law and management .provide prime media for interdisciplinary 
development. Those in the fields of law and management thus have 
a particular responsibility to maintain and promote multi-
disciplinary perspective. Due to the intensive level of 
specialisation that occurs in today's rapidly developing 
professional world, those who specialise within a discipline, 
such as clinical psychology within the broader field of 
psychology, are compelled to keep abreast of developments within 
the specialised area, leaving little time for explorative 
interdisciplinary excursions. 
It is especially in this light that management and legal 
professionals must foster collaboration between specialists, and 
promote interdisciplinary development. Nevertheless, as has been 
stated, specialists within fields must still maintain an 
essential working knowledge of relevant law and principles of 
management applicable to their fields of specialisation. 
--see fn 8 concerning systems thinking, and fn 17 for some 
comments concerning psychology in this regard, supra. 
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2. 3 The Relationship between Intradisciplinary Refinement and 
Interdisciplinary Refinement 
2.3.1 General 
To facilitate efficient interdisciplinary refinement and 
application, it is important for professionals within each field 
to develop and refine terminology and concepts' within that 
particular field. This process could be referred to as "intra-
disciplinary"23 as opposed to "interdisciplinary". Where 
different sectors within a particular discipline are involved, 
the internal interaction may be described as 11 intersectoral". 24 
As the illustration of HMM indicates25 , intersectoral refinement 
is a structural micr9cosm of interdisciplinary refinement26 , and 
~'This word has been used, for instance, in the website 
http://www.ashs.edu/prog pa.htm, and many others. Unfortunately, 
many different usages lead to divergent meanings and great 
potential confusion. The meaning presently suggested to be 
ascribed to "intradisciplinary" is simply: "within a particular 
discipline". For exactly what a "discipline" would be, see fn 7 
supra. 
-
4 
n Intersectoral" means "between the sectors of the 
integrated whole''; cf fn 7 supra. The term "intersectoral" is 
particularly apposite in a systems-thinking context (see fn 8). 
One could also view various disciplines as sectors of the world 
body of knowledge. For the sake of clarity and consistency, 
however, "sectors" will be used· only in the intradisciplinary 
context. "Intersectoral" thus necessarily implies 11 intra-
disciplinary11. The sectors within disciplines/fields can then 
also be comparatively rated as "smaller", "medium" or "larger". 
In the context of law, for instance, two closely related areas 
of law within one particular state's legal system would have a 
small-system intersectoral (thus necessarily intradisciplinary) 
relationship, whereas the legal systems of various states would 
have a large-system intersectoral relationship. It should be 
noted that these "size ratings" are merely terms of convenience 
that can be used to describe various levels of interaction. The 
description as larger or smaller, is totally relative, depending 
from which perspective the interaction is viewed. 
_rSee figure 3 and its explanation infra under 2. 6. 3. 
- Intersectoral refinement enables different sectors of a 
discipline more efficiently and effectively to draw on one 
another. This not only contributes to the enrichment of the 
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(as part of intradisciplinary refinement) eventually contributes 
thereto. 27 Interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary refinement are 
mutually beneficial, since the latter facilitates the former, and 
the former is reinforcing or constructively critical of the 
latter. 
2.3.2 Terminological and Definitional Refinement 
It is submitted that multidisciplinary applications of concepts 
and terminology especially require definitional precision. The 
more precisely each respective field's terminology and underlying 
philosophy may be defined, the smoother the integrated 
application amongst fields would be rendered. 28 
Both law and psychology, for instance, are characteristically 
vulnerable to over-complex and tediously wordy formulations. This 
tendency results not only in internal disparity and obscurity29 , 
sectors themselves, but also promotes coherence of the entire 
discipline. The more congruence and mutual enrichment there can 
be between sectors, the greater potential there is to maximise 
the efficiency of the greater system. 
:.:
7As discussed infra under 2. 3. 3. 
~HKerzner refers, for 
by Professor Boulding, 
physicists, economists, 
languages 11 ; see Kerzner H 
to Planning, Scheduling, 
Wiley & Sons (2001) 48. 
instance, to a concern, raised in 1956 
that "subsystem specialists" (eg 
chemists, etc) "have their own 
Project Management: A Systems Approach 
and Controlling (7 ed) New York: John 
~"A shining example of obscurity in legal terminology is the 
use of the term culpa. The use of culpa in South African legal 
terminology has given rise to three possible meanings: In its 
broadest sense it denotes fault or culpability. In a narrower 
sense it is supposed to denote negligence (which is said to be 
one form of culpability). Finally, in its narrowest sense it has 
been held to denote unconscious negligence (one form of 
negligence); see S v Ngubane 1985 (3) SA 677 (A). The effect is 
that, when referring to culpa, one would have to qualify whether 
one means to include intent as part of culpability, and if not, 
whether one means to include luxuria (so-called conscious 
negligence), or whether one actually means to use it to denote 
only unconscious negligence. It is submitted that in a case such 
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but also fortifies external inaccessibility. Intradisciplinary 
inconsistency or obscurity can, in this way, seriously hamper 
interdisciplinary development, since the contents of fields must 
be accessible, to a viable extent, for there to be efficient 
interaction and successful informed integration among fields. 
To promote terminological and definitional multidisciplinary 
accessibility and refinement, the following three general 
principles are advanced: 
1) When attempting to discern what a word "really" 
means, regard should be had to its derivation - this 
should have special persuasive force. Due to the fact 
that language is by no means a static phenomenon, 
there are instances where the meaning of a word has 
developed in such a way as to be disconnected from its 
etymology. In some cases it may thus be impractical or 
lead to absurdity to hold the derivation as ~ecisive 
in establishing its meaning. For the most part, 
however, etymology provides a solid point of reference 
as to the real meaning of a·word, and, should, as far 
as reasonably possible, be decisive. 
2) Generally, the use of words as terms in fields of 
expertise should then also have regard for the 
ordinary dictionary meanings of those words (provided 
that these are etymologically sound - dictionaries 
generally do well in this regard). Obviously these 
meanings are inevitably adapted and refined in areas 
of expertise, but the terms should still be firmly 
connected to their basic meaning, or, if development 
so dictates, the terms themselves should be changed, 
rather than assuming twisted and peculiar meanings. 
Peculiar usages of words are disposed to 
as this, the term culpa must either be accurately and 
consistently defined and used, or completely abandoned. The use 
of "culpa" will be avoided in this dissertation. 
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misunderstanding and breed obscurity. Bearing'ordinary 
dictionary definitions in mind when developing 
terminology, advances common comprehensibility and 
more congruence across all fields. 
3) Where different fields of expertise interact and 
share concepts, terminology and definitions attached 
to those concepts should be very similar if not 
identical. In this way collaboration and cross-
pollination are facilitated. As the modern proverb 
states: "everyone is on the same page"; moreover, they 
are in a better position to improve the "text" ( ie 
subject matter) together. 
It is submitted that the above three general principles, basic 
as they may be, can contribute significantly to promoting the 
effectiveness and efficiency of multidisciplinary ventures. 
2. 3. 3 Smooth Interdisciplinary Integration as an Effect of 
Intradisciplinary Refinement 
To promote interdisciplinary collaboration and effective 
interactional application, management, law, psychology, 
psychiatry and general medicine, for instance, should endeavour 
towards clarity and precision so as to render their contents more 
readily comprehensible, and hence more accessible to capable 
professionals in the other fields. 
Although the ideal would be to be able simply to explain the 
contents of complex fields to virtually anyone, it is not here 
contended that all terminology and concepts can be simplif ied30 
to the extent that any lay person can understand them. Experience 
"
1It is emphasised that the suggestion, here, is for 
intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary clarification, rather 
than simplification. It is submitted that the latter is not only 
difficult and sometimes impossible, but may also potentially 
threaten demanded pr~cision and comprehensiveness. 
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teaches that the complexity of the concepts that must be 
articulated in the fields of psychology and law, for instance, 
cannot simply be circumvented. It is inevitable that complex 
fields will necessarily contain complicated definitions and 
require complex formulations to explain concepts within them. 
What is here suggested, is that formulations should be clear and 
consistent enough to be accessible to competent individuals from 
other fields and that unnecessarily vague or prolix formulations 
be avoided. In this way, concepts can at least be clearly 
explained to members ·of the lay public who consult professionals. 
Nevertheless, it is reiterated that technical language inevitably 
arises in a field of expertise, and that complexity itself cannot 
always be avoided. It is hardly possible for outsiders readily 
to access all given areas of expertise. However, where the reason 
for this is disparity and confusion within the "area of 
expertise", that is regrettable, and, in principle, avoidable. 
2.3.4 Intradisciplinary Refinement as Facilitator of 
Collaboration 
When practitioners from various fields respect one another, their 
collaboration is facilitated. The overall efficiency of a field 
itself is a reflection of those who dwell in it and develop it. 
Clumsy or tautologous formulations reflect poorly on prac-
titioners within the field. 31 Where practitioners from different 
fields are faced with obscurity in each other's domains, this 
cultivates hypercritical dispositions due to (and coupled with) 
'
1Because law and psychiatry are such prime examples of 
fields where complex abstract concepts are sought to be defined, 
sound formulation, clarity and consistency are not always duly 
achieved. Herein lies the challenge to those who are in a 
position to ameliorate that situation. In this dissertation, it 
will be attempted, wherever possible, to promote clarity, 
consistency, and intersectoral harmony in the definitions and 
terminology relevant to both fields. 
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inevitable frustration. 32 Needless to say, collaboration is 
hampered. 
2.3.5 Interdisciplinary Integration as Contributor to Intra-
disciplinary Development and Refinement 
For fields to interact efficiently in an holistic sense, their 
orientation must be such that they enrich one another33 , striving 
for harmony in terminology denoting common or related concepts. 34 
Effective integration should thus be seen not only as a 
facilitated consequence of refinement within and across fields, 
but also as a causally contributing factor in the development of 
each respective field. Where advances are made in psychology or 
law, for instance, and either does not duly incorporate those, 
not only is disparity created between these inevitably 
'~see, for instance, Van den He ever JA' s rather 
uncomplimentary remarks regarding psychiatry in R v Von Zell 1953 
(3) SA 303 (A) 311 A-B, where he refers to "the deductions 
of .. [a] .. speculative science with rather elastic notation and 
terminology, which is usually wise after the event". 
·jBut one notable specific instance where psychology has had 
a generally enriching impact on law (there are numerous others), 
is the development of therapeutic jurisprudence. The crux of 
therapeutic jurisprudence is that the inevitable psychological 
consequences for those whom the law affects should be studied, 
and that the law should be developed to maximise positive 
''therapeutic" effects of legal rules and procedures; see Smith, 
SR "Symposium: Law and Psychology: From Law and Bananas to Real 
Law: A Celebration of Scholarship in Mental Health Law" 34 Cal 
W L Rev 1 (1997) 5. Therapeutic jurisprudence has been described 
as a "law of healing". This integrative study of the 
psychological impacts of law, has a special application in 
assessing the impact of law that pertains to individuals with 
mental disabilities. It "recognises that substantive rules, legal 
procedures and lawyers' roles may have either therapeutic or 
anti-therapeutic consequences". In the United States, 
"therapeutic jurisprudence has been embraced and endorsed by 
judges, by practitioners, and by mental health professionals." 
See Perlin ML "A Law of Healing" 68 U Cin L Rev 407 (2000) 408. 
qThis, particularly, is an aim that features throughout 
this dissertation. Wherever possible, every endeavour is made to 
develop an acceptable common language between psychiatry and 
law. 
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interacting fields,. but 
Especially when the law 
each field is also impoverished. 
falls behind, its use of archaic 
terminology35 or concepts, threatens the respectability of the 
law and its real and perceived effectiveness and efficiency. 
2.4 Intradisciplinary Refinement amongst Areas of Internal Law 
(Smaller-system Intersectoral Refinement36 ) 
This is a type of intersectoral refinement in the context of law: 
that between the different sectors of a state's internal law. 
Where different areas of law have common ground, it provides the 
opportunity for fruitful comparison. The relationship between the 
law of delict and criminal law, for instance, invites such 
comparison. Exploration of the essence of the nature and purpose 
of one, can be great1y enhanced by comparison with the other. 
Having regard to other relevant areas of 
from the focus of an investigation, but 
creating broader perspective and more 
law does not detract 
rather enriches it, 
diversely informed 
insight. 37 The various sectors of law, as is the case with any 
'''That South African law still, for instance, refers to 
"idiots" and "imbeciles" (see the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957) 
when these terms have long since fallen into desuetude in 
psychology and psychiatry, is unacceptable. In 1995, Snyman uses 
these terms, without any reference to their being obsolete, see 
Snyman C.R. A Draft Criminal Co~e for South Africa. Cape Town: 
Juta (1995), and for a discussion see Snyman CR Criminal law (3 
ed) Durban: Butterworths (1995) 350-351, where these terms are 
erroneously described as being part of "the technical language 
of psychology". H.owever, the discussion containing that statement 
does not appear in Snyman•s latest edition. Nevertheless, the 
abovementioned terminology is still used without criticism; see 
Snyman CR Criminal Law (4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (2002) 365. 
'GSee fn 24 supra for a brief explanation of this usage of 
these terms. 
•
7Alluding to how studies within the specialised area of 
mental-health law can enhance an understanding of other areas of 
law, Smith states: "Scholarship in mental heal th law [is] a 
relatively new specialty by legal standards ...... Law and 
psychology and law and psychiatry were sometimes called "law and 
bananas" just a decade or two ago .... [now] mental health law has 
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other system, do not function in isolation, but are interrelated. 
As in the case of operational islands within an organisation38 , 
numerous adverse effects can result where related areas of law 
become dislocated in their development. 
2.5 Intradisciplinary Refinement amongst Systems of Law (Larger-
system Intersectoral Refinement) 
This is another type of intersectoral refinement in the context 
of law: that between similar sectors of different states' laws. 39 
South African law may be classified as a "hybrid" system, notably 
containing Roman-Dutch-law and English-law elements. Indeed, as 
the modern "global village" expands, South African law becomes 
more hybrid. 40 
become a high-quality, diverse and sophisticated contributor to 
our understanding of the law and legal system." With regard to 
the enrichment of mental health law by an understanding of other 
areas of law, Smith states: "Another strength of the scholars in 
mental health law is that they usually teach or conduct research 
in another substantive area of the law in addition to mental 
health law ...... criminal law, torts, and law and· medicine are 
among the common areas of additional expertise ..... this expertise 
brings to mental heal th law a very strong doctrinal understanding 
of almost all other areas of the law. 11 • See Smith SR "Symposium: 
Law and Psychology: From Law and Bananas to Real Law: A 
Celebration of Scholarship in Mental Health Law" 34 Cal W L Rev 
1 (1997) 1, 8. 
-Hsee fn 13 supra. 
'qThese comparative-law aspects would conceptually also 
translate into intersectoral refinement in the context of other 
disciplines. Many other disciplines have diverse branches within 
them, just as the law does. Moreover, comparing different 
approaches of experts in different countries to problems within 
a field, would be analogous to comparative-law evaluations, and 
similarly fruitful. 
4
°For decades now, South African law in its development has 
actually been quite open to the influence of foreign law. Medical 
law is a particularly fertile area for international cross-
pollination. Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) is an 
example where American, English, German and Austrplian law was 
strongly relied upon; in fact, the "test" for disclosure (see 
discussion infra chapter IV 2.1) is based on the formulation in 
the Australian case, Rogers v Whitaker ( 1993) 67 ALJR 47. 
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The subdiscipline known as "comparative law" compares various 
legal systems, or parts thereof, seeking solutions and attempting 
to promote optimality where possible. 41 Through comparative 
study, the laws of different countries are able to enrich one 
another. Having regard to comparative law can be a valuable asset 
to legal development. Development in one system of law can both 
benefit from perspectives in other legal systems, and be of 
benefit to perspectives in other' legal systems. 
2.6 Conclusion: An HMM Approach 
2.6.1 Law and Management 
Any interdisciplinary analysis or multidisciplinary application 
would be incomplete if it does not have regard to relevant 
aspects of the law and relevant applied principles of management. 
With regard to law, conduct in the course of virtually any kind 
of professional practice can potentially have special legal 
consequences. It is thus important for those involved to 
understand the law in that area in order to be able to function 
efficiently within it. As regards management, action in the realm 
of any field can be rendered more efficient by the appropriate 
application of relevant principles of management. 
The better practitioners in their fields understand relevant 
Especially since 1997, with section 39 of the South African 
Constitution (Act 108 of 1996, hereafter referred to as the 
Constitution), stating that a judge may consider foreign law when 
giving meaning to South African law, the door is even wider open 
to global legal influence. 
41Medical law generally has a strong comparative focus, and 
developments are shared by various states. The resultant 
similarities in legal principles, in turn, facilitate further 
mutual development. See, for instance, Carstens PA Die 
Strafregtelike en Deliktuele Aanspreeklikheid van die Geneesheer 
op Grand van Nalatigheid (University of Pretoria, 1996) 304-305, 
who, after a comprehensive analysis of the laws of various states 
regarding medical negligence, concludes that, on the whole, the 
resultant principles are virtually the same. 
principles 
efficiently 
of law and 
they will 
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management, 
practise. 
the more effectively and 
In turn, the better legal 
practitioners in the specialised interactive areas of the law 
understand the fields with which they interact, the better 
relevant applications from experts in those fields can be 
utilised by the law, and the better conduct within those fields 
can be regulated by the law. 
2.6.2 Sound Terminology and Definitions 
Paying careful attention to the language used to convey concepts 
is imperative. To avoid misunderstanding, which can often be 
disastrous, the meanings of concepts must be correctly and 
unambiguously articulated. Sound definitions are not merely a 
matter of theory. As discussed, unsound definitions and 
terminology can significantly impact on the interaction between 
professionals within fields and, especially, the interaction 
between those from various fields. Some of a proclaimed 
"practical disposition" might argue that "splitting hairs" about 
definitions and terminology is a waste of time and effort. On the 
contrary, in the same way that the conceptualisation phase in a 
project can make or break its eventual success", fundamental 
definitions and conceptualisations can facilitate or severely 
hamper intradisciplihary and interdisciplinary applications. 
It is of great practical importance that people who are 
attempting to work together understand the substance of their 
communications. In the same way that communication is paramount 
in an organisation, it is paramount in effectively and 
efficiently solving a multidisciplinary problem. The words used, 
and that which is understood by them, after all, li~ at the heart 
4 ~Good conceptualisation facilitates smooth implementation. 
The better one plans and sets oneself up initially, the more 
smoothly one's venture will progress. Poor planning and 
conceptualisation are associated with unnecessary scope changes 
during implementation, resulting in cost and complication that 
could have been avoided. 
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of communication. 
2.6.3 Illustration Using Medicine and Psychology 
Not only those involved in interdisciplinary work, but also all 
those involved exclusively within fields which interact with 
others, can contribute to better interdisciplinary integration 
and refinement (for reasons discussed). Figure 3 (next page) 
illustrates an example of the interaction of fields and the 
potential for refinement that this creates. An extract of the 
interactive relationships between (mainstream) medicine and 
psychology is depicted, as encompassed by HMM. An intersectoral 
interactive cluster within medicine, which interacts with a 
similar interactive cluster within psychology·, features. 43 
Certain inherently interdisciplinary sciences that emerge from 
some of these interactions, are also indicated. 44 
On a small-system intersectoral level, the areas of (mainstream) 
medicine, viz psychiatry, paediatrics and neurology, can inform 
and enrich one another, and the areas within psychology, viz 
4
'The interactive relationships within the discipline, law, 
have been discussed supra. The potential for medium-system 
intersectoral refinement between the laws of different states 
within the United States of America, is also depicted, per 
illustration. The same principles enunciated under 2.4 and 2.5 
supra apply to this process. 
44 The origin of forensic medicine (an application of medical 
expertise in the context of law) is indicated. Similarly, the 
origin of forensic psychology (the application of .psychological 
expertise in the context of law) is noted. The reason for the 
downward arrows' representing the origin of only a part of heal th 
law, is that health law encompasses more than just law applied 
to the field of medicine and the field of psychology; see the 
discussion infra, chapter III· under 3.2.1.3, for details. 
Finally, the origin of part of health psychology is reflected in 
the bidirectional interface between medicine and psychology. It 
should be noted that this interface covers more than just a part 
of that field, however; the interactions between clinical 
psychiatry and clinical psychology regarding certain aspects of 
psychopathology, for.instance, would not necessarily involve any 
aspect of health psychology. - · 
e.g. 
e.g. 
e.g. 
South Mrk:an .... 
P~-.i--4--- Small-system intersectoral interaction ~~~ 
Interdisciplinary 
interaction 
Origin of part of 
Health Psychology 
e.g. 
e.g. 
Cllnlc:.i 
....._ ____ __... intersectoral interaction -4-1--------' 
Origin of 
Forensic Psychology 
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clinical psychology, developmental psychology and cognitive 
psychology, can similarly inform and enrich one another. Then, 
on an interdisciplinary level, all the intersectoral enrichment 
that has taken place in each field, can in turn enrich the other 
field. 
The corresponding subdisciplines especially have potential for 
mutual enrichment: clinical psychiatry and clinical psychology, 
for instance, both involve intervention in psychological/ 
behavioural problems; cognitive psychology and neurology have a 
significant overlap in so far as certain functions of the brain 
are concerned; developmental psychology and paediatrics have a 
significant overlap in so far as children at various stages of 
development are involved. 
Nevertheless, each part in the· intradisciplinary cluster can 
enrich any part of a cluster in the other discipline. For 
example, although developmental psychology and paediatrics would 
have the closest interactive interdisciplinary relationship, 
experience in the field of clinical psychology, as such, would 
also have the potential directly to enrich applications of 
paediatric medicine. 45 
In sum, although each sector in its respective position within 
the cluster has the most direct interdisciplinary relationship 
with its respective counterpart, all sectors have the potential 
for multilateral intra- and interdisciplinary refinement. 
2.6.4 The Crux: Continuous, Reciprocally Enriching Collaboration 
In addition to having regard to law and management, any 
professional field must also pay careful attention to fields 
related to it. The HMM approach invites professionals to maintain 
perspective beyond the confines of their specialised fields in 
40
'For instance, cases that involve child psychopathology. 
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order to promote interdisciplinary harmony and efficient 
specialist collaboration. Moreover, such perspective continuously 
creates opportunities for intradisciplinary enrichment. 
One of the fundamental principles of project management is that 
the activities within an organisation must not lose touch with 
the overall strategic goals of the organisation. Projects within 
an organisation, apart from having their own goals and 
objectives, must remain aligned with the strategic aims of the 
organisation as a whole. This principle features in HMM in that 
there must be the following constant underlying strategic purpose 
in any multidisciplinary venture: apart from solving the specific 
problem at hand, the process should be aligned with the strategic 
purpose of interdisciplinary development and the continuous 
improvement of interactions and results. 
It is in the interest of all to aim to develop, refine and 
streamline endeavours within fields and in their interactions. 
The more refinement there could be on the intradisciplinary 
level, the more efficient and effective the integration and 
application on the interdisciplinary level would be rendered. 
Sound multidisciplinary interaction, in turn, enriches all the 
fields of expertise involved, not to mention the experts 
themselves. Moreover, the most significant beneficiaries of 
holistic multidisciplinary development, are those whom the 
disciplines serve. The benefits of the effects of successful HMM 
are not only numerous, but also of dire importance to those who 
rely, sometimes with their very lives, on those to whom 
multidisciplinary efficiency and effectiveness have been 
entrusted. 
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CHAPTER II 
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY IN CONTEXT 
1 Psychiatry: A Specialised Subfield of Medicine 
In the light of the discussion in the previous chapter, it is 
appropriate to take the opportunity in this chapter critically 
to discuss and to clarify some fundamental terms and definitions 
relating to clinical psychiatry. Since clinical psychiatry forms 
part of the broader subfield of "psychiatry" within medicine, 
psychiatry should first be defined. 
According to Dirckx et a1 46 , "psychiatry" is "the medical 
specialty concerned with the diagnosis and treatment of mental 
disorders" 47 • This definition is too narrow - it does not reflect 
the full scope of modern psychiatry. Although the term 
"psychiatry" 
(mind) and 
is essentially a synthesis of the Greek psyche 
iatreia (care/treatment), the modern field of 
psychiatry is broader, involving more than just the diagnosis and 
treatment of "mental disorders". 
Anderson, Anderson and Glanze48 define "psychiatry" as "the branch 
of medical science that deals with the causes, 'treatment and 
prevention of mental, emotional and behavioural problems". This 
definition is a more accurate reflection of the scope of modern 
psychiatry. "Psychiatry", in spite of the precise narrow 
derivational meaning of the word, has indeed grown to involve not 
only diagnosis and treatment, but also strategies for prevention, 
along with theories and research on the causes (aetiology) of 
4
'Dirckx J (Ed) Stedman's Concise Medical and Allied Health 
Dictionary (3 ed) Baltimore: Williams and Wilkens (1997). 
47The desirability of the term "mental disorder" is 
discussed infra under 2.2.2. 
4
"Anderson KN, Anderson LE and Glanze WD (Eds) Mosby's 
Medical, Nursing and Allied Health Dictionary (4 ed) St Louis: 
Mosby (1994) at 1296. 
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psychological/behavioural problems. Apart from this, the broader 
field of psychiatry has adopted a few different guises involving 
more than the diagnosis and treatment of psychopathology. 
Forensic psychiatry49 is an example of one of these. 
2 Clinical Psychiatry 
2.1 Definition 
The branch specifically dealing with the diagnosis and treatment 
of "mental disorders'', would be "clinical psychiatry". The word 
"clinical" is also derived from Greek: kline meaning "bedside". 
In various professional contexts, this word has come to apply to 
the diagnosis and treatment of living persons as if "at the 
bedside". Prima facie the term "clinical psychiatry" would then 
appear to be etymologically tautologous. In modern reality, 
however, it is not, since the word "clinical" must be added when 
it is necessary to distinguish "clinical psychiatry" from the 
broader term "psychiatry". The definition that Dirckx et al 50 
furnish for "psychiatry" would thus actually then amount to the 
definition of ""clinical psychiatry": "the medical specialty 
concerned with the diagnosis and treatment of [psychopathology]". 
2.2 "Psychopathology" and "Mental Disorder" 
2.2.1 Definition 
It is clear that the phenomenon described as a "mental disorder" 
is central to clinical psychiatry. "Psychopathology" is basically 
4
'.'Discussed in Chapter I I I infra. 
00Supra 29. 
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a synonym for the term "mental disorder". The DSM IV-TR51 
describes rather than defines "mental disorder" 52 : 
11 
••• it must be admitted that no definition adequately 
specifies precise boundaries for the concept of 'mental 
disorder 1 " ••• each of the mental disorders is 
conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral 
or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an 
individual and that is associated with present 
''
1American Psychiatric Association (APA) Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4 ed - Text Revision) 
Washington: APA (2000). This is probably the most widely 
recognised and accepted classification system of "mental 
disorders". DSM I was first published in 1952. Since then, the 
many problems and shortcomings have been sought to be eradicated 
by numerous task groups. The DSM has made tremendous advances in 
the area of classification of psychopathology and has met 
worldwide, though not unanimous, approval. The World Health 
Organisation's classification system, the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD), also includes a classification 
system for psychopathology. In South Africa, the DSM is accepted 
as a primary authority in the diagnosis and definition of 
psychopathology. See, for instance, Louw DA (Ed) Suid-Afrikaanse 
Handboek van Abnormale Gedrag Johannesburg: Southern ( 1989). 
After stating that classification is an integral part of science 
and human experience, Barlow DH & Durand VM Abnormal Psychology: 
an integrative approach Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole (1995) 
indicate that most mental health professionals use the 
nosological system contained in the DSM. They describe it as the 
most advanced nosological system that the world has ever seen. 
"·'.:American Psychiatric Association DSM-IV-TR Washington: APA 
( 2000) xxx-xxxi. 
''
1King NA "The .Role of Culture in Psychology: A Look at 
Mental Illness and the 'Cultural Defense'" Tulsa J Comp & Int L 
(Fall, 1999) asserts that though classification of "mental 
illness" is not universal, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD), reflecting the official nomenclature for the 
classification of "mental disorders" for application in a wide 
variety of contexts, have received validation among numerous 
sectors. King states that "mental illness" has in fact been 
defined within the limits of the DSM and ICD: The Comprehensive 
Glossary of Psychiatry and Psychology defines "mental illness" 
as "any serious impairment of adjustment; any psychiatric 
disorder listed in the American Psychiatric Association's 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or in the 
World Health Organization's International Classification of 
Diseases." 
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distress ... or disability ... or with a significantly 
increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or 
important loss of freedom. In addition, this ... must not 
be merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned 
response to a particular event. Whatever its original 
cause, it must currently be considered a manifestation 
of a behavioural, psychological, or biological 
dysfunction in the individual ... " 
The crux of the latter notions is that the manifestation must be 
a significant deviation from the norm in the particular context 
of the indi victual. It is submitted that the concept 
"psychopathology"/"mental disorder" may be concisely defined as 
"any clinically significant abnormal condition manifesting 
psychologically or behaviourally".~ The inclusion of the words 
"clinically significant" in the furnished definition is due to 
the fact that, before a phenomenon can qualify as 
psychopathology, it must be sufficiently deviant from "normal 1155 
'
4However, the term "psychopathology" can also be used to 
refer to the study of such abnormal conditions. Although that 
usage is actually technically closer to the etymology of the 
word, ie psycho - mind + pathos - disease/disorder + logos -
study, the "-logy" suffix has developed (in medical terminology 
and ordinary grammar) to be often used also to denote the actual 
phenomenon, not only the "study thereof". Although the 
classification of something as psychopathology depends on a 
psychological/psychological-behavioural manifestation, it is, as 
will be discussed, inevitably related to many factors, including 
possible physical pathology. 
'·"Adjudicating on the matter of what should be considered 
"normal" is a difficult task - especially in multicultural 
societies such as South Africa and the United States. King (op 
cit 224) points out that culture is, and indeed should be, 
receiving greater attention as the international arena converges. 
She avers that it is not until the impact of culture is 
universally recognised in all fields, that humankind will be able 
to broaden its visions and deepen its insights. In psychiatry and 
psychology, especially, culture is a factor that cannot be 
omitted from the process of interpreting behaviour. King (ibid 
201) correctly asserts that a collection of signs and symptoms 
cannot simply be universally accepted as indicative of 
abnormality - there are immense- differences in the degree of 
their acceptability from one culture to the next. She furnishes 
the example of an elderly Neapolitan cobbler who comes to a 
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unimpaired human behaviour to warrant clinical , intervention. 
"Clinical" intervention then, in the present author's estimation, 
involves any type of integrated treatment strategy aimed at 
ameliorating the condition or it$ effects. 
2.2.2 Desirability of the Term: "Mental Disorder" 
The term "mental disorder" is in current, albeit reluctant, use. 
The DSM56 itself states that 11 ••• the term mental disorder 
unfortunately implies a distinction between mental disorders and 
'physical ' disorders that is a reductionistic anachronism of 
mind/body dualism. A compelling literature documents that there 
is much physical .. in mental ... and much mental ... in physical[.] 
The problem raised by the term 'mental' disorders has been much 
clearer than its solution, and, unfortunately, the. term persists 
in the title of DSM-IV because we have not found an appropriate 
hospital clinic with a rambling story, wandering from headaches 
and listlessness to an old woman who has made him sick. The 
cobbler is referred to the psychiatric department. The 
examination reveals some detail about the perceived "enemy" and 
how long she has wished him ill and how "she makes his head 
hurt". The psychiatrist interprets this as an indication of a 
persecutory delusion. To be sure, an interpreter is summoned. A 
fluent Italian-Amer1can subsequently explains that the man is 
illiterate and believes the woman to be a witch who has cast the 
evil eye on him - the apparent delusion is nothing more than a 
bit of superstition typical of some parts of Neapolitan society. 
What constitutes a normal belief there might thus be interpreted 
as a psychotic symptom in an American hospital. King (ibid 212-
213) acknowledges that distinguishing between truly pathological 
reactions on one hand, and behaviour sanctioned by society on the 
other, is a difficult endeavour - for example, according to her, 
Puerto Rican persons, whose culture encourages hyperverbal, 
hyperactive behaviour and easy expression of emotions, have 
sometimes been erroneously considered as manic or acutely 
schizophrenic. Indeed, physicians must be aware of their own 
potential cultural biases in their approach to psychopathology. 
This is particularly true in the South African context. Taking 
cultural factors into account .should be demanded by basic 
standards of practice. If this were so to be established, 
misdiagnoses due to an unreasonable disregard of cultural factors 
could then form the basis of malpractice. 
'American Psychiatric Association DSM-IV-TR Washington: APA 
(2000) xxx. 
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substitute." 
The present author contends that the term, in addition, 
particularly lends itself to stigma, and does not adequately 
uphold the dignity57 of those to whom it is ascribed. Moreover, it 
is submitted that .it can have countertherapeutic effects. 58 
Persons whose problems justify psychiatric intervention, are 
further encumbered by having to see themselves as "somebody with 
a mental disorder". The term "mental disorder" is indubitably not 
conducive to positive self-appraisal. Ironically, especially 
psychologists and psychiatrists should be sensitive to the impact 
that choice of words can have on people. These professionals 
should well know that the interpretation of combinations of words 
contains an intellectual component as well as a potentially very 
powerful emotional component. 59 
0
'
7 Upholding any person Is dignity is not only important per 
se, but is also firmly entrenched as a fundamental right in 
section 10 of the Constitution: "Everyone has inherent dignity 
and the right to have their dignity respected and protected." 
58The attitudes that both afflicted persons and the 
community have towards "mental disorders" can be extremely 
significant. As Dr TA Lambo, a psychiatrist who started a 
therapeutic village in Nigeria, stressed: "[O)ne of the most 
important culturql factors which influences or determines the 
nature of treatment is community attitudes. Community attitudes 
towards emotional disorder ... may considerably influence what 
action the patient takes about his disability, and even the 
content and evolution of his ... symptoms. They may impede free 
communication of his emotional (inner) experiences without the 
knowledge of which proper diagnosis of his condition is 
impossible." See King NA "The Role of Culture in Psychology: A 
Look at Mental Illness and the 'Cultural Defense'"· Tulsa J Comp 
& Int L (Fall, 1999) 210. According to King, Lambo's experience 
in Africa revealed that the greater the confidence of the 
community with respect to both the treatment and the people who 
treat them, the more readily they come forward for treatment or 
encourage their relatives to do so. 
r:'King (ibid 211) points out that underutilisation of mental 
health services is common throughout many societies. She avers 
that in many cultures, for example Southeast Asia, individuals 
are reluctant to admit to or discuss their own or family members' 
psychiatric problems.. Stigma, which is part and parcel of the 
labels attached to phenomena and the words by which they are 
described, indeed has an impact that must not be underestimated. 
The present author contends that the mental health professions 
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This is an instance where the field of health psycpology60 should 
enrich clinical psychology and psychiatry. The scope of health 
psychology includes assessing and attempting to ameliorate the 
effect that the actions of health professionals have on their 
clients. A great part of this involves the substance and method 
of communication. That psychiatric clients will be exposed to 
commonly used terminology such as 11 disorder 11 , is mostly 
unavoidable. 61 Apart from the controversial situation that clients 
may, in appropriate cases, have insight into their personal 
records62 , the term "disorder" is in common usage in the popular 
media. Conditions such as "bipolar disorder" and 11 obsessive-
compulsive disorder" are well-known. 
The word 11 disorder 11 is clearly not a friendly one - it can quite 
easily be perceived as having a strong negative quality that 
could, it is submitted, have a powerfully destructive impact on 
an individual's self-appraisal. 63 Moreover, the description of 
someone as "having obsessive-compulsive disorder" or "having 
bipolar disorder", for instance, compounds the risk of making the 
should evolve to a level where using insensitive and 
unnecessarily harsh terms to describe conditions, would 
constitute poor practice, and, in clear cases, even malpractice. 
'
0 see the discussion infra in chapter III, 3.2.1.3. 
~ 1Almost all the diagnosable conditions in the DSM contain 
the word 11 disorder 11 ; exceptions are, for instance, 
"schizophrenia" and 11 pica 11 • 
,;_:Section 32 of the Constitution (right of access to 
information) has the effect that persons have access to their 
medical records (see also The Promotion of Access to Information 
Act 2 of 2000). However, like ali fundamental rights, the right 
is not absolute - it can be limited in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution. For a discussion on access to medical records in 
the psychiatric context, see Coetzee LC Medical Therapeutic 
Privilege (LLM dissertation, University of South Africa, 2001) 
156-164. 
''with regard to labelling individuals, Barlow and Durand 
correctly assert that, once labelled, a client may be inclined 
to identify with the negative connotations associated with the 
label, negatively affecting his or her self-esteem; see Barlow 
DH & Durand VM Abnormal Psychology: an integrative approach 
Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole (1995) 112. 
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error commonly ref erred to as reif ication of diagnostic 
categories. 
Barlow and Durand64 note reification as an important danger 
inherent in the "diagnosis" of "mental disorders". It involves 
seeing "mental disorders" as definite 11 things 1165 that exist in the 
same way as infectious diseases, for instance. One of the 
dangers, then, is that clinicians might force a manifested 
behavioural 11 disorder 11 into one category or another, on the 
mistaken assumption that everything must 11 fit" somewhere. 66 
Instead of seeing diagnostic categories for that which they are: 
convenient methods for organising observations of human behaviour 
and emotions, some clinicians may become inclined to view the 
"disorders" that clinical science has created from grouping and 
classifying clusters of signs and symptoms, as concretely 
existing entities, akin to a physical disease. 
Mental manifestations are inherently diverse and, although there 
may be many correlations in the progression of similar conditions 
in various individuals, people would be more aptly described as 
having features of a specific type of "condition", rather than 
one cast-in-stone, specifically diagnosable "disorder". 67 
'"·Reification literally means "making into things 11 (legal 
scholars and practitioners will immediately discern the 
connection to the Latin res): perceiving an abstract "mental 
disorder" as something which exists concretely in that specific 
form, classifiable more or less in the same way as a breed of dog 
or a typical-course infectious disease. 
,:,;Reification of diagnostic labels can result in a psycho-
therapist• s perceiving a client's situation through distorted 
spectacles, unduly riob~erving" what he or she expects to see, 
while overlooking other important details. 
'
7 Individual differences and differences across societies 
and cultures lead to inevitable, striking variations in 
manifestations. See King NA "The Role of Culture in Psychology: 
A Look at Mental Illness and the 'Cultural Defense'" Tulsa J Comp 
& Int L (Fall, 1999) 206, where she acknowledges that compelling 
evidence exists that although "psychiatric disorders" are 
panhuman phenomena, the manner in which these are experienced is 
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Accordingly, it is submitted that it is unsound to describe 
someone as "having obsessive-compulsive disorder••, for instance. 
It would be more accurate to state that someone has nan 
obsessive-compulsive condition" , rather than "obsessive-
compulsive disorder". The latter sounds much more like a definite 
specific disease with definite specific elements. The diagnostic 
criteria in the DSM should thus rather indicate a diagnosis of "a 
bipolar (type I) condition", for instance, rather' than "bipolar 
I disorder" . 68 
It is submitted that the word "condition" is a much "friendlier" 
word than the word "disorder". It is also not foreign - it has 
been used on many occasions in a variety of medical contexts. 
This dissertation will, accordingly, refer to X and Y "types of 
conditions", rather than X and Y "disorder". It is suggested that 
clinical psychiatry and psychology should evolve to do the same. 69 
linked to the social context in which the individual lives. This 
is not even to mention the individual's unique personal 
characteristics. With regard to social context, she furnishes the 
following example: A study by the World Heal th Organisation (WHO) 
found a better outcome among patients with schizophrenia in 
developing countries, faring far better than patients in North 
America and Europe. There is a belief that such .11 major mental 
illness 11 is almost inevitably chronic and incurable. However, 
research has revealed that many 11 severe forms of mental illness 11 
have remarkably dissimilar progressions, ranging from complete 
recovery, to serious disability. Social and cultural factors, not 
to mention individual personality, have a very significant role 
in the manifestation and course of any "mental disorder 11 • 
c
8Numerous scholars in psychology even contend that it is 
dehumanising and judgmental in any way to assign a term to a 
person with a particular cluster of problems. It is submitted, 
however, that some scholars go too far when they suggest that no 
psychopathology can be seen to exist in reality and that no 
condition can in any way be objectively assessed; see the 
discussion infra under 2.3. 
,;'.'Strategies to avoid personal and social stigmatisation 
have to some extent made their way into psychotherapeutic 
practice. There has, for instance, emerged a tendency to refer 
to the person utilising psychotherapeutic services as 11 the 
client 11 rather than 11 the patient". Exactly what the impact of 
this is on the clients themselves and the general public, is 
difficult to ascertain empirically. Nevertheless, ,the notion of 
a "person making use of professional medical services 11 as being 
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Standards of practice are central to determining when there has 
been malpractice. This dissertation therefore must have regard 
to, and comment on, relevant elements of psychiatric practice. 70 
The question that presently arises is then which term could 
replace the undesirable "mental disorder". 
a "client" accords with modern trends in health-care delivery. 
Moreover, if one considers the 11 sick 11 connotations to the word 
"patient" and that it is, after all, derived from the present 
participle stem pati- of the Latin verb "to suffer" (see Rooney 
K (Ed) The Encarta World English Dictionary London: Bloomsbury 
(1999) 1383), the term "client" is clearly a friendlier one. 
Whereas the word "patient" may be more inclined to cause a person 
to feel like a suffering victim with whom there is something 
11 wrong 11 , the term 11 client 11 is more likely to inspire feelings of 
autonomy and dignity the person chooses to engage the 
professional services of a medical practitioner, and has "a say" 
and a role to play in that process. Although the use of the word 
11 client 11 in some instances may lead to rather unusual results, 
it is submitted that its use does not give rise to any practical 
problems. It is, however, submitted that there is one instance 
in which 11 client 11 is inappropriate, viz where a person is treated 
against his or her will. A client is someone who chooses to take 
someone else's advice - an "involuntary/unwilling ,client" seems 
a contradiction in terms. Since the instances where a person is 
treated against his or her will are extremely limited (see 
chapter IV infra), those persons could perhaps still, 
proportionally exceptionally, be referred to as "patients" -
after all, in addition to whatever else might ail them, they also 
suffer a significant curtailment of autonomy. Such a distinction 
in nomenclature might even augment the exceptionality of those 
instances. Nevertheless, it is suggested, in the interests of 
furthering feelings of dignity and freedom, that all voluntary 
health-care consumers be described as clients rather than 
patients. The terms py which people choose to describe concepts 
are intimately and inherently connected to the 11 feel 11 created 
within that sphere. Encouraging the use of more appropriate 
terminology may have a very significant contribution to make in 
effecting paradigm shifts. Considering that a human-rights 
culture, placing emphasis on dignity, equality and freedom/ 
autonomy, is sought to be cultivated in South Africa, encouraging 
health professionals to pay attention to a relatively minor 
detail such as using the term 11 client 11 , which requires a personal 
mental paradigm shift, might hence contribute to the broader 
paradigm shift desired for the larger health-care system. 
70If the description of someone as "having a disorder" were 
to be rejected in standard psychiatric practice, it would then 
be potentially legally actionable malpractice overtly to label 
someone as "having a disorder''· It is here suggested that such 
rejection is indicated. See further the discussion statim infra. 
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2.2.3 Alternative to the Term: "Mental Disorder" 
It is submitted that adding one word and a few syllables will 
exponentially more accurately reflect the nature and complexity 
of what are imprecisely and rather callously described as "mental 
disorders". The alternative here suggested is not particularly 
user-friendly, but it need not be user-friendly it must 
imperatively be psychologically friendly. 
It should be empha~ised to any client who is capable of the 
necessary comprehension that he or she does not "have a mental 
disorder", but that his or her condition is a result of the 
complex interactions between his or her body, mind and 
environment - it is a biopsychosocial71 condition. Because it 
warrants clinical intervention, however, the inclusion of the 
word "clinical" in the term is necessitated, since it is only 
those conditions that feature in a clinical context that would be 
included in a diagnostic manual. 72 The 
condition" on its own would actually 
term 11 bi6spsychosocial 
include virtually any 
condition which a person may experience. The term "clinical 
biopsychosocial condition" ("CBC") 73 is thus suggested as a viable 
71A term used, for instance, by Paris J "Personality 
Disorders: A Biopsychosocial Model" Journal of Personality 
Disorders 7 (3) (1993). As will shortly be elaborated, it is 
submitted that this term can have general application. Virtually 
every condition which may be classified as a "mental disorder" 
depends on a complex interaction between biological factors, 
psychological factors and social factors. Importantly, the order 
in which these appear is not intended to emphasise any one set 
of factors as more important than the others. In many conditions, 
it will be quite clear which factors dominate; nevertheless, 
other factors will invariably be involved. The clinical 
conditions that are so precipitated and maintained are indeed 
"clinical biopsychosocial conditions". 
7
.::If the term "clinical biopsychosocial condi:tion" were to 
be adopted, the DSM would still be called the DSM (diagnostic and 
statistical manual); however, its full name would then be the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Clinical Biopsychosocial 
Conditions, rather than the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders. 
7 jThe initialism "CBC" is also used to denote other 
concepts. For instance, in medicine it refers to "complete blood 
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alternative to "mental disorder". Taking into account an 
individual's self-appraisal, he or she can then consider himself 
or herself as having a "clinical condition 11 , rather than a 
"mental disorder". The term CBC .is, it is submitted, more than 
representative of the phenomenon of psychopathology. Admittedly 
it is a very broad term - actually broad enough to encompass 
virtually any medical condition. However, it is suggested that 
the context of the use of CBC will distinguish it from other 
conditions where psychological and social factors do not play as 
prominent a role. Whereas "mental 11 is too narrow74 , it is widely 
accepted that that which manifests as psychopathology depends on 
the dynamic interplay between biological, psychological and 
social factors. Moreover, the term 11 biopsychosocial 11 is not 
charged with negative connotations, as is the word "mental" as 
used in the context of mental illness, defect, disease or 
disorder. 
It may take decades for the general public not to stigmatise 
"people with mental disorders". Professionals, on the other hand, 
constantly have the opportunity to improve terminology and to 
limit stigmatising appellations. In the present dissertation, the 
terms 11 client 1175 and "CBC" /"condition" will hence be employed 
wherever possible. 
2.3 Desirability of Classification 
Al though it is evident that there are inherent dangers in 
classification, the need for a classification system is 
count", and in management to "cumulative budgeted cost". This is 
not problematic, since the context would invariably clearly 
reveal which usage is intended, just as ADR ("adverse drug 
reaction") and ADR ("alternative dispute resolution"), for 
instance, create no confusion in the medical-malpractice context. 
-
4See also, for instance, the definition of Anderson et al, 
supra under 1. 
70
'See fn 69 supra. 
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indisputable. Without common points of reference, terminology, 
definitions and clinical descriptions, it would be very difficult 
for research and experience regarding clinical biopsychosocial 
phenomena to be compiled and utilised to the benefit of all. 76 In 
diagnosis, one is necessarily required in some way to identify a 
particular possible crystallised collection of features in order 
to gain insight from research conducted on similar behavioural 
manifestations. Overtly "labeling" a client in the course of 
treatment should, however, be avoided. 77 
2.4 Clinical and Legal Terms 
As HMM suggests, the law should also employ termi~ology that is 
sensitive to the people whom it serves, and is soundly harmonious 
on the interdisciplinary level. There has been much written and 
said regarding distinguishing cleariy between legal and clinical 
definitions and terms. 78 However, the more congruence and mutual 
understanding there could be between law and the clinical 
sciences, the better subtle distinctions could be drawn. It is 
submitted that the definitions themselves should be shared as far 
as possible, although the purpose for which they are applied may 
be vastly different. There is no reason why the law should, for 
instance, speak of "insanity" (as is common in the United States 
- NGRI is the standard initialism to denote "not guilty by reason 
76Cultural diversity, in the context of classification, is 
indeed acknowledged in the DSM-IV-TR. It has "incorporated an 
awareness that the manual is used in culturally diverse 
populations in the United States and internationally." DSM-IV-TR 
identifies with how challenging it can be for clinicians from one 
ethnic or cultural background "to evaluate an individual from a 
different ethnic or cultural group". See King NA "The Role of 
Culture in Psychology: A Look at Mental Illness and the •cultural 
Defense'" Tulsa J Comp & Int L (Fall, 1999) 215. 
77 See fn 6 3 supra. 
78 See, for instj:mce, Gillmer, BT, Louw DA & Verschoor T 
"Forensic expertise: the psychological perspective" SACJ (1995) 
267. 
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of insanity") 79 when this term has. long since been rejected in the 
clinical sciences. 80 Rather, the crux of the matter in "the 
insanity defense'' is the person's disability at the time of the 
act: this is the extent to which the alleged CBC must affect the 
person - an incapacitating extent; the law defines the type of 
incapacity required,.while psychiatry determines whether the CBC 
in question could have that effect. The effect is "disability" or 
11 incapacity 11 , and could soundly be so described without creating 
interdisciplinary disharmony. It is submitted that 11 NGRI 11 should 
rather be 11 ICBC 11 ("Incapacity due to Clinical Biopsychosocial 
Condition"). 
It is appropriate now to turn to the discussion of, the interface 
between law and psychiatry, and the place of malpractice law 
therein. 
7
"It is notable that, in South Africa, the Rumpff 
Commission, as long ago as 1967, rejected the term 11 insanity 11 ; 
see the Rumpff Commission of Inquiry: Certai,n Views and 
Recommendations into the Responsiblity of Mentally Deranged 
Persons and Related Matters (RP69/1967). 
H°For an example of the negative impression that the law 1 s 
and/or lawyers 1 dislocation from clinical terminology can create, 
see Sevilla CM (an attorney at law in San Diego, CA) "Anti-Social 
Personality Disorder: Justification for the Death Penalty?" J 
Contemp Legal Issues 247 (1999, 10): "[I]f the person is mad and 
lacks the ability to choose to conform to societal rules, 
conviction and punishment for crime is [sic] not warranted; 
rather, treatment of the incapacitating condition seems 
appropriate for the truly insane person. A partially mad person, 
whose mental condition does not satisfy the test of insanity, can 
be convicted and punished, but either the degree of the crime or 
the harshness of the punishment should be subject to mitigation. 11 
CHAPTER III 
PSYCHIATRIC MALPRACTICE IN CONTEXT: 
THE INTERFACE BETWEEN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 
1 Introduction 
There is a multifaceted interface between psychiatry and the law, 
both from psychiatry to law81 and from law to psychiatry. From the 
former, in other words, psychiatry applied in legal contexts, 
emanates the field known as forensic psychiatry. 82 From the 
81Haslett et al aver that psychiatry has closer links with 
the law than most other branches· of medicine, particularly due 
to the fact that psychiatric problems sometimes impair judgment 
to the extent that persons are not considered fully responsible 
for their actions. See Haslett C (Ed) Davidson's Principles and 
Practice of Medicine (18 ed) Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone 
(1999) at 1096. 
H:cAccording to Rieber RW and Vetter HJ The Psychological 
Foundations of Criminal Justice New York: John Jay Press (1978), 
the first American forensic psychiatric text (which emphasised 
medical causes of deviant behaviour) was published already in 
1812, by Benjamin Rush. Early forensic psychiatry focussed mainly 
on 11 insanity 11 (now most correctly regarded as an archaic term -
see supra 41-42) as a defence in criminal law, as well as 
attempting to explain criminal behaviour. The scope of forensic 
psychiatry has since expanded significantly. Examples of 
interaction and problems related thereto, both old and new, 
abound; see, for instance, Glueck S Law and Psychiatry: Cold War 
or Entente Cordiale Baltimore: John Hopkins Press (1962) (where 
he discusses some dilemmas in the "partnership" between law and 
psychiatry), and Freedman AM & Halpern AL "Professionalism, 
Mental Disability, and the Death Penalty: the Erosion of Ethics 
and Morality in Medicine: Physician Participation in Legal 
Executions in the United States" 41 NY L Sch L Rev (1996), where 
these two psychiatrists discuss what they see as an erosion of 
ethical standards in the practice of medicine: they refer to the 
report of the American Medical Association (AMA) Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) that was adopted by the AMA 
as policy (entitled "Physician Participation in Capital 
Punishment: Evaluation of Prisoner Competence to be Executed; 
Treatment to Restore Competence to be Executed 11 • According to 
Freedman and Halpern, the prior prohibition of psychiatrists' 
participation in legally authorised executions is virtually 
nullified by that CEJA Report. It declares as ethical the 
examination of death-row inmates for competence to be executed, 
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latter, in other words, law applied to the field of psychiatry, 
emanates a field, ·which, it is submitted, may be termed 
"psychiatric jurisprudence". These two directions of the 
interface will next be dealt with respectively. 
2 Forensic Psychiatry 
2.1 The Definition and Scope of Forensic Psychi~try 
Kaplan and Sadock83 state that "the intermix of law and 
psychiatry, called forensic psychiatry, includes problems of 
credibility of witnesses, culpability of accused persons, 
competency to make a will, contract, to take care of oneself or 
one 1 s property, or to stand trial; compensation of injured 
persons; and custody of children". They also note the matter of 
assisting in jury selection as an instance encompassed by 
forensic psychiatry. It is submitted that these indeed all fall 
within the scope of forensic psychiatry. However, as will be 
discussed, strictly speaking, the "intermix of law anci; 
psychiatry" is broader than "forensic psychiatry". 
In a later publication, Kaplan and Sadock (this time with 
Professor Jack Grebb) more accurately state that "forensic 
psychiatry is the branch of medicine that deals with [clinical 
and advocates the concept that "a psychiatrist is not a 
psychiatrist" when performing evaluations for the state. 
According to Freedman and Halpern, the notion that "a 
psychiatrist is not a psychiatrist" in the forensic setting is 
a recent concept in American literature. It is apparently based 
on an article by psychiatrist Paul Appelbaum, entitled, "The 
Parable of the Forensic Psychiatrist: Ethics and the Problem of 
Doing Harm". In this article, Appelbaum states: "The forensic 
psychiatrist in truth does not act as a physician. If the essence 
of the physician's role is to promote healing and/or to relieve 
suffering, it is apparent that the forensic psychiatrist operates 
outside the scope of that role." It is clear that the complex 
elements in the interface between law and psychiatry continue to 
lead to disparity and conflict. 
"'see Kaplan HI and Sadock BJ Clinical Psychiatry Baltimore: 
Williams and Wilkins (1988) 512. 
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condition] s of the mind and their relation to legal principles". 84 
However, this definition is too narrow: not every matter in 
forensic psychiatry would necessarily involve a clinical 
condition as such. For example, where a psychiatrist might become 
involved in assisting with or evaluating a child's testimony, no 
clinical condition is concerned the expertise here would 
involve understanding earlier stages of cognitive' and emotional 
development. 
Simon' s 85 concise description is, it is submitted, correct: 
forensic psychiatry is "the application of psychiatry to legal 
issues for legal ends". The law applied to psychiatry (which is 
part of the "intermix of law and psychiatry") then, is not a 
branch of psychiatry, but rather a branch of law, namely 
"psychiatric jurisprudence". 86 
It is submitted that "forensic psychiatry" may be representa-
tively defined as "the integrative branch of psychiatry where 
there is specialised application of psychiatry in a legal 
context" (forensic literally means "of the courts of law", from 
the Latin forum). In its etymologically purest form, forensic 
84Kaplan HI, Sadock BJ & Grebb J Synopsis of Psychiatry (7 
ed) Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins (1994). Kaplan et al still, 
however, incorrectly discuss matters relating to the law applied 
to psychiatric practice under the chapter heading "Forensic 
Psychiatry". It is clear (also according to their definition) 
that these matters do not technically form part of forensic 
psychiatry. It is submitted that these matters would correctly 
fall within the realm of psychiatric jurisprudence. The first 
half of their chapter' on forensic psychiatry deals primarily with 
psychiatric jurisprudence, whilst the first part of the second 
half deals with forensic psychiatry, returning to psychiatric 
jurisprudence in the form of malpractice law just before the very 
end. The authors then conclude with two further examples of 
instances involving forensic psychiatry. The present author 
opines that the contents of this chapter should have been 
separated into two chapters, the other one being entitled 
"Psychiatric Jurisprudence". 
f"see Simon RI Clinical Psychiatry and the Law ( 2 ed) 
Washington: American Psychiatric Press (1992). 
H·see discussion infra under 3. 
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psychiatry would thus involve any aspect of legal interest on 
which a psychiatrist might be summoned to give specialised expert 
testimony, or be otherwise directly or indirectly involved in the 
forensic (court) process. 
Matters indeed covered by forensic psychiatry include mental 
capacity in private-law87 and criminal-law88 contexts; exploring 
the problems regarding, and assessing the value of, eyewitness 
testimony, offender ( 11 line-up 11 ) identification89 and eyewitness 
credibility90 ; exploring the psychological effects of emotional 
shock, personal insult, and physical injury; assessment following 
trauma for purposes of compensation for disability91 ; evaluations 
regarding the best interests of the child in, for instance, 
custody cases92 ; preparing traumatised or otherwise sensitive 
87This includes accountability for the purposes of a delict, 
and the capacity for concluding a contract or a will. 
88This includes the capacity to commit the offence in 
question, see, for instance, Slovenko R Psychiatry and Criminal 
Culpability New York: John Wiley and Sons (1995). Also included 
is the capacity to stand trial for an alleged offence, see the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, s 77, and for a more elaborate 
perspective: Snyman CR Criminal ~aw (4 ed) Durban: Butterworths 
(2002) 167-176; Campbell IG Mental Disorder and Criminal Law in 
Australia and New Zealand Sydney: Butterworths (1988) 98-116. 
8
'
1
see Eysenck MW and Keane MT Cognitive Psychology ( 3 ed) 
East Sussex: Psychology Press (1995) 190-195; their discussion 
includes suggestions as to how the most accurate information can 
be obtained during the police interview. This type of activity 
is actually more likely to be encompassed by forensic psychology, 
rather than forensic psychiatry. 
'"'Slovenko R Psychiatry and Criminal Culpability New York: 
John Wiley and Sons (1995) 259-272: In general, in the United 
States, psychiatric testimony as to the credibility of a witness 
(is he or she lying?), is not permissible; however, evidence as 
to the unreliability of eyewitness testimony (could he or she be 
making a mistake?) is permissible. 
nSee, for instance, Shapiro DL Forensic Psychological 
Assessment: An Integrative Approach Needham Heights: Allan and 
Bacon (1991) 239. 
'•..:see Berk L Child Development ( 4 ed) Needham Heights: Allan 
and Bacon (1997) 562-563. 
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witnesses for testimony." 
Apart from aspects of direct relevance to the courtroom, forensic 
psychiatry in the broader sense (but still within the furnished 
definition94 ) might involve explaining and predicting criminal 
behavioure, and the rehabilitation of offenders96 • Finally, there 
is also some scope for psychiatrists' informing the decisions of 
policy-makers in law as to the psychological implications of 
legal policies and provisions both in evaluating existing law and 
the need for new law. 97 
2.2 The Acceptance of Psychiatry by the Law, and Vice Versa 
2.2.1 The Acceptance of Psychiatry by the Law 
Psychiatric testimony is extensively featured in courts of law 
,, 'In line with the HMM approach, it is submitted that any 
application of psychiatry in a legal context should occur with 
integrative interdisciplinary perspective. It is, for instance, 
essential for psychiatrists to understand the legal effects of 
various statements. A different· choice of words, which might 
appear to have little significance from the perspective of the 
ordinary clinical psychiatrist, might have great significance to 
the lawyer. Forensic psychiatry must therefore, of necessity, 
have regard to relevant legal principles in order properly to 
fulfil its function. Moreover, Kaplan et al express the view that 
feelings of fear on the part of the psychiatrist in the courtroom 
can be tempered somewhat by insights into the process; see Kaplan 
HI Sadock BJ and Grebb J Synopsis of Psychiatry (7 ed) Baltimore: 
Williams and Wilkins ( 1994). Preparing the expert clinical 
psychiatrist witness for the courtroom could, for instance, be 
the task of a specialised forensic psychiatrist or psychologist, 
or a psycholegal consultant. 
';
4Ie "the integrative branch of psychiatry where there is 
specialised application of psychiatry in a legal context". 
''
0
'See Rieber RW and Vetter HJ The Psychological Foundations 
of Criminal Justice. New York: John Jay Press (1978). 
%See Campbell IG Mental Disorder and Criminal. Law in 
Australia and New Zealand Sydney: Butterworths (1988). 
"
7once again, this is a role that is more likely to be 
fulfilled by a forensic psychologist or psycholegal consultant, 
rather than a psychiatrist, however. 
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around the world98 , indicating an acknowledgement. of the need 
therefor and some acceptance of the value thereof. As might be 
expected, however, the value of the opinions of psychiatrists and 
psychologists, has also been vehe~ently challenged. 99 It is common 
cause that psychiatry and psychology are not the most concrete 
and exact of sciences. 100 This renders them susceptible to abstract 
"Hsouth African .courts have relied heavily on the testimony 
of experts in cases such as S v Kavin 1977 (2) SA 731 (W). As 
might be expected, the American courts have featured psychiatric 
testimony on a considerably larger scale. 
~"The following remarks of Diemont JA, in Stock v Stock 1981 
( 3) SA 1283 (A) 1296 D-E, demonstrate some doubt as to the 
objective value of such expert testimony: "The overall impression 
gained is that the witness was not always fair and that when she 
was shown to be wrong she became argumentative. Counsel was in 
my view justified in submitting that the Court did not take a 
sufficiently critical view of the evidence givep by the two 
psychologists. An expert in the field of psychology or psychiatry 
who is asked to testify in a case of this nature, a case in which 
difficult emotional, intellectual and psychological problems 
arise within the family, must be made to understand that he is 
there to assist the Court. If he is to be helpful he must be 
neutral. The evidence of such a witness is of little value where 
he, or she, is partisan and consistently asserts the cause of the 
party who calls him." 
1011Nevertheless, the rules of scientific evidence attempt to 
ensure the reliability of such evidence. See Grove WM & Barden 
RC "Protecting the Integrity of the Legal System: The 
Admissibility of Testimony From Mental Health Experts Under 
Daubert/Kumho Analyses" 5 Psych Pub Pol and L (March, 1999) 225-
226, where these authors comment on a leading case, Daubert v 
Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc 509 U S 579, 594-95 (1993) (setting out 
requirements for admissibility of scientific evidence): "In the 
Daubert (1993), Joiner (General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 1997), 
and Kumho (1999) cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has begun the 
long-overdue process of educating legal professionals in the 
essential, minimal characteristics of science. Six factors of 
scientific analysis, or indicia of testimonial reliability, can 
be distinguished in Daubert: 
1. Is the proposed theory, on which the testimony is to be based, 
testable .. ? 
2. Has the proposed theory been tested using valid and reliable 
procedures and with positive results? 
3. Has the theory been subjected to peer review? 
4. What is the known or potential error rate of the scientific 
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challenges not easily refutable with "hard evidence". It is not 
always easy for the expert to explain the complex basis for 
legitimate conclusions based on clinical judgment. 101 Nevertheless, 
psychiatrists are human, and make mistakes. It is also 
conceivable that, in a particular instance, the "mental-health 
opinion" of an intelligent lay person might even be superior to 
that of the psychiat'rist. 102 Being a psychiatrist does not endow 
one with the quality of omniscience, nor does it confer immunity 
to error. There will be excellent psychiatrists and, as in any 
profession, relatively less competent ones. 103 However, to 
theory or technique? 
5. What standards, controlling the technique's operation, 
maximize its validity? 
6. Has the theory been generally accepted as valid in the 
relevant scientific community? 
[T] hese features were not enumerated as an exhaustive list. 
Furthermore, the Daubert Court did not require trial judges to 
combine these factors algorithmically in deciding on 
admissibility, nor did they [sic] assign weights to the factors. 
Hence, it has been left to case law to clarify the proper 
application of Daubert." 
1n 
'Indeed, however, the most competent expert would be one 
who can explain him- or herself; see the discussion of HMM in 
chapter 1 supra. 
1
'
1
-see Slovenko R Psychiatry and Criminal Culpability New 
York: John Wiley and Sons (1995) at 226, where the work of Jay 
Ziskin is mentioned. Ziskin, who is both a lawyer and a clinical 
psychologist, is critical of the techniques employed by other 
psychiatrists and psychologists. He inter alia notes that in a 
study concerning the prediction of dangerousness, "the 
participating psychiatrists were found to be nearly always 
wrong". Ziskin has provided attorneys dealing with psychiatric 
evidence with a three-volume publication (now being expanded), 
"Coping with Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony". Two of the 
questions Ziskin suggests to be raised in court involve the basic 
value of psychiatric and psychological testimony: "Is the 
expertise shown by psychologists or psychiatrists in the court 
any better than the judgment of the ordinary man or woman?", and: 
"Are you aware of the great number of studies which show that 
more experienced psychiatrists are no more accurate in their 
assessments than inexperienced ones or even lay people?". 
11;,As in any medical matter directly affecting a person's 
health and well-being, however, a low level of competence cannot 
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disregard the legitimacy of psychiatric expertise per se, is 
obviously not justified. Where someone with real interest in and, 
imperatively, a natural aptitude for understanding the workings 
of the human mind, spends years and years studying and constantly 
thinking about human functioning, his or her opinion can most 
certainly be of value. To trivialise or disregard it, would 
indeed be a grave loss to all involved.~4 
2.2.2 The Acceptance of the Role of the Law by Psychiatry 
In American literature, complaints that psychiatrists are being 
11 belegaled 11105 , abound. Psychiatric malpractice law, if properly 
be tolerated. It is, appropriately, the law that must, 
imperatively from an informed perspective, ensure the legitimacy 
of the practices of professionals in society. 
1il"Slovenko asks whether it is "not entirely reasonable to 
assume that one who has had special training in understanding 
people, one who spends his life studying and thinking about 
people, one who reputedly knows so much about the unknowable and 
can interpret a glan.ce, a gesture, a slipped word, or a phrase 
to mean so much, is in a position to bring relevant and probative 
testimony on the legal regulation of behavior". The learned 
author also points out that when lawyers and judges say that 
psychiatric terms are vague, they imply that legal terms are not, 
and that such protest by lawyers or judges against psychiatric 
testimony "smacks of hypocrisy"; see Slovenko R Psychiatry and 
Criminal Culpability New York: John Wiley and Sons (1995). 
1
'
1r'Ie the law intrudes too much on psychiatric practice. 
Simon RI "Coping Strategies for the Defensive Psychiatrist" 
MedLaw (1985) 551-552, states as follows: "It is not unusual for 
psychiatrists to feel that the law is heavily weighted in the 
favor of [cl] ients because of the numerous court decisions during 
the past decade that have strongly emphasized [cl]ients' rights 
and civil liberties. But the defensive psychiatrist goes beyond 
this perception and sees a potential malpractice case behind 
every [cl]ient, all the while feeling 1 belegaled 1 • The legally 
uninformed psychiatrist [on the other hand] sees nothing, but the 
denial may render him even more vulnerable to liability. 
Defensive psychiatrists can be divided into two types - positive 
and negative. The positive defensive psychiatrist can be defined 
as one who orders procedures or treatments to prevent or limit 
liability. This may or may not accord with a reasonable standard 
of care. A negative defensive psychiatrist avoids procedures or 
treatments out of fear of a suit even though the [cl]ient might 
benefit from these interventions. This course is unconscionable 
and potentially legally actionable. The ubiquitous fear of 
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applied, should, however, be regarded very 
psychiatrists, since it is inter alia this area 
positively by 
of law which 
serves to ensure the respectability of their area of expertise. 
As is the case with any applied skill, simply studying psychiatry 
and psychology and achieving the required academic grade, does 
not afford somebody a vastly superior understanding of the human 
psyche. Only where natural ability is complemented by knowledge 
and forged by experience, can the result be a legitimate mental-
health expert: the kind that the rational lay person can trust 
and respect. The law, in appropriate consultative interaction 
with the field of expertise involved, must protect' the community 
against those who should not be trusted. 
Psychiatrists should appreciat'e the role of the law in 
safeguarding the legitimacy of psychiatry. In the desirable 
situation where psychiatrists are held justly accountable for 
their actions, it would cultivate a climate of warranted trust in 
their conduct, and would promote the general positive perception 
of the field as a whole. Throughout the dissertation, it is hoped 
that it will become progressively clearer that the relationship 
between psychiatry and the law has inherent potential to be a 
mutually reinforcing partnership106 , rather than a competitive war 
malpractice contributes to a reactive position with [cl]ients 
that may have its own paradoxical legal liability consequences. 
The defensive psychiatrist is unaware of a fundamental truth -
that in addition to an ethical (moral) and professional duty, 
psychiatrists possess a fundamental affirmative legal duty to 
provide a reasonable standard of care for their [cl]ients." The 
law must imperatively support good practice, and not have the 
opposite effect - law and psychiatry must work with each other, 
not against each other. 
10
';Psychiatric malpractice law and sound legal regulation of 
psychiatry reinforce the legitimacy of psychiatric practice, 
whilst appropriate integrated application of psychiatry in a 
legal context reinforces the legitimacy of those legal 
applications that inherently demand psychiatric consultation. If 
the law were to maintain ignorance in these instances, 
inappropriate and unjust results would scathe its legitimacy. By 
the same token, if psychiatric practice were devoid of legal 
regulation, the flagrantly unsound practices of a minority of 
psychiatrists would threaten the real and perceived legitimacy 
of psychiatry as a whole. 
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of words. 
3 Psychiatric Jurisprudence 
3.1 Introduction 
The term "psychiatric jurisprudence" is broad enough to encompass 
all areas where law and legal philosophy may affe~t psychiatry. 
The part of psychiatric jurisprudence on which this dissertation 
focusses, is "psychiatric malpractice law", which falls under 
"medical law". The precise position of psychiatric malpractice 
law in these legal divisions will next be elucidated. 
3.2 Psychiatric Malpractice Law: Part of Medical Law 
3.2.1 Definitions in Comparative Context 
In step with the HMM approach, the definition of health law and 
medical law should have regard to other definitions in related 
fields that involve the words "medical" and 11 health 11 • Moreover, 
the use of these words should be as close as possible to their 
real meanings. The place of psychiatric malpractice law in the 
context of medical law and health law is accordingly presently 
discussed with comparative reference to the divisions of health 
psychology and medical psychology. This is particularly 
appropriate, since there is considerable scope for interaction 
between these areas. 107 
107Wi thin the framework of sound HMM, medical law can, for 
instance, be informed by health psychology with great benefit. 
The law governs the conduct of health professionals, and, in so 
doing, should take cognisance of the range of psychological 
effects that such conduct can have on health consumers. Without 
an understanding of the real social/psychological impacts of the 
manner in which health care is delivered, the law may be impotent 
in ensuring the appropriate standards. This is an instance where 
medical law and health psychology must be properly integrated. 
Of course, since heal th-care professionals are the ones who 
generally guide the courts as to the establishment of the 
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3.2.1.1 The Term: "Medical": A Broad Concept 
Before venturing into the brief comparative investigation, the 
word "medical" should be carefully examined. The word "medical" 
is derived from the Latin medicus, which broadly means "healer" . 100 
In this sense, "medical" actually includes all professionals 
involved in bringing about healing. However, although the 
adjective "medical" is etymologically connected to "healer" or 
11 healing11109 , it is clear that not all areas of medical expertise 
necessarily involve healing. Where a pathologist, for instance, 
performs a necropsy in order to determine the cause of death for 
forensic purposes, there is obviously no healing involved. To say 
that a pathologist is not part of the medical profession, 
appropriate standards, it is imperative that health psychology 
inform all relevant areas of heal th care. Indeed, it should 
actually be trite law that all health-care providers should have 
training in heal th psychology, in order to ensure that they 
understand the possible psychological consequences of what they 
say and do, and that they consider the entire person in their 
treatment manner and strategy. Once again, law, medicine and 
psychology must work harmoniously together if the best results 
are to be achieved. 
10HAs evidenced also by its relation to the verbs medeor, 
which means "heal, cure, remedy", and medicare, which means "to 
heal, cure .. "; see Morwood J (Ed) The Pocket Oxford Latin 
Dictionary (2 ed) Oxford: Oxford University Press (1994). The 
Afrikaans term "geneesheer", which is commonly ascribed to a 
"medical doctor", actually literally means "master of healing". 
If one considers the word 11 geneesheer 11 , it should actually be 
broad enough to encompass all persons who have mastered some form 
of the broader art of healing. 
10
''The term "medicine" is also derived from Latin: medicina, 
which actually means ."the art of healing"; see Morwood J (Ed) The 
Pocket Oxford Latin Dictionary (2 ed) Oxford: Oxford University 
Press (1994). The Afrikaans 11 geneeskunde 11 , literally does mean 
"the art of healing", thus more accurately reflecting the meaning 
which is sought to be conveyed. Unfortunately, the fact that 
"medicine" also means "a drug for treating illness" and 
"treatment of illness or injury using drugs .. ", creates a very 
strong association in people's minds of medicine in that sense 
with medicine in the sense of "the art of healing". In fact, the 
definition "a drug for treating illness" is the first one to 
feature under "medicine" in the Encarta dictionary; see Rooney 
K (Ed) The Encarta World English Dictionary Lond~n: Bloomsbury 
(1999) at 1175. 
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however, would be rather absurd - the derivation of a term may 
provide the general preferred framework for its meaning, but 
cannot be applied totally literally in all instances. 
What is here suggested is that at least any technique applied 
with the direct or indirect aim of bringing about' healing would 
correctly fall within the ambit of "medical". It is not, however, 
suggested that any activity that does not per se involve healing 
should then be excluded from "medical activities" . 110 All those 
practitioners who have been traditionally seen as medical 
practitioners, should still fall under the umbrella of "medical", 
since medical practices have evolved to encompass more activities 
than merely those directly or indirectly related to healing. 111 In 
other words, "medical" can involve more than merely the art of 
healing, but should not be seen as involving less. The point here 
made is that any person who provides services designed to "heal" 
110Where, for instance, a specialist in preventive medicine 
advises a perfectly healthy individual on strategies to maintain 
excellent health, it is also not a matter of healing, but rather 
of maintaining existing good health. "Preventive me<;iicine" in the 
sense of "the preventive art of healing" ostensibly does not make 
good sense. However, the term is not, it is submitted, 
impermissible if one considers the fact that preventive medicine 
is actually the application of "medical" expertise in preventing 
disease. In this sense, "the healer" uses his or her expertise 
not to heal but to prevent. Due to the fact that it should 
actually be an imperative to integrate a strong preventive 
component into medical practice, the term "preventive medicine" 
is desirable. In any event, where exactly the line between 
prevention and healing lies would not always be readily 
ascertainable. Thos~ who heal should at the same time give 
considerable attention to preventing, and those who are focussing 
on preventing, will invariably be ameliorating underlying 
potentially harmful conditions, thus in effect bringing about a 
degree of healing. Any condition within the human body or mind 
that disposes to the manifestation of disease, detracts from the 
sound whole. Any activity which restores the integrity of the 
whole, would amount to a form of "healing". The Encarta 
dictionary defines healing as follows: "to make a person or 
injury healthy and whole" (ibid 865). 
111Therefore, even the activity of the doctor who performs 
a termination of pregnancy, who is quite clearly not engaging in 
any activity that would promote healing (unless the termination 
is required for therapeutic reasons), would still fall within the 
ambit of "medical". 
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in whatever way, should be seen as providing "medical services". 112 
Due to be deeply ingrained habit of using the word "medical" to 
refer to the traditional image of the "doctor trained in 
allopathic medicine", it may seem unpalatably foreign to some to 
describe, for instance, a homeopath, clinical psychologist or 
dentist as a "medical profes~ional 11 • Indeed, it is this 
conditioning that evokes, for instance, the laborious description 
"medical, dental, nursing and allied heal th sciences". 113 Actually, 
these can all soundly be grouped together under the single 
umbrella of "medical". 
The term "medical practitioner" would, accordingly, actually be 
very broad. However, it is firmly entrenched in the minds of the 
members of society, both lay and professional, that when someone 
uses the term "medical practitioner" they would almost certainly 
mean to say: "a person who is trained and licensed in the field 
of mainstream medicine". It may also safely be accepted that 
someone who refers to a "medical doctor", means to exclude, for 
instance, a dentist, or a clinical psychologist or homeopath with 
a PhD. The conditioning that has led to these divisions, may take 
some time to undo. Nevertheless~ it is submitted that the real 
meaning of the word "medical", as derived from its Latin roots, 
is broad enough to encompass all heal th-care professionals. 114 The 
iL.:A clinical p~ychologist who alleviates a person's CBC, 
would thus be engaging in a medical activity. An industrial 
psychologist who in an instance advises on the optimum 
combination of personality types to create a high-performance 
work team for a particular business task, on the other hand, is 
clearly not engaging in a medical activity. 
111See eg Dirckx J Concise Medical and Allied 
Dictionary ( 3 ed) Baltimore: Williams and Wilkens 
Anderson KN, Anderson LE & Glanze WD Mosby's Medical, 
and Allied Health Dictionary Missouri: Mosby (1994). 
Health 
(1997); 
Nursing 
~ 14 It is merely societal conditioning that dictates that a 
radiologist who studies an X-ray and gives only a diagnosis, is 
most certainly engaging in "medical activities 11 , whilst the 
aromatherapist who skilfully eradicates a chronically recurring 
headache caused by muscle tension, is not. There is, of course, 
a vast difference between these two p~actitioners in knowledge, 
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divisions within "medical" should rather then be arranged as 
follows: 
1) Mainstream medical: the conventional "medical practitioner" as 
presently understood; someone trained in "western" /allopathic 
medicine, who "went to medical school" and has been registered as 
a "medical doctor". 115 
2) Allied medical: those who practise alongside the mainstream 
physicians, in line with the conventional "western" paradigm, 
such as clinical psychologists, physiotherapists and dentists. 
3) Alternative medical: those who practise arts of healing that 
fall outside "conventionally scientific" healing arts, such as 
reflexology and aromatherapy. 
In line with HMM, these subdivisions should endeavour not to be 
"divided", as in many ways they currently are, but rather to be 
skills and approach. They belong to very different "schools", and 
will have appropriately dif f erirrg specific rules that apply to 
them. In the broadest sense, however, they are both still 
governed by medical law, as will shortly be affirmed. 
115The term "doctor", actually literally means "teacher", as 
derived from the Latin docere (stem: doct-), which means "to 
teach"; see Rooney I\ (Ed) The Encarta World English Dictionary 
London: Bloomsbury (1999) 552. Therein lies an important lesson 
to "doctors" - their traditionally educative function should be 
upheld: in consultation, the client should not just be "treated", 
but should also be educated as to how best to deal with the 
relevant condition. Here again, professionals from mainstream 
medicine and health psychology ("allied medicine") should work 
together to make this process maximally effective and efficient. 
Whereas the mainstream medical doctor may not have much time to 
explain in lengthy detail all that a client should or should not 
do in the light of his or her condition, and may even find it 
difficult to articulate all the facets of the full spectrum, the 
professional health psychologist could fulfil that'task and take 
it further. Whereas the doctor might explain the major 
fundamental "do's and don•ts", the health psychologist will be 
in a position to set up an integrated programme, incorporating 
all the relevant facets in the full spectrum, providing a client 
with strategies and techniques for putting the advice into daily 
practice. After all, a primary focus of health psychology is the 
promotion of positive heal th behaviours; see fn 116 statim infra. 
57 
collectively harmoniously "medical" - promoting op;timum holistic 
heal th care. Whether one sees many different disciplines as 
falling under the superordinate umbrella "medical", or sees 
various sectors of one discipline, the more cross-pollination and 
holistically integrated functioning there can be among these 
various areas, the better the interests of health-care consumers 
can be advanced. 
3.2.1.2 The Definition of Medical Law 
"Medical law" should, as it ostensibly states (in the light of 
the meaning of "medical"), refer to "the law applied in the 
context of health-care provision, consumption and expertise". 
Psychiatrists would fall squarely under mainstream medicine, and 
"psychiatric malpractice law" would be "the law related to 
malpractice on the part of psychiatrists". Ther~fore, in line 
with the above discussion, it is clear that "psychiatric 
malpractice law" forms part of "medical law". 
3.2.1.3 Interdisciplinary Harmony in Related Definitions 
In step with the HMM approach, the definit.ions of health law and 
medical law should be seen in relation to the related fields 
heal th psychology and medical psychology. "Heal th psychology" may 
be defined as "the subfield of psychology concerned with the 
interactions of health-care professionals with consumers, and the 
interrelationship of behavioural and psychological factors with 
human heal th". 116 Accordingly, "heal th law" would be "laws and 
m;Bishop broadly defines "heal th psychology" as "the 
subfield of psychology concerned with the dynamic inter-
relationship of behaviour and psychological states with physical 
health"; see Bishop GD Health Psychology: Integrating Mind and 
Body Needham Heights: Allyn and Bacon (1994) 3. It is submitted, 
however, that the concept of heal th psychology is broader in that 
it also encompasses the dynamic 'interrelationship of behaviour 
and psychological states with resultant mental health. Moreover, 
the psychology of the interactions between heal th-care 
professionals and consumers is also covered by heal th psychology. 
Bishop divides the domain of health psychology into three broad 
areas: 1) the promotion and maintenance of health, for example 
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legal philosophy that concern human heal th". 117 It is evident that 
heal th law is extremely broad. "Medical law" ("the law applied in 
the context of heal th-care provision and expertise" 118 ) is a 
by giving attention to habits such as smoking, drinking, use of 
safety belts, exercise and diet; 2) the prevention and manner of 
treatment of illness; 3) involvement with the health-care system 
and the formulation qf health care policy. In regard to the last-
mentioned area, Bishop states the following: "[O]ur interactions 
with health care professionals involve more than a mechanical 
dispensing of health care; these interactions are also personal. 
Health psychologists are interested in how people interact with 
heal th care professionals and institutions and the impact of 
these interactions on their health. For example, the relationship 
between people and their physicians, or other heal th care 
providers, is likely to affect their willingness to follow 
medical recommendations as well as their rate of recovery from 
illness or surgery". See ibid 6. 
117
"Mental-health law" would then logically encompass all 
areas where the law has its impact specifically on mental health. 
The term has, for instance, been used in South Africa, and 
extensively in the United States. See eg fn 37 supra, and Kruger 
A Mental Health Law Durban: Butterworths (1980). Psychiatric 
malpractice law would thus also fall within the ambit of "mental-
health law". 
11KThus, in line with the HMM approach, "medical psychology" 
would be defined as "psychology applied to health care provision, 
consumption and expertise". Bishop GD Health Psychology: 
Integrating Mind and ·Body Needham Heights: Allyn and Bacon ( 1994) 
asserts that the term "medical psychology" is synonymous with 
psychiatry in Britain, while in the United States it refers to 
"a subspecialty of clinical psychology concerned with the 
application of clinical methods from psychology to problems of 
the physically ill". It is submitted that neither of these 
descriptions is sound. In line with HMM, medical psychology 
should, as it ostensibly states, be defined as proposed statim 
supra. According to the proposed definition, Bishop's definition 
for the United States would indeed fall under medical psychology, 
but would more specifically be "clinical medical psychology" (see 
Chapter I I, 2. 1 supra, for a discussion on the meaning and 
application of the term "clinical"). Medical psychology is a 
broader concept: it covers the entire area where the principles 
of psychology can impact on heal th-care provision and 
consumption. A workshop to equip doctors better to deal with the 
impact that life-and-death decisions in the medical context can 
have on them personally would, for instance, still fall under 
medical psychology, but not clinical medical psychology. To 
reiterate, health psychology, then, is an even broader concept: 
it involves psychology not only in the health-care context, but 
also in indi victual and societal promotion and maintenance of 
health. Similarly, health law would also be broader than medical 
law in that it involves law not only in the health-care context, 
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narrower, more defined area of l~w; thus it is the term that will 
consistently be used in this dissertation. It is also the term 
most frequently used in South African law. Other countries, such 
as the USA and Holland119 , use the broader term "heal th law". Much 
of health law, in any event, mostly falls within the ambit of the 
narrower concept "medical law". Examples of areas of law that 
fall under heal th law but not medical law are: therapeutic 
jurisprudenceuo and public health regulationsu1 , eg those 
regarding smoking122 , and other environmental heal th law123 • 
3.3 The Definition of Medical Malpractice 
3.3.1 Different Views 
As might be expected, in the light of the discussion surrounding 
HMM, definitions of malpractice furnished by various authors from 
various countries, are rather disparate. For instance, Barnesu4 , 
an author from the United Kingdom, asserts that malpractice is 
"generally defined as practice or behaviour that is 
intentionally .. abusive", and that "in medical and other settings 
but also in individual and societal promotion and maintenance of 
health. 
11
''see, for instance, Leenen HJJ Handboek Gezondheidsrecht, 
Deel I: Rechten van Mensen in de Gezondheidszorg Houten/Diegem: 
Bohn Stafleu Van Loghum ( 2000). "Gezondheidsrecht" literally 
means "health law". 
L:
0 See fn 33 supra. 
u
1See, for instance, Nadasen S Public Heal th Law in South 
Africa: An Introduction Durban: Butterworths (2000) 55-56. 
i;::::See the Tobacco Products Control Act 83 of 1993. 
i::: 'In this sense, section 24 (a) of the Constitution would 
technically be health law (but not medical law) as well as 
environmental law. 
1
-'
4Barnes FP Complaints and Grievances in Psychotherapy: A 
Handbook of Ethical Practice London: Routledge ( 1998). It is 
notable that Barnes has served as the chair of the Ethics 
Committee of the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy. 
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it would be referred to as gross professional misconduct ... the 
act of engaging in practise with malicious intent with a specific 
aim of neglecting the practitioner's professional duty through 
intentionally uneth~cal professional misconduct." According to 
Barnes, malpractice would thus necessarily involve intentional 
conduct, which is "knowingly wrong". 125 
On the other hand, in the United States, malpractice is generally 
defined as professional negligence.u6 The authors of a leading 
text in mental-heal th law127 , however, define malpractice more 
broadly: 11 [M] alpractice ... encompasses all actions for substandard 
professional care, regardless of the specific doctrinal basis of 
their claim. Private actions for malpractice may be based on any 
of several legal grounds. Most actions are grounded in negligence 
doctrine, but some malpractice claims rest on the intentional 
tort doctrines of assault and battery, invasion of privacy, or 
breach of confidentiality. Additionally, occasional malpractice 
suits are based entirely on principles of contract law." 
It is submitted that this broad conceptualisation of malpractice 
is correct.us Although it is well-established that negligence is 
1
:c
5Ibid 47-57. 
i_::,;Furrow BR, Greany TL, Johnson SH, Jost TS & Schwartz RL 
Health Law (2 ed) St Paul: West Group (2000) at 264, comment that 
malpractice is usually defined as unskilful practlce resulting 
in injury to the client, where there is a failure to exercise the 
degree of care, skill and diligence that is required under the 
circumstances. 
127Reisner R, Slobogin C. and Rai A Law and the Mental Heal th 
System: Civil and Criminal aspects St Paul: West Group (1999) 
131. 
L:"See also Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law: A 
Selection of Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: J L Van Schaik 
( 1991) 243, where it is clearly stated that the concept of 
medical malpractice liability is not narrowly confined to 
liability flowing from professional negligence. See also Snyman 
JL Die Siviele Opneming van Geestesongesteldes: Regte en 
Regsbeskerming van die Betrokkene (LLD thesis, Unisa, 1981) 563, 
fn 4. 
61 
the most common basis for malpractice129 , it would be unsound to 
limit the concept of malpractice exclusively to instances of 
negligence. Where X performs an operation on Y, without procuring 
Y's consent, this would amount to intentional conduct .(an 
assault, if no ground of justification exists) 130 • It would be 
absurd to say that such professional misconduct does not amount 
to malpractice, due to the fact that it was intentional and not 
merely negligent. It follows that malpractice liability could 
involve criminal law, the law of delict, and the law of contract. 
Malpractice can thus lay the foundation for an action ex delicto 
or ex contractu, or both, depending on the nature df the case and 
specific elements involved, and could, where appropriate, 
simultaneously give rise to criminal liability. 
3.3.2 "Malpractice" Defined 
The word "malpractice" literally refers to "poor practice". 131 In 
the context of liability, however, the poor practice in question 
would have to be of such a degree that it warrants raising the 
L'.'Indeed, most claims in respect of medical malpractice are 
instituted ex delicto ( ie non-contractual private-law actions for 
damages) on the ground of negligence. This is the case, for 
instance, in South African, English and American jurisdictions; 
see Reisner, R, Slobogin C and Rai A Law and the Mental Health 
System: Civil and Criminal Aspects (3 ed) St Paul: West Group 
(1999) at 131, who state: "Most actions are grounded in 
negligence doctrine .. "; and Mason and McCall-Smith Law and 
Medical Ethics (5 ed) Butterworths: Edinburgh (1999) at 219: 
"Most claims in respect of medical injury are brought in 
tort ... ". "Tort" is the Anglo-American-law equivalent of the 
South African "delict" - the authors briefly describe it as a 
"non-contractual civil wrong" - their use of the Anglo-American 
appellation here indicates that they refer to the English law; 
pure Scots law would also use the term 11 delict 11 , since Scotland 
has a Roman-law heritage; see for instance McManus F and Russell 
E Delict: A Comprehensive Guide to the Law Chichester: Wiley 
(1998). 
1 
'')See Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law: A Selection 
of Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: J L Van Schaik (1991) 243. 
For a discussion of assault in the context of consent, see 
chapter V, 3, infra. 
1 nThe prefix "mal- 11 is derived from the Latin malus, meaning 
"bad" or "poor" (in the sense of bad) . 
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issue of professional liability. In the final analysis, however, 
anything that clearly constitutes poor practice should actually 
be tantamount to malpractice. 132 It is submitted that malpractice 
should be defined as: "professional conduct which falls outside 
th~ limits of acceptable practice in that profession." 
It is submitted that "malpractice'' is limited to conduct within 
the course of legitimate ( ie legally recognised) professional 
practice, as is also reflected in the definition furnished supra. 
Illegal psychiatric practice ab ini tio, 
complying with the legal requirements 
practise yet or anymore, would thus 
in the ' sense of not 
for being allowed to 
not be a case of 
"malpractice" as such, but rather another form of unlawful 
conduct, such as "illegitimate practice" (eg without being duly 
registered with the legally required professional body). 
3.3.3 The Legal Bases for Malpractice Liability 
It has already been stated that the three main legal bases for 
malpractice liability are delict, contract and crime. 133 These will 
next be dealt with in turn. 
3.3.3.1 The Law of Contract 
In the case of most medical interventions, there would be a 
13
-In the context of the law of delict, poor practice that 
results in legally significant damage would inevitably be 
significant enough to constitute malpractice. Similarly, in the 
context of criminal law, poor practice that is severe enough to 
amount to criminal conduct would be significant enough to 
constitute malpractice, and in the context of the law of 
contract, poor practice that amounts to a breach of contract 
would also be significant enough to constitute malpractice. It 
follows that, poor practice that attracts legal liability, would 
always be malpractice. In the context of liability under 
disciplinary committees, however, there may be cases where 
conduct amounts to professional malpractice but is not sufficient 
to form the basis of legal liability. 
1
; ·,The concept "delict" would, however, as discussed supra, 
there be referred to as 11 tort 11 • 
63 
contract between doctor and client. 134 Regarding actions based on 
contract, the following is stated in a recent American case, Bond 
v Frank135 : "A duty enforceable in law is one which arises out of 
the relationship between the parties involved. A contract is a 
private agreement that imposes on the parties the specific duties 
to which each has expressly agreed to perform. Failure to perform 
a duty thus owed may be a breach of the contract, for which the 
other party is entitled to damages or specific performance." That 
is also true in South African law - the duty or obligation 
(vinculum iuris: legal tie) arises ex consensu. Breach of 
contract may indeed also lead inter alia to an action for damages 
and/or specific performance in South African law. 136 The type of 
damage for which damages may be claimed is limited to patrimonial 
damage. Damages for injury to personality thus cannot be claimed 
ex contractu, but must be claimed ex delicto. 137 
11~See Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law: A Selection 
of Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: J L Van Schaik (1991) 3. 
11
"·court of Appeals of Ohio, Second Appellate District, Miami 
County) 2001. 
13 '~See Christie RH The Law of Contract ( 4 ed) Durban: 
Butterworths (2001) 606-641. See also chapter VIII, 3, infra. As 
has been. stated, the scope of this dissertation does not allow 
for a discussion of the general principles of, the law of 
contract. These will be featured as they are applied to the 
specific matters dealt with in the dissertation. 
inA leading South African case regarding damages ex 
contractu in the context of medi-cal liability is Administrator 
of Natal v Edouard 1990 (3) SA 581 (A), which involved a claim 
by the father of a normal and healthy child conceived and born 
after an unsuccessful tubal ligation performed on his wife. In 
the Supreme Court of Appeal case, Mukheiber v Raath 1999 (3) SA 
1065 (SCA), Olivier JA approvingly provides the following 
overview of Edouard: " [ T] he action was based on breach of 
contract. Damages weie claimed for (a) the cost of supporting and 
maintaining the child up to the age of 18 years and (b) for the 
discomfort, pain, suffering and loss of amenities of life 
suffered by the mother. This Court disallowed claim (b) on the 
basis that in our law general damages of the type claimed under 
this head are not recoverable in a breach of contract action. 
Claim (a) was upheld. In upholding claim (a), this Court 
undertook an extensive review of overseas cases and legal 
literature dealing with claims for •wrongful conception', 
'wrongful birth' and 'wrongful life' in the context of public 
policy." 
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3.3.3.2 The Law of Delict and Criminal Law 
Although there would usually be a contract between doctor and 
client, the doctor always owes the client a duty of care, 
independent from the existence of any contract.us A doctor who 
undertakes a procedure on a person, whether with or without his 
or her consent, is obliged to perform the procedur~ with due care 
and skill. Regardless of any contract, if a procedure is 
performed in a substandard manner, this can give rise to 
delictual or even criminal liabil~ty (for example, if a procedure 
negligently causes the death of a person, leading to a conviction 
of culpable homicide). 
The obligation in delict arises ex lege. This accords with the 
court' s 139 further statements: "Some duties do not arise from 
private agreement but are instead imposed by law. That form of 
'duty' is an obligation imposed by law on one person to act for 
the benefit of another person due to the relationship between 
them. When risks and dangers inherent in the relationship or 
incident to it may be avoided by the obliger's exercise of care, 
an obliger who fails to do so will be liable to the other person 
for injuries proximately resulting from those risks and dangers 
if the injuries were reasonably foreseeable." The details 
regarding the use of the term "duty" and approaches to the 
element of causation140 are different in South African law; 141 
u><The establishment of a therapist-client relationship 
creates the professional duty of care owed to a client. See 
Pergament D "Internet Psychotherapy: Current Status and Future 
Regulation" Journal of Law-Medicine 8 Health Matrix 233 (1998). 
See also Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law: A Selection of 
Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: J L Van Schaik (1991) 3. 
11
''Bond v Frank Ohio App 2d (Miami County) 2001. 
w·rn South African law, proximate or direct consequences and 
reasonable foreseeability may be taken into consideration when 
establishing legal causation. Courts are not obliged to adhere 
to any particular approach, however, but rather adhere to a 
"flexible approach" as formulated in the leading case, S v 
Mokgethi 1990 (1) SA 32 (A). The basic question is whether there 
is a "close enough" (the similarity to "proximate" is readily 
apparent) relationship between the act and its factual 
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however, the underlying idea is the same. 142 In assessing whether 
the "duty of care" was breached, the United States and English 
courts apply virtually the same general negligence tools and 
standards as the South African courts. 143 As has been affirmed, 144 
in South Africa, England and the United States, most professional 
liability claims arise due to alleged negligence. · 
consequence for that consequence to be legally imputed to the 
actor, 11 in view of policy considerations based on reasonableness, 
fairness and justice". See Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser 
PJ Law of Delict (4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (2001) 187. 
141As has been stated, the scope of this dissertation does 
not allow for discussion of those details. 
14
_:In order to establish delictual liability I South African 
law determines that there was an unlawful (1) act (2) on the part 
of a culpable ( 3) actor which factually ( 4) and legally ( 5) 
caused damage (6) to another (elements in random order). These 
six elements are identified by Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 
op cit 4, fn 9. In order to establish tortious liability, 
American law determines that there was a duty of care (1) that 
was breached (2) and "directly" or proximately caused (3) damage 
(4). See, for instance, Simon RI Clinical Psychiatry and the Law 
(2 ed) Washington: American Psychiatric Press (1992). Simon 
describes these as the four D's: Duty, Dereliction thereof, 
Direct cause, and Damage. Grabois states it as follows: "The 
plaintiff in a malpractice action based on tort must establish 
four elements to make out a prima facie case. He or she must show 
( 1) that there was a legal duty or obligation requiring the 
person to conform to a certain standard of care in treating the 
plaintiff; (2) that there was a failure on the person's part to 
conform to the standard required: a breach of the duty; (3) that 
there was a reasonably close causal connection between the 
conduct and the resulting injury. This is the proximate cause; 
and (4) that there was actual loss or damage resulting to the 
interests of another." See Grabois EW "The Liability of 
Psychotherapists for· Breach of Confidentiality" 12 J L & Health 
39 (1997/1998) 68-69. 
141The approaches to specifically medical negligence are also 
fundamentally similar; for instance in Bond v Frank (supra), the 
court states: "[Where] a condition by its nature requires the 
application of knowledge and skill superior to that of the 
ordinary person, one who possesses that superior knowledge and 
skill and who fails to employ it for the benefit of another when 
their relation requires it will be held liable for injuries 
[caused by] that failure. Such persons must use the care and 
skill reasonable in the light of their superior· learning and 
experience, not simply a minimum standard of care. 11 
144 See fn 129 supra. 
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3.3.3.2.1 Medical Negligence 
It is trite in medical malpractice law that the doctor does not 
guarantee positive results. With the numerous factors involved in 
certain medical procedures and conditions, it is simply not 
possible to guarantee success. 145 The requirement is that the 
doctor must act in accordance with the standard with which he or 
she is expected to comply. Furrow·et a1 146 affirm that American law 
relies on the medical profession itself to set the standards of 
practice, while the courts enforce those standards. The situation 
is the same in South Africa. 147 
As with any medical speciality, the psychotherapist is held to 
the standard of care exercised by others in his or her field of 
expertise. Grabois148 avers that when dealing with the standard of 
care of psychotherapists, courts have to determine the standard 
appropriate to those specialists. She affirms that, since there 
are so many schools of thought in psychotherapy, professionals 
practising therapy must set the legal standards of conduct by in-
house expert testimony. 149 Apart from expert testimony, ethical 
codes of conduct can also play an important role. 150 
14
''In respect of psychotherapy, Grabois (op cit) states: "In 
psychotherapy, the practitioner is not an insurer of a perfect 
cure. The practitioner is also not required to exercise the 
highest degree of skill possible or even extraordinary skill or 
care. He or she must exercise only reasonable care under the 
circumstances." 
14
'Furrow BR, Greany TL, Johnson SH, Jost TS & Schwartz RL 
Health Law (2 ed) St Paul: West Group (2000) 265. 
147See fn 277 infra. 
14
"op cit 71. 
14
''The importance of expert testimony in proving standards 
of practice is echoed by Furrow BR, Greany TL, Johnson SH, Jost 
TS & Schwartz RL Health Law (2 ed) St Paul: West Group (2000) at 
265. See also Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law: a 
Selection of Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: Van Schaik (1991) 
at 290. 
1"·
11The importance of medical ethics will shortly be discussed 
(under 3.3.3.4 infra). 
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3.3.3.2.2 Intentional Conduct 
As has been affirmed, intentional, wrongful conduc 
of a medical practitioner can also give rise to malpractice 
liability. Once again, intentional conduct can feature in the 
context of the law of contract, the law of delict and criminal 
law. Various instances of wrongful intentional conduct in the 
context of psychiatric practice are highlighted in chapters V-IX 
of the dissertation, including sexual misconduct and assault. 
3.3.3.3 The Role of Ethics in Malpractice Liability 
Strauss151 defines ethics as "the science of rules of moral conduct 
which should be followed because they are good in themselves." 
According to him, this involves the "rational study of 
preferences", providing "a general basis for the making of value 
judgments". Strauss further asserts that law and ethics overlap 
to a large extent, but that they do not coincide. 152 
The influence of ethics on the law153 , and vice versa154 , are clear. 
151Strauss SA "Ethics in the Treatment of Mental Patients: 
Some Aspects" in Van Wyk C & Van Oosten H (Eds) Nihil Obstat: 
Feesbundel vir WJ Hosten/Essays in Honour of WJ Hosten (1996) 
181. 
i:,_:Ibid: "There are large areas of law that are morally 
neutral. Yet ethical considerations can never be excluded from 
the administration of justice, which is the end and purpose of 
all civil laws. Professional ethics is part and parcel of ethics 
in the general sense of the term, although ... it has a peculiarly 
legal character, in the medical context in any event. The body 
of professional ethics reflects the attitudes prevailing within 
a profession in respect of what is good and proper." 
i:''See, for instance, Grabois EW "The Liability of 
Psychotherapists for Breach of Confidentiality" 12 J L & Health 
39 (1997/1998) 72, where she avers that, in establishing 
standards of care, the court will point to the "Hippocratic Oath" 
that physicians take, and also to the "Principles of Medical 
Ethics" published by the American Medical Association. 
l'~Pergament, for instance, comments on how civil actions 
establish practice guidelines for therapists. She asserts that 
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Ethics and law inevitably combine to set standards of practice, 155 
and are potentially reciprocally reinforcing and.enriching. As 
might be expected, there is also scope for clashes and conflict. 
These could, however, be seen as opportunities for positive 
development with a resultant deep~ning of mutual understanding.~6 
Law and ethics both have an extremely important role to play in 
the lives of clinicians1~ - they function to provide guidance in 
dealing with dilemmas and to aim to ensure the high standards of 
practice that earn the trust and respect of the community -
indeed crucial for all involved. 
3.4 Psychiatric Malpractice 
Traditionally there have been markedly fewer cases against 
psychiatrists compared to other medical practitioners. However, 
the impact of civil litigation on psychotherapeutic practice is 
significant. Indeed, case law can strongly influence the ethical 
standards that guide therapists in practice. See Pergament D 
"Internet Psychotherapy: Current' Status and Future Regulation" 
Journal of Law-Medicine 8 Health Matrix 233 (1998) 266. 
1
''''In the preface to Verschoor T Verdicts of the Medical 
Council Pretoria: Digma ( 1990), Strauss states: "As a jurist who 
has been closely involved with legal and ethical problems in 
medical practice, I have often been struck by how ignorant young 
physicians in particular are regarding the more practical side 
of medical ethics - not to mention legal practitioners consulted 
by medical practitioners. A legal practitioner may provide a 
physician with a thoroughly substantiated legal opinion, but if 
he has failed to also take the professional-ethical implications 
thereof into account, it will have but little practical value." 
l'•'The potentially developmental value of conflict is well 
emphasised in management, and would be applied in this context 
as a facet of HMM. 
1 ~Strauss op cit 189: "[T]he word of the [Heal~h Professions 
Council of South Africa] is for all practical purposes law, pure 
and simple, to the medical practitioner." Ethical rules certainly 
do have a significant degree of enforceability. Strauss (189-190) 
points out that some of the sanctions imposed are co-enforced 
indirectly by the civil courts. Moreover, if a doctor whose name 
has been removed from the register by the Heal th Professions 
Council, continues to practise, he or she would be committing a 
criminal offence for which he or she may be prosecuted in court. 
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psychiatric malpractice suits have been on the rise in the United 
States and other countries. Perlin~8 reports that in 1982, 4% of 
malpractice suits filed were for psychiatric malpractice, which 
percentage had doubled by 1998. 159 Perlin discusses possible 
reasons why psychiatrists have been sued less than other medical 
practitioners. Some of those involve inter alia the following 
factors 160 : 
1 Tort law had been generally reluctant to provide 
remedies for emotional injuries. 161 
2 It is difficult to prove the standard of care in 
psychotherapy. 
3 Plaintiffs have been afraid of the stigmatisation 
following the publicisation of their psychiatric 
histories. 
4 The complex emotional ties between therapist and 
client make it difficult for clients to enter into a 
high-conflict situation with their therapists. 
5 A client is qften unable to assess the efficacy or 
otherwise of treatment what would his or her 
1
"•Hperlin ML Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal Vol 
3 (2 ed) Lexis publishing (2000) 285-286. 
i::.•;Bass et al discuss the growth in litigation against 
psychotherapists, commenting that this has not been as severe in 
Canada as in the United States, in which it had reached 
"appalling proportions". See Bass LJ, DeMers ST~ Ogloff JRP, 
Peterson C, Pettifor JL, Reaves RP, Retflavi T, Simon NP, 
Sinclair c, and Tipton RM Professional Conduct and Discipline and 
Psychology American Psychological Association: Washington DC 
(1996) at 117. 
1
''ncf Perlin op cit 285-286. 
1
"
1Landmark South African cases in this regard are Bester v 
Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy 1973 1 SA 769 (A) and 
Barnard v Santam Bpk 1999 1 SA 202 (SCA) (see infra chapter VII, 
2) • 
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condition have been if the treatment in question had 
not been provided? 
6 Psychiatrists are often able to manipulate their 
clients, thereby averting suit. 
7 Psychiatric :medicine is "somewhat of an enigma to 
most trial lawyers". 162 
Some of the reasons that Perlin1 " discusses regarding the 
increasing frequency164 of psychiatric malpractice suits, include 
the following: 
1 The 1980s and 1990s have seen tort law become more 
receptive to emotional injury compensation. 
2 Clients making use of psychiatric services are 
progressively "coming out of the closet", thus 
alleviating some of the general perception of 
stigmatisation. 
3 Increasing litigation in psychiatric malpractice has 
made judges and lawyers more familiar with the "enigma" 
of psychiatric medicine. 
ic~Quoting Alan Wilkinson, a Californian trial lawyer (quoted 
in Perlin op cit. 
h'Op cit. 
164 See also Grabois EW "The Liability of Psychotherapists for 
Breach of Confidentiality" 12 J L & Health 39 (1997/1998) 46, 
where she points out that while the number of claims against 
therapists remains low, it is increasing for a number of reasons. 
She contends that one of these is a more open attitude about 
psychotherapeutic treatment, coupled with increased expectations 
of its efficacy. Another reason that she mentions is that there 
is more emphasis on clients' rights and new legal duties imposed 
on therapists (arising from the therapist-client relationship). 
In addition, she contends that the "larger judgments" seen in 
lawsuits based on psychiatric malpractice may well encourage new 
plaintiffs to bring suit. 
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4 More is known about potential side-effects of certain 
treatments, especially physical treatments, such as 
pharmacotherapy, which can inter alia lead to tardive 
dyskinesia. 165 
Psychiatry is indeed a potentially very complex, markedly more 
abstract medical speciality. Although the general principles of 
medical malpractice law will also apply to psychiatric 
malpractice, the issues involved in psychiatric practice are, in 
many cases, quite different from those involved in other areas of 
medical practice. 166 
Matters relating to psychiatric and clinical~psychological 
malpractice are to an extent addressed in the Health Professions 
Act167 and, to a lesser degree, the Mental Heal th Act. 168 However, 
there is a marked paucity of l~gal literature on the specific 
matter in South Africa. According to Kruger169 , by 1980 no state 
psychiatric institutions had been involved in litigation 
involving professional psychiatric negligence. However, Kruger 
points out that many cases had been settled out of court without 
the psychiatrists' admitting liability. Kruger correctly asserts 
ic=·see infra chapter VII under 3. 1. 
ic:t;The fundamental general principles of medical law do apply 
directly to psychiatrists and their clients; however, specific 
development is demanded by some of the unique features of this 
area of medicine. With regard to ethics in psychiatry, Strauss 
SA "Ethics in the Treatment of Mental Patients: Some Aspects" in 
Van Wyk C & Van Oosten H (Eds) Nihil Obstat: Fees'bundel vir WJ 
Hosten/Essays in Honour of WJ Hosten (1996) at 182, states: "The 
ordinary set of medico-ethical rules applies to [psychiatric 
clients]. But because of [their] special vulnerability, certain 
special considerations apply in Legard to [them]. A complicating 
factor in regard to determining ethics in the [psychiatric 
context] is that psychiatric intervention, representing state 
interests, may clash with [cl]ients' rights." 
i-;"18 of 1973. 
1
'''Kruger A Mental Health Law Durban: Butterworths (1980) 
at 124. 
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that, because of the abstract nature of psychotherapy, it is very 
difficult to challenge its quality in court, as opposed to other 
medical treatment where concrete physical effects are usually 
apparent. 170 
As is the case with any medical malpractice, psychiatric 
malpractice is limited to conduct within the course of 
professional practice. 171 Various instances of clinical-psychiatric 
malpractice~2 are discussed in chapters V-IX. The next chapter 
lays the foundation for the examination of those instances by 
elucidating the legal bases for medical intervention. 
17
°Kruger (ibid) correctly maintains that psychotherapy can 
be as harmful as any physical treatment, and that it is merely 
the matter of proof that creates problems. 
171 See supra under 3.3.2. 
17~Matters involved in other forms of psychiatric mal-
practice, such as forensic-psychiatric malpractice, fall outside 
the scope of this dissertation. Forensic-psychiatric malpractice 
would, as it readily appears, involve malpractice in the course 
of rendering professional forensic services(see 2.1 supra). 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE LEGAL BASES FOR MEDICAL INTERVENTION 
1 Introduction 
In the ordinary course of events, the legal relationship between 
doctor and client is contractual and thus based on consensus. 173 
The basis for most interventions would, accordingly, be consent. 
A wealth of literature has emanated from attempting to define the 
full nature and extent of that consent. The consent required has 
become relatively globally known as "informed consent" . 174 
Van Oosten175 points out that it is trite law in societies 
subscribing to a human-rights culture that every person has the 
right to self-determination176 , which includes the freedom to 
choose to undergo or forego medical treatment, irrespective of 
17
'See Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law: A Selection 
of Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: J L Van Schaik (1991) 3. 
174According to Welz D "The boundaries of medical-therapeutic 
privilege" SALJ (1999) 301, the term "informed, consent" is 
inapplicable in Australia and England, for instance. Cf, however, 
Mason and McCall-Smith Law and Medical Ethics (5 ed) 
Butterworths: Edinburgh ( 19 9 9) 245, and Van Oosten FFW The 
Doctrine of Informed Consent in Medical Law (LLD thesis, Unisa, 
1990) 137-155; cf also Kahn M,. Robson M & Swift K Clinical 
Negligence (2 ed) London: Cavendish (2002) 44, 65-66. 
175Van Oosten FFW "Some Reflections on Emergencies as 
Justification for Medical Intervention" in Ahrens HJ, Bar C, 
Fischer G, Spickhoff A, Taupitz, J (Eds) Festschrift fUr Erwin 
Deutsch Koln: Carl H~ymanns Verlag KG (1999) 673. 
17
';Wi th South Africa's adherence to consti tutionalism, this 
fundamental right is now firmly entrenched as part of the Bill 
of Rights in the Constitution, the supreme law of South Africa. 
Section 12, which deals with "freedom and security of the 
person", provides as follows: "Everyone has the right to bodily 
and psychological integrity, which includes the right - (a) to 
make decisions concerning reproduction; (b) to security in and 
control over their [sic] body; and (c) not to be subjected to 
medical or scientific experiments without their informed 
consent." 
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its medical necessity. Every person thus has the right to refuse 
even life-sustaining treatment if he or she is clearly capable of 
making a lucid choice in that regard.n7 
Whereas consent (also known as the doctrine or defence of volenti 
non fit iniuria, in the context of justificationn8 ) is widely 
established as the first and foremost179 basis or justification180 
for medical intervention, circumstances may exist which may 
justify medical interventions where consent is insufficient or 
absent. 181 Van Oosten classifies· those grounds of justification 
that operate where informed consent is lacking, as emergencies, 
authority and duty. 182 
The various justific~tions, as categorised by the present author 
(taking into account the commentary of various authorities), are 
depicted in figure 4 (see next page). The first division in the 
flowchart (figure 4) represents the well-established principle 
that grounds of justification do not form a numerus clausus in 
South African law. The bani mores (legal convictions of the 
177As might be expected, this fundamental right can lead to 
very controversial situations. Discussions in this regard feature 
infra. 
17 HSee, for instance, Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser 
PJ Law of Delict (4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (2001) 98-104. 
17
''Perlin also acknowledges the fundamental importance of 
informed consent, maintaining that informed-consent principles 
are the most important inquiry in virtually all negligence-based 
psychiatric tort litigation. See Perlin ML Mental Disability Law: 
Civil and Criminal Vol 3 (2 ed) Lexis publishing (2000) 323. 
lKuJustification in law renders conduct that would have been 
wrongful, lawful. Medical intervention in the absence of consent 
or another ground of justification, is wrongful. 
1
"
1Van Oosten FFW "Some Reflections on Emergencies as 
Justification for Medical Intervention". in Ahrens HJ, Bar C, 
Fischer G, Spickhoff A, Taupitz, J (Eds) Festschrift fur Erwin 
Deutsch Koln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG (1999) 673-674. Van Oosten 
considers these "exceptions to the general rule". 
iK~Ibid. Therapeutic privilege should actually be included 
here, as reflected in figure 4 (next page). 
Figure 4: Grounds of Justification in Medical Law 
Grounds of Justification in Medical Law 
Novel instances Crystallised grounds 
in step with boni mores (m step with boni mores) 
I 
Consent Therapeutic privilege ~ ...... -... Authonty. "'"'"~o'lri"-y Duty 
I 
Necessity Unauthorised administration 
I 
Public necessity Private necessity Therapeutic necessjj;y 
76 
community) can create new crystallised grounds or a singular 
justification in a unique instance. The existing crystallised 
grounds, then, are merely instances that have been defined (have 
"crystallised") in step with the boni mores. The crystallised 
grounds of justification in medical law will next·be discussed. 
2 Informed Consent 
2.1 Requirements for and Forms of Informed Consent 
When a client consults a doctor, he or she tacitly enters into a 
contract with the doctor, and generally tacitly consents to such 
treatment as is medically indicated."3 However, for such consent 
to be valid, the client must know and understand all the material 
elements of that to which he or she tacitly consents. The leading 
case in South Africa regarding which elements should be 
considered material for the purpose of informed consent is 
Castell v De Greef184 • In casu the court held that the doctor must 
warn a client of all material risks185 ; a risk is material if: 
a) a reasonable person in the client's position, if 
warned of the risk, would be likely to attach 
significance to it, or 
b) the doctor is .or should reasonably be aware that 
that particular.client, if warned of the risk, would be 
lH 'see Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law: A Selection 
of Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: J L Van Schaik (1991) 4. 
1
>i
4 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
rn··subject to "therapeutic privilege" (see di~cussion infra 
under 3.3), although the court did not venture to define the 
ambit of the so-called privilege. Some commentators contend that 
the attitude towards the privilege in casu can be construed as 
somewhat negative; see Coetzee LC Medical Therapeutic Privilege 
(LLM dissertation, University of· South Africa, 2001) 13, fn 73. 
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likely to attach significance to it."6 
Therefore, whichever form the consent of the client took, if 
sufficient information was not given in the course of treatment, 
the consent is invalid. Consent can be express, tacit or implied. 
Express consent would be where tne client actually expresses his 
or her consent in words, be it vocally or in writing. According 
to Van Oosten187 , "tacit consent" refers to "consent communicated 
by the conduct of the patient", while "implied consent" refers to 
"consent to matters which are by necessary implication included 
in the subject-matter of express or tacit consent" 188 • All 
instances, in principle, amount to valid actual consent. 
Thus, although it is not required for the client expressly to 
consent to every step of the indicated treatment, the client must 
be informed of every material step, thus giving him or her the 
opportunity to withdraw consent. Due to the manner in which 
medical treatment is generally provided, there are ·some who argue 
that informed consent in actual fact amounts to somewhat of a 
fiction. 189 In reality, it is not practically possible to impart 
18 l;Wi th regard to disclosure in the psychotherapeutic context 
(in the United States), see also, for instance, Perlin ML Mental 
Disability Law: Civil and Criminal Vol 3 (2 ed) Lexis publishing 
(2000) 318, who asserts that the psychotherapist must disclose 
all risks that are "material" - if the "reasonable person" in 
what the physician ·knows or ought to know to be a client's 
position would be likely to attach significance to the risk in 
reaching a decision. 
1870p cit 680. 
i'""As an example, Van Oosten (ibid) states that the violation 
of bodily integrity is a necessary concomitant of express or 
tacit consent to surgical intervention under general anaesthesia. 
lH'!According to Miller, in the United States, physicians' 
obligations to obtain informed consent from their clients before 
initiating treatment dates back to at least the 1950s. In theory, 
competent clients have the "right to refuse treatment" (which he 
maintains is more accurately called "the right to be treated only 
with informed consent"). Mill~r asserts that, despite the 
theoretical benefits of informed consent•s supposedly enhancing 
client autonomy, several scholars have argued that it has had 
little impact on day-to-day medical practice; see Miller RD 
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all possibly relevant information; moreover, a doctor would not 
generally wait for a client's express consent (unless it involves 
a major intervention, such as an operation), but rather continues 
with the treatment as he or she sees fit, unless the client 
actually objects as long as the client submits, this is 
considered tacit consent. 
Therefore it is submitted, in practice, the "right to consent" 
exists more as the 11 'right to refuse or object". Provided that a 
person is adequately informed, and does not refuse or object 
when the doctor proceeds (given the opportunity to do so before 
procedures are commenced190 ), he or she indeed gives tacit consent. 
Nevertheless, if a doctor proceeds without giving information as 
to the material nature of what he or she is doing, such tacit 
consent would not be informed, and therefore invalid. A client's 
right to be informed so as to be placed in a posit~on to consent 
or refuse, is indeed fundamental. 
2.2 Informed Consent and Health Psychology 
The process involved in informed consent also provides fertile 
ground for the inf 1 uence of heal th psychology. 191 The manner in 
which communications.take place in this regard can be therapeutic 
or countertherapeutic. Moreover, for the client truly to exercise 
"Advance Directives for Psychiatric Treatment: A View From the 
Trenches" 4 Psych Pub Pol and L (September, 1998) 728-729. 
1
';('Van Oosten FFW "Some Reflections on Emergencies as 
Justification for Medical Intervention" in Ahrens HJ, Bar C, 
Fischer G, Spickhoff A, Taupitz, J (Eds) Festschr-ift fiir Erwin 
Deutsch K6ln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG (1999) at 680: "One of the 
essentials of consent as a defence is that it must precede the 
act in question. Even if the [cl]ient were, subsequent to an 
unauthorised medical intervention, to express his or her complete 
satisfaction with the course of 'action taken by the doctor or 
hospital, that would at most be tantamount to concurrence or 
ratification, but not to consent. Ex post facto consent is 
plainly a [contradiction in terms]." 
1
''
1cf fn 116 supra. 
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his or her rights, the doctor must do more than pay mere lip-
service to providing information - the client must essentially 
understand the material elements' involved. 
In this regard, a doctor must be sensitive to the degree to which 
a person is medically educated, and pitch his or her disclosure 
accordingly. Here the doctor should take a little time to fulfil 
his or her role as "teacher", building trust and rapport, 
providing insight into the relevant condition, and, wherever 
possible, emphasising basic life-style modifications for 
facilitating cure and preventing further problems. 1~ 
Not only must the doctor be sensitive to the person's level of 
education, but also, as alluded to above, he or she must be 
sensitive to the person's emotional state in the manner in which 
he or she communicates information. 193 Indeed, as has been stated, 
every health professional should have some training in health 
psychology in addition to the basic legal requirements involved. 194 
2.3 Advance Directives 
Advance directives for medical treatment are well-known in the 
United States. They were designed specifically to allow 
individuals to specify what treatment, if any, they would desire 
if they were to become terminally ill and unable to express their 
preferences. 195 According to Miller196 , advance directives are of 
1
''-rdeally, there should be an alliance with a professional 
health psychologist/consultant in this regard; see'fn 115 supra. 
E"'see also Coetzee LC Medical Therapeutic Privilege (LLM 
dissertation, University of South Africa, 2001) 166-169, 180. 
1
';4see Chapter I I I, 3. 2. 1. 3 supra. 
1
""see Miller RD "Advance Directives for Psychiatric 
Treatment: A View From the Trenches 11 4 Psych Pub Pol and L 
(September, 1998). According to him, advanced directives are a 
product of the trend in society to transform the doctor-client 
relationship from a paternalistic-fiduciary one (where physicians 
assume control and imperatively act in their clients' best 
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two types: a so-called "living will", in whidh individuals 
specify what treatments they consent to or ref use if they were to 
become incapacitated (and hence unable to express a treatment 
choice); and a proxy or "surrogate directive" or "durable power 
of attorney", where the indi victual names a person who is 
empowered to make the aforementioned choices in the event of the 
individual's becoming incapacitated. 
Advance directives have not yet been formally recognised in South 
Africa. Clark v Hurst NO and Others1n is the leading case in this 
regard. This case particularly concerns the so-called "right to 
die 11 , involving the withdrawal of medical treatment. In casu C 
had signed a living will, declaring his wish to be allowed to die 
if attempts at resuscitation were to leave him in a persistent 
vegetative state ( PVS) 198 • It subsequently so happened that C 
lapsed into a PVS, following complications during· an operation. 
The court refused to give recognition to the living will as such. 
The court applied the ordinary criterion for wrongfulness, the 
boni mores, in determining whether the discontinuation of medical 
treatment (including. artificial nourishment) would be lawful or 
not. 
Interestingly then, in casu on the facts, in spite of not 
formally giving effect to the advance directive, the court found 
that it was not wrongful to discontinue medical care. South 
African law will most probably come to recognise advance 
directives in the future. 199 These are thus incorporated into the 
following discussion. 
interests), to a consensual one (where clients assume more 
personal control over their care). 
1
''';Ibid 730. 
1 17 19 9 2 ( 4) SA 6 3 0 ( D) . 
1
''riA state in which a person has no awareness of self or 
surroundings. 
i····In fact, the South African Law Commission has already 
recommended this in one of its reports. 
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2. 4 The Existing and Potential Roles of Informed Consent and 
Advance Directives in Clinical Psychiatry 
2.4.1 Basic Informed Consent 
Although there are cases in which psychiatric clients are not 
competent to make decisions regarding their treatment, informed 
consent remains fundamental - if it is at all possible to procure 
a client's consent, such consent must be procured. 200 In the 
unreported South African case, Rompel v Botha201 , a psychiatrist 
was held liable for administering electroconvulsive therapy 
( ECT), during which the client sustained a bone fracture, 202 
without informed consent. Strauss203 asserts that the facts of the 
case clearly indicate that the client had been capable of consent 
and, despite that fact, had not been properly informed of the 
risks involved. In the context of South African law, this case, 
as Strauss points out, highlights the fact that it must be 
established whether ~ psychiatric client is capable of consenting 
and, if so, tllat such consent must be obtained. 204 
~ 011The consequences of not obtaining duly informed consent 
are discussed in the next chapter. 
_u
1Quoted in Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 1957 3 
SA 710 (T) at 719. 
~ 0-rt is evident that this is a rather old case (1953). The 
risk of sustaining a fracture has since been eradicated by the 
development of muscle-relaxants (eg suxamethonium), which are 
administered during ECT. 
~ 0 'Strauss SA "Ethics in the Treatment of Mental Patients: 
Some Aspects" in Van Wyk C & Van Oosten H (Eds) Nihil Obstat: 
Feesbundel vir WJ Hosten/Essays in Honour of WJ Hosten (1996) at 
188. 
~ 04 See Mason and McCall-Smith Law and Medical Ethics ( 5 ed) 
Butterworths: Edinburgh (1999) 503, for a British perspective: 
"The mere presence . of a psychiatric condition will not, of 
itself, be sufficient to justify compulsory treatment: a person 
may suffer from psychiatric [condition] and yet still be able to 
reach a reasoned decision as to whether or not to undergo 
therapy. Compulsory treatment is justified only if a person's 
remaining untreated poses a threat to his own health or safety 
or to the safety of others." Mason and McCall-Smith (at 506) 
further state that compulsory psychiatric treatment for those who 
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Significantly, Allan and Allan contend that, from a therapeutic 
perspective, even incompetent clients should be involved in the 
decision-making process as far as possible, since "this often 
facilitates the success of the treatment". 205 Miller206 comments 
that a major benefit that is claimed for the recognition of 
clients' "rights to refuse treatment" is that psychiatrists are 
compelled to listen to them. He maintains that, although client 
refusals of psychotropic medications, for instance, are rarely 
sustained by the courts, the process of psychiatris~s' attempting 
to explain the risks, benefits, and alternatives involved, can be 
beneficial. 
Indeed, in most medical contexts, the process involved in 
obtaining consent can actually be therapeutic. 207 As has been 
pose no threat to others is based ori "the notion of justified 
paternalism", where the intention is to protect an incapacitated 
person from harm. They (506-507) assert that: "ordinarily, 
paternalistic action will be considered wrong because it offends 
the principle of autonomy. It may be justified, however, when the 
person for whose benefit the act is performed is unable to make 
an informed choice for himself." They mention two approaches to 
the situation: 1) the American substituted-judgment test, which 
asks the question: "would the client, were he or she rational, 
consent to the treatment proposed?" . If the answer is yes, 
treatment may be justified; 2) the "doctrine of implied consent", 
where someone who is not able to consent to a procedure at one 
time may later be able to endorse what was done, thereby 
providing "a form of retrospective consent". Mason and McCall-
Smith note that there are serious objections to the latter 
approach (see also Van Oosten, fn 190 supra). Some objections 
observed by Mason and McCall-Smith include that there may be 
difficulty in predicting when a client's subsequent consent will 
be given, and that it is also possible that any post hoc consent 
"will be a product of the intervention itself - as, for example, 
where treatment results in increased docility, compliance or even 
dependence on the person providing it". Mason and McCall-Smith 
accordingly conclude that it is better to rely on the first-
mentioned approach. · 
-
0
"Allan A & Allan M "The right of mentally ill patients to 
refuse treatment" SALJ (1997) 586. 
~' 1 'Dp cit 735 
~'''"commenting on informed consent through advance directives, 
Stavis asserts that building a client's trust in this manner 
indeed "encourages participation, reinforces a therapeutic 
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stated, however, there is also scope for 
effects. It is in those few cases where 
countertherapeutic 
the controversial 
"therapeutic privilege 11200 might operate. Nevertheless, in most 
cases, the sharing of information, and the dialogue that this 
stimulates, are very therapeutic. Ideally, the imperative of 
obtaining informed consent should provide an opportunity not only 
to give effect to the client's rights, but also to .further his or 
her best interests by giving him or her insight into his or her 
condition, cultivating a relationship of mutual trust and 
respect, and promoting his or her sense of control regarding his 
or her situation. 
2.4.2 Advance Directives 
According to Miller209 , although the laws in the United States 
concerning advance directives originally developed in the context 
of living wills, advance directives are currently used for future 
medical treatment generally and also for psychiatric care. 210 
Nevertheless, he contends that there are major conceptual and 
practical differences between advance directives for non-
psychiatric medical treatment and those for psychiatric 
treatment. The main differences are summarised in the table on 
the next page. 
alliance, minimizes conflict, and maximizes cooperation where 
there is mutuality of trust, understanding, and appropriate 
treatment". See Stavis PF "The Nexum: a Modest Proposal for Self-
guardianship by Contract, a System of Advance Directives and 
Surrogate Cammi ttees-at-large for the Intermittently Mentally 
Ill" 16 J Contemp H L & Pol 1 (Winter, 1999) 17 . 
.:oHDiscussed infra under 3. 3 . 
.:o"Miller RD "Advance Directives for Psychiatric Treatment: 
A View From the Trenches" 4 Psych Pub Pol and L (September, 19 9 8) 
735. 
.:iDMiller (ibid) notes several states (in the United States) 
that have passed explicit statutes authorising psychiatric 
advance directives: Minnesota in 1991, Hawaii in 1992, Oregon in 
1993, and Utah in 1995. 
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NON-PSYCHIATRIC MEDICAL 
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
Designed to express the wishes 
of clients who are, at the 
relevant later time, totally 
unable to express any wishes 
at all. 
Medical directives in practice 
are usually negative (ie 
refusing life-sustaining 
treatment) . 
PSYCHIATRIC ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
Express the prior wishes of 
clients who are rprely totally 
unable to express their 
preferences at the relevant 
later stage, even though they 
might not be technically 
competent to do so. 
Psychiatric directives can, at 
least in theory, either 
request or refuse treatment: 
the choices include hospita-
lisation for protection of the 
client and others, and active 
treatments that have been 
demonstrated to be effective 
with the great majority of 
clients in controlling the 
symptoms of their conditions. 
2.4.3 Assessment of Advance Directives and Informed Consent in 
Clinical Psychiatry 
With reference to the work of Winick, a chief proponent of 
therapeutic jurisprudence211 , Miller212 advances inter alia the 
following possible benefits of psychiatric advance directives: 
1. Contemplating the possibility of a disabling CBC may 
~ 11 See fn 33 supra. 
~LCf Miller op cit 735-736. 
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motivate a person to take preventive measures. 
2. Taking responsibility for treatment empowers the 
client and counters the 11 infantilization typical of 
institutionalization". 
3. The ability to determine future treatment reduces 
stress created by uncertainty and the experience of 
helplessness. 
4. Addressing this important issue allows clients to 
"experience fe~lings of self-esteem and self-control 
that can increase their decision-making capacities and 
their ability to perform in other areas of their 
lives". 
5. Psychiatrists are compelled to "negotiate with", 
rather than 11 infantilize 11 , their clients. 
6. If clients know that they have chosen their own 
treatments, they are more likely to comply with them. 
7. As long as an incapacitated client's current wishes 
accord with the advance directive, it is possible to 
avoid formal adjudication of incompetency, which 
expends resources and can be stigmatising. 
It is submitted that the preponderance of authority in 
multinational medical law is indeed correct - indi victual autonomy 
should indeed be the point of departure as far as decisions 
regarding medical treatment are concerned. The approach is not 
only sound in principle, but also, if adhered to with due care 
and skill, produces better results for all involved. 213 Of course, 
_:·see Stavis PF "The Nexum: a Modest Proposal for Self-
guardianship by Contract, a System of Advance Directives and 
Surrogate Committees-at-large for the Intermittently Mentally 
Ill" 16 J Contemp H L & Pol 1 (Winter, 1999), where he proposes 
a system of informed consent that includes a form of self-
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giving expression to a person's autonomy through advance 
directives depends on the existence of a sound administrative 
system that is well managed. 214 A discussion of the specifics of 
such a system and its management, is beyond .the scope of the 
present dissertation. The principle is, however, here supported: 
advance directives, in the same manner as ordfnary informed 
consent, should be a point of departure in decision-making; only 
if there is some justification to overrule the advance directive, 
should it so be done. 215 It is thus submitted that South Africa 
should come to recognise advance directives216 , especially in the 
light of the strong constitutional emphasis on freedom as a 
fundamental value. As has been stated, this includes the freedom 
to make choices regarding medical intervention. 2~ 
guardianship by an advance directive contract, called a "Nexum. 11 
He suggests that this might further the aim of maximising client 
autonomy and effective treatment, while reducing costs and 
relieving an invariably overburdened court system . 
.-:
14Miller (op cit 744-745) cautions that "psychiatric advance 
directives are an intriguing idea, but like other attempts to 
transplant procedures developed in other areas of the law into 
psychiatry, they run into severe.problems in practice. For such 
directives to support true [client] autonomy ... , it is not 
sufficient to pass laws in a vacuum. Those laws (and the 
regulations or procedures that operationalize them) must take 
into account the real-world situations in which they will be 
implemented." 
:.:i"rn a New York· case, In the Matter of Rosa M 597 N Y S 2d 
544 (Sup Ct 1991), cited in Miller (op cit), a client consented 
to electroconvulsive therapy ( ECT), at a time when she was 
competent to make that decision. A short while later, she 
withdrew her consent and directed that she not be given ECT in 
the future. Subsequently, her condition deteriorated, and she 
became clearly incompetent to make treatment decisions. Her 
psychiatrist petitioned the court to authorise ECT, arguing that 
no other treatment would be effective. The court ruled that, in 
the absence of "an overriding state interest", a hospital must 
respect the "fundamental rights of individuals to have the final 
say in respect to decisions regarding their medical treatment". 
The court found that the petitioner had not proved that she had 
lacked capacity at the time that she had refused ECT. 
:.:
1
,;As the South African Law Commission has recommended; see 
fn 199 supra. 
1
'In South Africa, the law is obliged to promote the rights 
in the Bill of Rights (see section 7 (2) of the Constitution). 
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In sum, in respect of any medical treatment, individual autonomy 
should always be the first fundamental: only if it is clear that 
a person is not capable of exercising his or her autonomy218 , can 
actual informed consent be bypassed. 
This adds to the case for the recognition of advance directives, 
since these promote freedom of choice. 
~ 1Hin the psychiatric context, such competence would have to 
be constantly monitored. Stavis PF 11 The Nexum: a Modest Proposal 
for Self-guardianship by Contract, a System of Advance Directives 
and Surrogate Cammi ttees-at-large for the Intermittently Mentally 
Ill 11 16 J Contemp H L & Pol 1 (Winter, 1999) at 33, contends that 
"rejection of clearly necessary treatment, eg, in the case of a 
life-threatening condition and a patient's suicidal tendency, 
might call for an assessment of competency. This is, of course, 
not to say that disagreement with clinicians is evidence of in-
competence. Rather, in appropriate and substantial deviations 
from normal client behavior, it would naturally raise a need to 
consider whether further investigation is warranted. The law's 
recognition of the importance of personal autonomy·in competency 
determinations is evident in requiring 'clear and convincing' 
evidence before autonomy is reduced or negated. 11 As also emerges 
at intervals throughout his discussion, it is of cardinal 
importance that the process of adjudicating on competence should 
not interfere with urgently necessary treatment. Stavis (ibid 33-
34) cautions that remaining untreated can prevent a person from 
being restored to health, and that an "untreated severe [CBC] 
increases the chances of suicide and death from other causes". 
Nevertheless, he concludes: "Although seriously impaired people 
should be protected, the right to make decisions for oneself 
should not be burdened more than is absolutely necessary. In 
consequentialist terms, the issue is whether the harm of 
incorrectly labeling autonomous agents as incompetent is 
outweighed by the harm of incorrectly ignoring the [client]'s 
autonomy, or right of self-determination. The latter is 
significant to the extent [that] the [client] 'swell-being is at 
risk; no harm results from allowing an incompetent [client] to 
make a decision of minimal effect or one that is in keeping with 
his or her objective best interests. However, only [clearly] 
competent [persons should be allowed] to make decisions that are 
not in their [ 'objective' ] best interests [.] 11 • See also Stein MT 
"Decision-Making about Medical Care in an Adolescen:t with a Life-
threatening Illness" American Academy of Pediatrics 107 [Suppl]: 
979-982 (April, 2001), where, in respect of a case of a 13-year 
old boy with acute lymphocytic leukemia who refuses a potentially 
lifesaving bone marrow transplant, Stein contends that the 
possibility of depression that may be impairing the adolescent's 
ability to be part of the decision-making process, must first be 
addressed: "If [J] is clinically depressed, all other medical 
decisions should be deferred, and he should be treated for 
depression. A combination of antidepressant medication and 
individual therapy may be needed. 11 
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3 Emergency as Justification for Intervention 
According to Van Oosten219 , emergency interventions may be 
classified into two categories: unauthorised administration and 
necessity. This division is reflected in figure 4 (supra 75) with 
the suggested further subdivisions under necessity. These grounds 
will next be discussed. 
3.1 Unauthorised Administration (Negotiorum Gestio) 
The requirements for negotiorum gestio can be summarised as 
follows 220 : 
1) The client is at the time incapable of cons~nting to 
a medical intervention that is 
2) urgently necessary to save his or her life or to 
protect his or her health, where he or she 
3) would have consented thereto had he or she been in 
a position to do so, 
4) and such intervention is performed clearly in the 
client's best interest. 
Point 3) above requires some discussion. Traditionally, it has 
been stated that the requirement is that the client must have 
placed no prior prohibition on the intervention. It is submitted, 
however, that the true requirement is that the client would 
-
1
'.'Van Oosten FFW "Some Reflections on Emergencies as 
Justification for Medical Intervention" in Ahrens HJ, Bar C, 
Fischer G, Spickhoff A, Taupitz, J (Eds) Festschrift fUr Erwin 
Deutsch Koln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG (1999) 676-677. 
_ _:,;See ibid; cf Coetzee LC Medical Therapeutic Privilege (LLM 
dissertation, University of South Africa, 2001) 79-82. 
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actually have consented to the intervention at the time. 01 Van 
Oosten222 advances the requirement. that the client m~st have placed 
no prior prohibition on the intervention, but adds: "and would 
have consented to it had he or she been in a position to do 
so .. ". It is submitted, however, that it is unnecessary to 
advance both points as requirements. In the final "objective" (in 
other words, the situation actually prevailing at the time) 
analysis in the assessment of wrongfulness, the only relevant 
·question is whether the client would have consented. 223 The 
~~ 1This also accords with its treatment as an instance of so-
c al led "presumed consent"; see Coetzee LC Medical Therapeutic 
Privilege (LLM dissertation, University of South Africa, 2001) 
82. Like any factual presumption (as opposed to certain 
"irrebuttable" legal presumptions), a presumption that a person 
would have consented can later be rebutted. tt should be 
clarified that the question whether the person would have 
consented or not is a question of fact - it would most notably 
distinguish whether a rescuer is acting in putative unauthorised 
administration or (actual) unauthorised administration. The fact 
of whether the person would have consented or not is subject to 
a balance-of-probabilities (civil claims) or a beyond-reasonable-
doubt (criminal charges) burden of proof, but the question 
remains objective (see also fn 223 infra). In the final analysis, 
if it was reasonable to believe (ie the reasonable rescuer would 
so have believed) that the person would have consented, the 
rescuer would escape liability even if it is proven that the 
person would not actually have consented. All that this would 
mean is that there was no actual valid unauthorised 
administration, but merely putative unauthorised administration. 
A court would carefully weigh the evidence, however, since 
invalid unauthorised administration will have the effect that the 
rescuer will not be able to claim remuneration; see 90-91 infra. 
-~-op cit 676-677. 
::~'Which, somewhat ironically is a purely subjective test in 
the sense that it depends entirely on the client's will - of 
course, this apparent objective-subjective dichotomy is instantly 
resolved if one considers that persons' thought processes are 
also part of the objective situation actually prevailing. Suppose 
late on a Friday (incidently the 13t'') night, X, a fairly 
innocently playful varsity villain, jumps from behind a bush, 
wearing a very scary "Scream" (the movie) suit, with the 
intention of scaring the wits out of a young girl who, unbeknown 
to him, is a 51:1i Dan Tae Kwon Do (a Korean martial art) expert. 
She interprets his actions as a life-threatening attack, 
considering his size and horrific resemblance to the killer in 
the movie "Scream". Without a sound or a hint of hesitation, she 
defends herself - to his dire detriment. In actual fact, he had 
had no intention of hurting her and was planning to turn and run 
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requirement that there must be. no prior prohib;i tion is thus 
actually irrelevant. If, for instance, the unlikely scenario 
would transpire that a client had placed a prior prohibition but 
would later actually have consented to the intervention, an 
objective ground of justification would be present. 224 
Considering that the test for wrongfulness is, in principle, 
"objective" and based on an ex post facto evaluation, the fact 
that a client would or would not have consented at that time is 
of central concern. If it appears that the client would not have 
consented, and thus that the intervention was in actual fact 
against the client's will, unauthorised administration cannot 
operate as (an objective ex post facto) ground of justification. 225 
It is notable that, if there is justified unauthorised 
administration, the practitioner would be entitled to claim 
remuneration for his services from the person to whose aid he 
came. 
226 Strauss227 points out, however, that South African law 
as soon as he had secured a mental picture of her expression so 
that he may have a satisfying chuckle later. Needless to say, he 
was not to laugh. Before he could escape, he had been severely 
injured. From a legal point of view, the only factor that renders 
this a situation of putative private defence (thus not real 
objective private defence) is actually the fact that he had had 
no intention to hurt her. If he had been planning to overpower 
her and to kill her in the manner that she had in mind, it would 
have been a case of (real) private defence. It is clear that a 
person's subjective intentions and desires can be very important 
factors to consider in assessing the objective situation. 
:::~ 4 0f course, a prior prohibition would create a strong 
presumption that the client would not have consented at the time 
of the unauthorised administration. Nevertheless, if he or she 
would have consented, the conduct will have been lawful. 
;:~"·rt is a well-established requirement of unauthorised 
administration that administration must not be against the will 
of the "beneficiary"; see Strauss S A Doctor, Patient and the 
Law: a Selection of Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: Van Schaik 
(1991) 94: "The treatment must not be against the will of the 
patient [emphasis in original]." 
-~·See Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law: a Selection 
of Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: Van Schaik (1991) 95. 
-~~Ibid. 
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allows recovery only where at the time of the action the 
practitioner acted with the intention of claiming remuneration. 
He also notes that such remuneration is limited to the recovery 
of expenses incurred.or any loss suffered by the practitioner as 
a result of the services that he or she rendered. 
3.2 Necessity 
3.2.1 General 
In the case of necessity, the intervention must also be urgently 
necessary, but points 1), 3) and 4) required for unauthorised 
administration, are not required. It follows that the state of 
emergency could relate to persons other than the client, and that 
the intervention can, in principle, be performed against the 
client's will if the emergency so justifies. 228 Van Oosten229 
correctly points out that the traditional distinction between 
unauthorised administration and necessity does not hold any 
water. Traditionally, it is said that: 
1) necessity involves the sacrifice of the interests of 
an innocent third party, whereas unauthorised 
administration involves two parties: the caretaker and 
the beneficiary; 
2) necessity protects the interests of society, whereas 
unauthorised administration protects the interests· of 
an individual; 
_c:HThis would generally be in society's best interest 
("public necessity" - see fn 241 infra) . Van Oosten furnishes the 
example of the inoculation of capable persons against their 
express refusal in . order to prevent a dangerous infectious 
disease from spreading. See Van Oosten FFW "Some Reflections on 
Emergencies as Justification for Medical Intervention" in Ahrens 
HJ, Bar c, Fischer G, Spickhoff A, Taupitz, J (Eds) Festschrift 
fur Erwin Deutsch Koln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG (1999) 677. 
--·'Ibid 678. 
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3) unauthorised administration protects a pecuniary 
interest, whereas any legally recognised interest may 
be protected in· necessity. 
Van Oosten refers to the 11 Karneades 11 example of necessity to 
refute points 1) and 2) above. In this example, two shipwrecked 
men fight for life over a piece of flotsam that is unable to hold 
both of them. This example indeed amounts to a situation of 
necessity, but involves neither a third person2~, nor the 
protection of society. 231 To refute the fin al point, Van Oosten 
contends that the medical setting clearly demonstrates that 
unauthorised administration can protect the interests of life or 
heal th. 232 
Van Oosten233 concludes that, in the context of medical 
interventions, the essence of unauthorised administration lies in 
an emergency situation and the impossibility of obtaining a 
client's consent, while the essence of necessity lies in an 
emergency situation and involuntary (against the client's will) 
invasion of the client's bodily integrity. 234 Two further 
:.:
30 In fact, another person per se is not even really 
required; one can violate an abstract legal provision in 
necessity (see Snyman CR Criminal Law ( 4 ed) Durban: Butterworths · 
(2002) 120). An example would be where one has ingested a noxious 
substance and one then exceeds the speed limit so ,as to receive 
urgently necessary medical attention (cf S v Pretorius 1975 (2) 
SA 85 (SWA), which was actually a case of putative necessity -
it was thought that the child was in grave danger due to 
swallowing the pills). 
2 nrn the context of justifying medical intervention, Van 
Oosten (op cit) acknowledges, however, that "whether or not 
necessity is also capable of operating, in extreme cases, as a 
justification where the protected legal interest is not that of 
society but that of the patient, is a notoriously controversial 
and ticklish issue. 11 • See, further, the discussion on therapeutic 
privilege and necessity statim infra. 
_:j_:Ibid 679. 
:.:"Ibid 682. 
- '·~on the issue of the practical value of differentiating 
clearly between defences by their definitions, Van Oosten (ibid) 
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noteworthy requirements for the operation of necessity as a 
ground of justif icatlon are that the extent of the invasion must 
be necessary to avert the danger (in other words, it must not be 
more harmful than necessary) and the interest infringed must at 
least be commensurate with the interest protected. 235 
3.2.2 Therapeutic Necessity and Therapeutic Privilege 
3.2.2.1 Therapeutic Necessity 
A recognised (but controversial). instance of applying necessity 
as a justification to protect the client, is that of, what Van 
Oosten236 terms, "therapeutic necessity": "where ·medical inter-
vention is indicated, but disclosure of the information in 
question to the patient would be more harmful than non-
disclosure". This particular situation of withholding information 
has also been referred to as "therapeutic privilege". 237 
In the light of the meaning of 11 necessity 11238 and 11 privilege" 239 , 
it is, however, submitted that a distinction should be drawn 
states: "[O]ne should not overlook the consideration that the 
more exact the definition and requisites of a def~nce are, the 
easier it will be to establish whether or not they have been 
satisfied[.] [C]larification ... adds practical value to the 
' def enc es involved. ir This accords with HMM. 
~'·"·see further Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Law 
of Delict (4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (2001) 86-92, and Snyman 
CR Criminal Law (4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (2002) 117-120. 
~''op cit 677, fn 27. 
~ 17 See Coetzee LC Medical Therapeutic Privilege (LLM 
dissertation, University of South Africa, 2001). See also Welz 
D "The boundaries of medical-therapeutic privilege" SALJ (1999). 
:: 'HGenerally used in the context of justifying acting 
positively, where an urgent situation so demands. 
- ''·Generally used in the context of not disclosing 
information, eg as in the case of attorney-client privilege; see, 
for instance Schmidt & Rademeyer Bewysreg ( 4 ed) Durban: 
Butterworths (2000) 553 et seq. 
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between therapeutic necessity and therapeutic privilege. 240 
"Therapeutic necessity" should be used to describe the situation 
of involuntary (in the sense of "against the will") medical 
intervention as such241 , whereas "therapeutic privilege" should 
refer to the situation of withholding information. 
1 
This distinction is warranted, since there is a significant 
difference between performing a procedure on a client against his 
or her will, and withholding certain information regarding the 
client's condition. It is submitted that the former is most 
appositely classified as therapeutic necessity, whilst the latter 
is most appositely classified as therapeutic privilege. 
:.:
4DThese two terms have generally been seen as synonyms; see 
Coetzee (op cit) 5, fn 23. Coetzee (ibid 78) prefers the term 
"therapeutic justification", but settles on "therapeutic 
privilege" due to its being so firmly entrenched in medical law 
around the world. A valid point of criticism that he (ibid 77) 
raises against the term is that it might create the impression 
that the doctor can use his or her professional discretion when 
deciding whether to disclose certain information - it is his or 
her "privilege". However, it is submitted that, if one views 
"privilege" as simply referring to the non-disclosure of certain 
information (as in "privileged" information), the term should not 
give rise to practical problems. Health-care prof~ssionals who 
are aware of the privilege, if they are not negligent, will take 
note that the privilege is very strictly limited (see further the 
discussion infra under 3.3). 
:.:
41This would then be a specific form of "necessity" as 
ground of justification in medical law. It is submitted that, 
where community interests are involved, this could more 
specifically be referred to as "public necessity". The situation 
where the treated individual's interests are infringed to protect 
another individual's (or limited group of individuals') 
interests, could then be referred to as "private necessity". An 
example of this is where a client's confidentiality is breached 
to warn another of imminent danger (see examples and discussion 
in chapter IX, 3, infra). It is submitted that "necessity" in 
medical law can, accordingly, be divided into "public necessity", 
where community interests are protected, "private necessity", 
where another individual's (or limited group of individuals') 
interests are protected, and "therapeutic necessity", where the 
treated individual's interests are protected (while at the same 
time infringing his or her autonomy). Just like other forms of 
necessity, therapeutic necessity would also require inter alia 
a real emergency and commensurability of interests. 
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3.2.2.2 The Scope of Therapeutic Necessity 
It is submitted that, if there is no reason to believe that a 
person's judgment is in any way clouded, there can be no 
justification for intervening in his or her "best interests'' on 
the ground of therapeutic necessity. 242 Consider the following 
contentions on the part of Strauss243 : 
"The law will not protect the health fanatic who 
forcibly attempts to prevent me from using ·a lot of 
sugar in my coffee, because he maintains quite 
correctly so - that in the long run it will harm my 
health and may even shorten my life. On the other hand, 
the doctrine of necessity will clearly avail the 
policeman who forcibly restrains me from committing 
~ 4 ~Cf Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law: a Selection 
of Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: Van Schaik (1991) at 91-92, 
who states: "It is submitted .. that in regard to medical treatment 
of a person whose life or health is in serious danger as a result 
of injury, disease or ill-heal th, such treatment against his 
express will is in principle not justifiable on the basis of 
necessity, unless the act is directed ... to protection of the 
community interest[.]" It is submitted that this' statement is 
correct (cf Van Oosten FFW "Some Reflections on Emergencies as 
Justification for Medical Intervention" in Ahrens HJ, Bar C, 
Fischer G, Spickhoff A, Taupitz, J (Eds) Festschrift fUr Erwin 
Deutsch Koln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG (1999) 678, fn 28). If an 
intervention is necessary to protect a community interest, it 
would be a case of "public necessity''· "Private necessity" is 
unlikely to justify medical treatment as such (see fn 241 statim 
supra). If the "express will" of the person is clearly 
unfettered, therapeutic necessity cannot operate to protect his 
or her own interests. If, however, the person's judgment is 
significantly fettered, it can, as will shortly be discussed, be 
overridden in therapeutic necessity. If the reasonable 
practitioner would clearly have believed, with expert 
psychological assistance if at all possible (it is submitted, see 
fn 244 infra), that the person's judgment is fettered, putative 
therapeutic necessity as an excuse could operate (see chapter v, 
5 infra) . An important point of difference between it and 
unauthorised administration should be highlighted: in the case 
of unauthorised administration, the person is totally incapable 
of consenting, whereas in therapeutic necessity it must merely 
be clear that his or her judgment is fettered, not that he or she 
is totally incompetent. 
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suicide by jumping off a window-ledge in a high 
building. A doctor would also clearly have the right to 
save the life of the would-be suicide who has taken an 
overdose of pills, by pumping out the content of the 
stomach or by administering a neutralisi~g agent. 
Likewise, it is submitted, medical treatment can be 
administered to a prisoner who, in consequence of a 
hunger-strike, is at death's door." 
With regard to the above, the following is submitted: The first 
~xample (ie sugar use) could not amount to therapeutic necessity 
for two noteworthy reasons: firstly, there is no emergency 
situation, and, secondly, there are no circumstances to suggest 
that the sugar-using person's judgment is manifestly clouded. In 
all the last-mentioned examples, however, circumstances may 
indeed indicate that the person's judgment may be significantly 
clouded. Those are the types of situations where the person, who 
at the time is not thinking clearly, might be very grateful for 
the intervention a while after the incident. A person who is 
about to die of starvation does not generally have ~he unfettered 
competence to make decisions. 244 Similarly, a person who is about 
to commit suicide, or has attempted suicide, does not 
characteristically act with crystal clarity of mind the 
circumstances that induce a decision to commit suicide would 
invariably cloud such decision-making. It is trite that consent 
must be given freely and voluntarily; so too refusal must be free 
and voluntary. If it objectively prevails that a person's 
judgment is impaired when he or she refuses urgently necessary 
treatment, therapeutic necessity as justification can operate. 245 
~ 44 Such a case should nevertheless involve expert assessment, 
however; unless, for instance, there is a clear precedent, where 
numerous mental-health professionals have unequivocally and 
consistently concluded that a person in that situation is hardly 
ever capable of thinking clearly, and that it is obvious that the 
benefit of the doubt should be awarded to the life-saving course 
of action. 
~ 4 "'Another example of such a situation in the psychiatric 
context features in Mason and McCall-Smith Law and Medical Ethics 
(5 ed) Butterworths: Edinburgh (1999) 517. They discuss R v W 
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It is submitted that an additional requirement, which is usually 
required in the context of unauthorised administration rather 
than necessity, viz that the intervention must clearly be in the 
person's best interest, should be demanded fo.r therapeutic 
necessity. The essential features of therapeutic necessity are 
thus as follows: 
1) The intervention is actually urgent. 
2) There is no viable alternative to deal with the 
emergency. 
3) Material information has been disclosed. 
4) The person refuses (or has refused) treatment. 
5) The refusal is clearly the product of fettered 
[ 1992] 4 All ER 627, a case concerning a 16-year old girl 
suffering from anorexia nervosa, who was violent towards the 
staff and prone to self-injury. On account of this, she had to 
be "immobilised". The English Co\lrt of Appeal had no doubt that 
it could overrule a minor's refusal of treatment. The court held 
that it is a feature of anorexia that it is capable of destroying 
the ability to make an informed choice (as per Lord Donaldson 
MR): "It creates a compulsion to refuse treatment or only to 
accept treatment which is likely to be ineffective. This attitude 
is part and parcel of the disease and the more advanced the 
disease, the more compelling it may become." Mason and McCall-
Smi th (ibid) suggest that this case opens the door to non-
consensual treatment in all instances of anorexia nervosa, 
irrespective of age. In another case, Re KB (1994) 19 BMLR 144, 
which involved an 18 year-old girl, Ewbank J accepted the 
argument that she was "suffering from anorexia nervosa ... and that 
relieving symptoms was just as much a part of treatment as 
relieving the underlying cause [.]" The court held that it was 
clear that feeding by nasogastric tube in the circumstances 
constituted "treatment". The treatment that she was refusing was 
held to be related to her particular "mental illness" and, 
accordingly, she did not have the capacity to refuse the 
treatment. Mason and McCall-Smith conclude (at 518) that "[t]he 
cases as a whole ... demonstrate a judicial anxiety to save lives 
when that is possible and some distrust of an autonomy which 
allows [people] to take fatal treatment decisions in 
circumstances in which their competence to do so is, at least, 
doubtful." 
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judgment. 
6) The intervention is clearly in the unwilling 
person's best interests (in these cases, this would 
inevitably also cover commensurability). 
4 Therapeutic Privilege 
As has been stated, "therapeutic privilege" involves withholding 
material information, where disclosure thereof to the client 
would be more harmful than non-disclosure. Welz246 quotes the 
Information Resource Manual of the American Society for 
Gastrointestinal Endoscopy, as follows: 
"There are times when disclosure .... might be 
detrimental to the welfare of certain [cl]ients. The 
law recognizes this and has fashioned the exception of 
therapeutic privilege. If you believe that ... 
disclosure would, on balail'ce, be more harmful to a 
[cl]ient, you may delete it citing this exception. In 
reality, [however,] the law looks with a critical eye 
toward the use of therapeutic privilege ... ". 
Welz247 also refers to the important American case of Canterbury 
v Spence248 : 11 [This J exception obtains when risk-disclosure poses 
such a threat of detriment to the [cl]ient as to become 
unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of view." 
Welz249 emphasises that the court insisted that the privilege must 
be very carefully circumscribed, or it might devour the 
disclosure rule itself. 
~ 4 'Welz D "The boundaries of medical-therapeutic privilege" 
SALJ (1999) 312. 
-~~Ibid. 
~~"464 F 2d 772 (App DC 1972). 
~~''op cit. 
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Coetzee contends that therapeutic privilege should be seen as a 
separate and independent legal defence eo nomine. 2~ It is 
submitted that it can indeed be seen as a ground of justification 
eo nomine. It can, for instance, operate even in instances where 
informed consent is not at issue, but merely information 
disclosure regarding a client's condition. 251 It is, however, a 
ground of justification that should operate only in extremely 
exceptional cases. Coetzee2~ offers the following cogent reasons 
for limiting the operation of therapeutic privilege: 
1) Therapeutic privilege represents a departure from 
~ 5°Coetzee LC Medical Therapeutic Privilege (LLM 
dissertation, University of South Africa, 2001) 94. 
~ 0' 1As is the general principle regarding therapeutic 
privilege, such instances would be highly exceptional. Coetzee 
op cit 179, avers as follows: "There can be no general rule in 
terms of which information - especially information relating to 
the diagnosis and prognosis of a serious or (potentially) fatal 
illness may be withheld from seriously ill or dying 
indi victuals. Several factors require that honest disclosure 
should be the rule in most cases: the very significance of such 
information for (cl]ient self-determination; the likelihood that 
attempts to shield [cl]ients from the truth will be futile; the 
fact that (cl]ients who discover the truth about their disease 
despite efforts to conceal the truth may find themselves in 
isolation, unable to share their concerns and fears; the fact 
that the withholding of information may lead to inadequate or 
inappropriate medical care; the relief of uncertainty which may 
follow on disclosure of the truth; and the fact that the doctor's 
own emotional reluctance, embarrassment, fears, uneasiness and 
anxieties to confront the patient with the truth may make it very 
difficult for the ·doctor to be objective when deciding whether 
or not to disclose such information ... Although it is undesirable 
to shower a moribund patient with upsetting information, doctors 
should not be allowed to escape their duty to inform by merely 
allowing a fatal disease to run its course without taking the 
time to divulge such information as would in th~ anticipated 
course of illness and treatment become necessary for the (cl] ient 
in making treatment decisions." Coetzee (ibid) makes some special 
remarks regarding psychotherapy clients: "It must be recognised 
that special considerations may apply in the case of psychiatry 
and psychotherapy because of the highly subjective nature of the 
psychiatrist- (cl] ient relationship, and because psychiatrists may 
be better able to predict the effect that information might have 
on (cl]ients." 
-'-op cit 37-68, 173. 
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the fundamental principle of self-determination. 
2) A decision to withhold information may lead to other 
deceptions - there is the possibility of significant 
harm ensuing if the client were to learn the truth 
despite efforts to prevent this. 
3) Too permissive an attitude towards therapeutic 
privilege may lead to a weakening of the relationship 
of trust that imperatively must exist between 
practitioner and client. 
4) Lack of trust may result inter alia in the 
deterioration of health standards and concomitant costs 
for society if clients were to avoid or delay 
consulting doctors for fear that their broader personal. 
needs might be disregarded. 
5) It may legitimise doctors' natural disinclination 
towards being bearers of bad news - the motivation to 
withhold the truth from clients might sometimes 
originate from·the doctor's unwillingness to be the 
bearer of bad news. 
6) There is potential for abuse, including the 
possibility that doctors might manufacture therapeutic 
privilege as a defence after the fact to shield 
negligence. 
7) There is a distinct lack of professional expertise 
in predicting the effect of disclosure of information 
on clients. 
It can safely be concluded that the scope for applying 
therapeutic privilege should be extremely limited. Health 
professionals must take careful note of this, and health-care 
consumers must be able to rest assured that the relationship of 
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trust that is essential to any practitioner-client relationship 
(especially in the psychotherapeutic context) is held in utmost 
high regard. It is submitted that therapeutic privilege can never 
justify the giving of false information only in certain 
exceptional, dire si tuations253 can the withholding of information 
be justified. 254 
It is submitted that therapeutic privilege should be able to 
operate as a ground of justification for withholding information 
only if: 
1) it is clear that disclosure will seriously harm the 
client; 255 
2) any proposed intervention concerning which material 
information is withheld, is urgently necessary ( ie 
there is no viable alternative, and it is an emergency 
~"' 1Coetzee (op cit 177) avers that the privilege should be 
upheld in cases where "disclosure of information may lead to 
serious and not merely transient injury to a [cl]ient's health 
or threaten [cl]ient's life .... Specifically, if disclosure would 
hold, or increase, the risk of suicide, for instance in the case 
of a severely depressed [cl]ient, information may be withheld". 
He states (at 88) that, in general, depression can provide a 
reason for invoking therapeutic privilege. 
:c:'
4The following submissions on the part of Coetzee (ibid 
180) implicitly emphasise the role that knowledge of medical 
psychology (see fn 118 supra) can play in health-care provision 
(see also fn 107 supra): "[T]he emphasis should be shifted from 
•what to tell the [cl]ient' to 'how to tell the '[cl]ient' and 
'when to tell the [cl]ient•. Improving the quality of 
communication, especially through the development of 
communication skills, could go a long way in overcoming the 
problem of avoiding harm through disclosure. Communication should 
be tuned in to the emotional state, fears and needs of the 
particular [cl]ient. Research shows that the common belief that 
communication skills cannot be taught is incorrect. Communication 
skills training [as part of medical psychology] should fulfill 
its rightful place on the medical curriculum." 
- It should be clarified that withholding information 
regarding risks must not be with the purpose solely of obtaining 
consent to a medically indicated intervention to which the client 
is unlikely to consent - it must be clear that the disclosure per 
se will seriously harm the client. 
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situation); 256 
3) any such proposed intervention is clearly in the 
client's best interest· 2~ 
' 
4) in the case of a proposed intervention, the client 
has not indicated that he or she would not undergo any 
intervention that harbours the type of risks that are 
now not being disclosed. 258 
It is notable that simply withholding certain material details 
regarding a client's condition (~ithout any particular proposed 
intervention) would not necessarily involve an emergency 
situation. In such a case the practitioner must, it is submitted, 
encourage the client to utilise counselling services as part of 
an holistic integrated treatment plan. Such counselling should 
then inter alia be d.irected at placing the client in a position 
to be given the outstanding information. Wherever 
indi victual autonomy and the right to information259 
respected and protected. 
possible, 
should be 
It is important to note that the antithetical situation, ie where 
a practitioner is callous and imprudently unselective as to the 
type of information, the timing of disclosure and.the manner in 
which the information is conveyed, could also constitute 
malpractice. Law and medicine ultimately both aim to serve the 
client's best interests (including the interest of autonomy). A 
"defensive" practice whereby a client is indiscriminately 
-"·';Cf Coetzee LC Medical Therapeutic Privilege 
dissertation, University of South Africa, 2001) 95-99. 
(LLM 
-r'Here again, autonomy should be weighed in this process; 
cf Coetzee (ibid 100), who contends that the requirement of 
proportionality (commensurability) should be applied . 
.cr"This is similar to the no-prior-prohibition requirement 
of unauthorised administration; cf Coetzee (ibid 176). 
~r'''See also fn 62 supra. 
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bombarded with as much information as possible (primarily so as 
to comply with the · 11 legal 11 requirement of informed consent), 
regardless of the client's emotional state and the sensitivity of 
the communication, is medically, ethically and legally 
unacceptable. There are proverbial fires on both sides of the 
disclosure spectrum. A practitioner would do well to keep his or 
her client's best interests (including autonomy) as his or her 
primary concern. Defensive medicine is not only clinically 
counterproductive, but can also be legally counterproductive. 
There is no place for defensive medicine in a sound partnership 
between medicine and law - the type of partnership that is 
advocated in accordance with HMM. 
5 Authority as a Ground of Justification 
Van Oosten260 notes the possibility of authority as a ground of 
justification for medical intervention, eg statutory authority or 
court authorisation. A recent example in South African history 
illustrates how a court order can be a ground of justification. 
A Cape court ordered the removal of a bullet from an accused's 
leg against his will, for the purpose of ballistic testing to be 
used in evidence. 261 
6 Duty as a Ground of Justification 
Regarding duty as a ground of justification, Van Oosten262 
furnishes the examples of a statutory duty and common-law duty, 
and states: 11 [D] uty has, if anything, an even stronger claim 
-·''van Oosten FFW "Some Reflections on Emergencies as 
Justification for Medical Intervention" in Ahrens HJ, Bar C, 
Fischer G, Spickhoff A, Taupitz, J (Eds) Festschrift fUr Erwin 
Deutsch Koln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG (1999) 674. 
-
1see Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 JDR 0212 
(C), not yet formally reported. 
c"-op cit 674, fn 8. 
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than authority to be treated as justification: A duty, as 
distinct from authority, not only creates a legal· obligation to 
act in accordance with it, but failure to do so may result in 
legal liability." An example of a duty that would justify the 
infringement of a person's rights in the medical context is the 
statutory duty imposed by section 13 of the Mental Health Act263 , 
which compels practitioners to disclose information regarding 
dangerous persons. 
7 Summary of Some Differences and Similarities between the 
Crystallised Grounds of Justification in Medical Law 
In the light of the above discussions regarding the various 
grounds of justification, the following clear fundamental 
differences/similarities between the various grounds can be 
highlighted: 
GROUND OF ROLE OF ROLE OF ROLE OF VIOLATION RELATED 
JUST I FI- INFORMA- PERSON'S EMERGENCY? OF LIABILITY 
CATION TION? WILL? AUTONOMY? ARISING 
FROM? 
INFORMED All Inter- Not No Intervention 
CONSENT material vent ion necessa- without real 
informa- with real rily justifica-
tion consent emergency tion 
disclosed 
THERA- Disclosure Inter- Not Yes, "for Inter-
PEUTIC of certain vent ion necessa- the vent ion 
PRIVILEGE material without rily person's without real 
informa- real emergency own sake" justifica-
tion (full) tion 
contra- consent 
indicated 
-·•·1a of 1973. 
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NEGOTIORUM Disclosure Rebut ta- Emergency No Intervention 
GEST IO of bly without real 
informa- presumed justif ica-
tion consent tion 
physically 
impossible 
PUBLIC Disclosure Inter- Emergency Yes, for Intervention 
NECESSITY of vent ion the sake without real 
informa- against of society justifica-
tion will or the tion 
irrelevant community 
at large 
PRIVATE Disclosure Inter- Emergency Yes, for Intervention 
NECESSITY of vent ion the sake without real 
informa- against of another justifica-
tion will person or tion 
irrelevant limited 
group of 
persons 
THERA- Disclosure Inter- Emergency Violation Intervention 
PEUTIC of vent ion of without real 
NECESSITY material against (fettered) justif ica-
informa- will autonomy tion 
tion has "for the 
occurred person's 
own sake", 
AUTHORITY Disclosure Consent Not Not Intervention 
of absent or necessa- necessa- without real 
informa- insuffi- rily rily justifica-
tion cient emergency tion 
irrelevant 
DUTY Disclosure Consent Not Not Intervening 
of absent or necessa- necessa- or not 
informa- insuffi- rily rily intervening 
tion cient emergency without real 
irrelevant justifica-
tion 
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It is notable that, with regard to authority and duty, consent 
must be lacking (for any reason). If consent were to be 
sufficient, that would be the ground of justification that 
operates, since it is the first and foremost ground. It would 
thus be unnecessary to rely on any other ground. Furthermore, as 
indicated, the authority or duty might or might not coincide with 
an emergency, or might or might not violate the relevant person's 
autonomy. For instance, if a physician has court authorisation to 
attend to an unconscious person who would actually have consented 
to the intervention (thus a·lso potentially ' meeting the 
requirements for negotiorum gestio), no autonomy would actually 
be violated. 
It is appropriate ne~t to examine the consequences of unjustified 
medical intervention, with specific applications in the context 
of clinical psychiatry. 
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CHAPTER V 
LIABILITY FOR PSYCHIATRIC INTERVENTION WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION 
1 Introduction: Justification and Excuse 
This chapter briefly examines the legal consequences of 
psychiatric intervention without justification. It deals 
specifically with those cases not involving negligent treatment 
as such, but rather perfectly successful and sound treatment save 
for the fact that justification is lacking. The consequences of 
the absence of any of the various grounds of justification: 
consent, necessity, unauthorised administration, and therapeutic 
privilege, are highlighted. 
Before focussing 
justification and 
on specifics, the difference between 
excuse must be elucidated. If something is 
justified in law, it means that the law recognises the conduct in 
question as "right 11 • 264 In some cases, however, a person acts in 
~'; 4 See, for instance, Eser A '~Justification and Excuse: a Key 
Issue in the Concept of Crime" in Eser A & Fletcher G 
Rechtfertigung und Entschuldigung: Rechtsvergleichende 
Perspektiven /Justification and Excuse: Comparative Perspectives 
(Volume One) Freiburg: Max Planck Institute (1987) 19-65. Eser 
indicates that he considers the distinction between justification 
and excuse very important in the everyday life of "the law-
abiding citizen: he·wants, and has the right, to know what is 
right and wrong. Accordingly, if he engages in an activity that 
might be covered by the definitional elements of an offence but 
yet not punishable by reason of a defence, he should know whether 
this defence is merely providing an excuse, thus putting his act 
outside the law, or whether his act would be justified, thus 
keeping it within the boundaries of the law." To demonstrate that 
this is "more than mere academic speculation", Eser (ibid 27-28) 
refers to the (then) debate in Germany concerning the 
characterisation of defences regarding abortion: "Even though a 
physician who procures an abortion in order to preserve the 
mother from a certain state of emergency is not punishable, the 
medical profession, as is true for other professional activities 
with high social prestige, is not satisfied with being merely 
'excused' but, quite understandably, wants to have the so-called 
'indication' to abortion recognised as a ground of 'justi-
fication' - because otherwise the'physician's conduct, though not 
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a manner which is not justified, but the person is excused by the 
law, based on the fact that his or her mistake was reasonable -
the law does not approve of the conduct, but excuses the person. 
This means that the conduct is wrongful, but the person lacks 
culpability. 265 
The grounds of justification were discussed in the previous 
chapter; if none of those is present, a person acts without 
justification, but there is still a chance t.hat the law will 
excuse him or her. 266 ' The following sections explore unjustified 
intervention in the context of clinical psychiatry. 
2 Intervention without Justification: Violations of Corpus 
(Bodily and Psychological Integrity) and Dignitas (Dignity and 
Privacy) 
2.1 General 
In South African law, the perso~ality interest known as corpus 
(bodily and psychological integri ty267 ) is protected268 against 
every factual infringement that is not of a trivial nature. Any 
factual infringement for which there is no justification is 
punishable, might still be considered unlawful." 
~c",As has been stated (see fn 2 supra), due to the limited 
scope of the dissertation, the finer details regarding these 
principles cannot be ventured into. 
~(;,;The key concept regarding the distinction between 
justification and excuse is a feature in both the Continental and 
Anglo-American systems. See, for instance, Eser (op cit) at 46: 
"[A]t least in principle, the distinction between justification 
and excuse is fully accepted by German criminal theory and 
practice." 
~C7See Visser PJ "Enkele gedagtes oar die moontlike invloed 
van fundamentele regte ten aansien van die reg op fisies-psigiese 
integriteit op deliktuele remedies" THRHR (1997) 496. 
~·,HNow also by section 12 ( 2) of the Constitution, it is 
reiterated. See also Visser (ibid). 
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wrongful. 269 As will be highlighted, in 
requisite culpability, such violation 
delictual or criminal liability, or both. 
the presence of the 
would give rise to 
Digni tas is a broad and rather vague270 concept that has been said 
to encompass all those personality interests relating to dignity, 
privacy, feelings and identity. In the context of criminal law, 
there appears to be. no separation between "dignity" and other 
feelings. According to Snyman271 , the exact meaning of "dignity" 
has never been clearly defined by the courts, but a "fair 
inference may be drawn from case law that 'dignity' includes both 
•self-respect• and 'mental tranquillity•. To ensure inclusivity 
"dignity/feelings" will be used in this dissertation. The 
instances of violation of dignitas that will feature herein, will 
thus be divided into two categories, viz those affecting 
"dignity /feelings" and those affecting "privacy". ' 
Privacy, apart from forming part of the concept dignitas, is also 
an independent personality right' and fundamental human right. 272 
Privacy can be violated by intruding on private affairs or 
personal areas (property or body), or through accessing personal 
_:'qSee Neethling. J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Law of Delict 
(4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (2001) 332-333. 
~ 70 In exploring its Roman-law origins, Neethling et al 
state: "Dignitas was not a single, clearly defined and 
independent personality interest as was the case with corpus or 
fama, and certainly was not limited to the personality interest 
honour or dignity. Rather it was a collective term for those 
personality interests which had not yet been clearly identified 
and defined in Roman law. It can be stated without fear of 
contradiction that dignity, privacy and feelings ... were included 
in the concept digni tas." See Neethling J, Potgieter JM and 
Visser PJ Neethling's Law of Personality Durban: Butterworths 
(1996) 50. 
_:
71 See Snyman CR Criminal Law ( 4 ed) Durban: But terworths 
(2002) 455. 
_:
7
-See Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Law of Delict 
(4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (2001) 354; Neethling J, Potgieter 
JM and Visser PJ Neethling's Law of Personality Durban: 
Butterworths (1996) 33-39. Section 14 of the Constitution (Act 
108 of 1996) entrencpes the fundamental right to privacy. 
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information273 or disclosing confidential information274 or non-
consensually acquired information275 about the person. 
2.2 Negligently Unjustified Interventions 
Negligence generally consists in not foreseeing that which a 
reasonable person would have foreseen and/or not taking steps to 
prevent that foreseen. 276 In the context of medical, law, however, 
it is most often formulated simply as "not exercising the care 
and/or skill that a reasonable practitioner (of the relevant 
category) would have exercised" . 277 In the present context, the 
focus is on negligently unjustified interventions as such, ie 
where a practitioner should have known (thus "the reasonable 
practitioner would have known" ) that there was no valid ground of 
justification for the intervention. The following sections thus 
deal with negligence' in respect of the unjustified intervention, 
and not the negligence of the actual treatment. The treatment 
might be superlatively administered, but, if not legally 
justified, it is a violation per se. 
Where anyone negligently violates the bodily integrity of 
;:.
71These would fall under so-called "intrusion"; see 
Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Law of Delict (4 ed) 
Durban: Butterworths (2001) 355. 
274So-called "disclosure", irt this case where a relationship 
of confidence exists - the act thus also constitutes a breach of 
confidence (ibid 356). 
~ 7 ''A case of disclosure where no confidential relationship 
exists - often intrusion followed by disclosure; see ibid. 
~ 7 ,;As classically formulated by Holmes JA in Kruger v Coetzee 
1 9 6 2 ( 2 ) SA 4 2 8 ( A ) . 
~ 77 See, for instance, Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the 
Law: a Selection of Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: Van Schaik 
(1991) 290: "The law on medical negligence is simple to state: 
the doctor must exercise reasonable care and skill. What is 
reasonable in a particular situation, is essentially a matter of 
expert medical evidence. It is the medical profession which lays 
down what the appropriate standard of care is. The courts do not 
make findings in vacuo, but strictly on the facts before them." 
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another, he or she can be held delictually liable. 278 Similarly, 
where a person negligently violates the psychological integrity 
of another, he or she can be held delictually liabl,e. 279 Negligent 
violations can attract compensation for patrimonial loss with the 
actio legis Aquiliae, and can be the basis for the action for 
pain and suffering. Since inten~ is generally required for the 
actio iniuriarum, negligent violations do not generally give rise 
to that action. 280 
As regards criminal liability, if a person negligently violates 
the bodily integrity of another, and, in so doing, negligently 
causes the death of that person, he or she could be convicted of 
culpable homicide. 281 
278This involves primarily physical harm, and the patrimonial 
consequences thereof; details on the range of actions available 
are provided when discussing psychiatric case examples infra. 
~ 7 '.'This then involves primarily psychological harm: "psigiese 
letsels", now fully recognised by South African law; see Barnard 
v Santam Bpk 1999 (1) SA 202 (SCA). For commentary on that 
landmark case, see Burchell J "An encouraging prognosis for 
claims of damages for negligently inflicted psychological harm" 
SALJ (1999) 697-711 and Neethlin~ J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ 
Law of Delict (4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (2001) 290-295. It is 
submitted that Burchell's translation "psychological harm", is 
to be preferred over "psychological lesions" (used by Neethling 
et al). 
::H°Cf Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Neethling' s Law 
of Personality Durban: Butterworths ( 1996) 64-65: "The question 
arises whether in a developed community it makes sense to persist 
with the intention requirement of the classical actio iniuriarum, 
and whether personality protection should not be extended to the 
negligent infringement of personality interests. The majority of 
South African writers support the latter view ... The idea of 
delictual liability for the negligent infringement of a 
personality right has long been accepted in foreign legal 
systems. It would seem that the legislature should step in and 
provide for a general extension of personality protection in 
South African law." It is submitted that the actio iniuriarum 
should indeed be available for negligent violations - the courts 
can then at least have the discretion to be able to allow the 
action in appropriate cases, those that warrant the payment of 
satisfaction (solatium). 
~ 81The reason why the word 11 'negligently 11 features twice in 
this sentence, is that it is necessary for a conviction of 
culpable homicide that the accused's negligence must have caused 
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2.3 Intentionally Unjustified Interventions 
Intent consists in the direction of a person's will towards 
performing an act with awarenes? of the material facts in the 
situation and the wrongfulness of the act. 282 As was explained in 
respect of negligent violations, the focus in this chapter is on 
intentionally unjustified interventions as such, ie where a 
practitioner knows, or foresees the reasonable possibility283 , that 
there is no valid gr'ound of justification for the intervention, 
and yet proceeds therewith. 
Where a person intentionally violates the bodily integrity of 
another, he or she can be held delictually liable on the basis of 
private-law ass~ult. 284 Depending on the severity of the case this 
can also constitute criminal assault. 285 Attempted assault 
the death; see Visser PJ and Mare MC Criminal Law through the 
Cases (3 ed) Durban: Butterworths (1990) 556. South African 
criminal law does not presently recognise "negligent assault"; 
cf Kahn MS "Negligent Assault" SACJ (1988) 470-472. 
~ 8 ~See, for instance, Snyman CR Criminal Law (4 ed) Durban: 
Butterworths ( 2002) 174. Subjective awareness of wrongfulness was 
unequivocally affirmed as part and parcel of intent in S v De 
Blom 1977 (3) SA 513' (A). 
~~'See the brief discussion of dolus eventual is fn 302 infra. 
~~ 4 Ie the wrongful and intentional application of force, or 
the immediate threat of such application, to another's person. 
In the context of "assault", the violation necessarily involves 
the physical component of corpus, whose infringement constitutes 
an iniuria. The wrongful and intentional violation of the 
psychological component of corpus, would also constitute an 
iniuria, but would not be termed "assault" in the absence of 
physical force or the immediate threat thereof. 
~ 8 "'See Snyman CR Criminal Law ( 4 ed) Durban: Butterworths 
( 2002) at 430, where he defines assault as "unlawfully and 
intentionally (a) applying force, directly or indirectly, to the 
person of another; or (b) inspiring a belief in another person 
that force is immediately to be applied to him or her. The 
elements of the crime are: 1) the application of force (Anglo-
American-law "battery") or inspiring a belief that force is to 
be applied (Anglo-American-law "assault"); 2) wrongfulness; 3) 
intent (ibid) . 
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( . . 1) . 1 . bl 286 h cr1m1na is a so poss1 e. However, w ere a person 
intentionally violates the psychological integrity of another, 
the violation would not constitute "assault" as suc~287 , but rather 
another iniur ia, which can take the form of emotional shock, 
fear, insult, embarrassment or humiliation, giving rise to the 
delictual actio iniuriarum for satisfaction (solatium), and, in 
the case of significant psychological harm288 , also the action for 
pain and suffering. 289 Moreover, if patrimonial loss is suffered 
due to the psychological harm, the actio legis Aquiliae is 
available to provide compensation. 290 
Where the psychological violation consists wholly or partly of 
insult, embarrassment or humiliation that is of a serious nature, 
the perpetrator of such violation could, in additi?n, be charged 
with crimen iniuria. 291 Where an intentional violation of the body 
28 libid 434. 
:::
117 Since there is no physical force or immediate threat 
thereof, see fn 285 supra. 
~ 8HExpressed in Afrikaans as "Psigiese letsel 11 : see Barnard 
v Santam Bpk 1999 (1) SA 202 (SCA). 
:::
8
"Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Law of Delict ( 4 
ed) Durban: Butterworths (2001) 291. 
2
''
0Ibid. 
~ncrimen iniuria is the wrongful, intentional and serious 
violation of the dignitas ("dignity" and/or "privacy") of 
another. Although most cases of crimen iniuria (on the ground of 
violation of "dignity" as opposed to privacy, the other major 
recognised component of digni tas) in South African law have 
mostly concerned situations such as persons' takipg offence at 
insulting language or sexual impropriety, the nature of the 
interest protected is evidently broad enough to cover novel (eg 
those in the psychiatric context) instances of humiliation or 
injury to self-respect. Snyman (ibid) avers that, for there to 
be an infringement of "dignity", ·the person must (a) be aware of 
the perpetrator's behaviour and (b) feel degraded or humiliated 
by it. Although the person's subjective feelings in this regard 
are mostly decisive, the law applies an objective standard so as 
to avoid hypersensitive persons unreasonably "constituting" 
instances of crimen iniuria. Snyman (op cit 456, 458) affirms 
that "X's conduct mu~t be of such a nature that it would offend 
at least the feelings of a reasonable person .... [Moreover, the 
courts will] treat it as criminal iniuria .... only if the iniuria 
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or mind of a person can also ·be construed as 1' significantly 
violating that person's privacy, this can also, where 
appropriate, found the actio iniuriarum and/or constitute crimen 
iniuria. 292 
Finally, of course, where a person intentionally violates the 
bodily integrity of another, and, in so doing, intentionally 
occasions the death of that other person, such perpetrator can be 
charged with murder. These instances will be elucidated in the 
discussion of examples infra under 8. 
3 Intervention Without Informed Consent: Assault? 
Strauss293 asserts 
assault in the 
that malpractice liability can arise from 
form of an operation however ' properly and 
if performed without a client's informed 
nature of the legal consequence of this 
skilfully performed, 
consent. The exact 
violation is, however, a matter of debate. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Broude v Mcintosh2~ makes some 
is of a sufficiently serious or reprehensible character to merit 
punishment in the interests of society." The last statement 
applies equally to crimen iniuria due to violation of privacy. 
:::•J:.:Neethling, Potgieter and Visser aver that it is a 
justified approach that "unauthorised medical examinations and 
tests, which amount primarily to an infringemeni of the body 
(physical integrity) , are often regarded as a ·violation of 
privacy". This is because there is "also an acquaintance with 
personal facts, mostly of a medical nature, contrary to the 
determination and will of the person involved 11 .,Neethling J, 
Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Neethling 's Law of Personality 
Durban: Butterworths (1996) 38. It is submitted that this 
principle is not limited to instances where the primary 
infringement is the body (physical integrity), but applies 
equally to unauthorised psychological examination; see the 
example infra under 7.3. 
-'''see Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law: A Selection 
of Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: J L Van Schaik (1991) 243. 
~ 94 1998 ( 3) SA 69 (SCA). 
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important remarks regarding the effect of lack of informed 
consent. The claim in casu was based upon the alleged failure on 
the part of M to app~ise B of the risks involved in a prospective 
vestibular cochlear neurectomy295 and of the existence of an 
alternative. In the pleadings, it was alleged that M had 
"wrongfully failed to obtain [B's] real or informed consent to 
the operation and [M] accordingly committed an assault on [B by] 
operating on him .. ·"· In the alternative, it was alleged that in 
"treating [BJ and in carrying out the operation[, M] acted in a 
negligent and unskillful manner" in that he "failed to inform [BJ 
prior to carrying out the operation of the risk's and hazards 
involved and he failed to inform [BJ of alternative operative 
treatment available". In this regard Marais JA asserts: 
"Pleading a cause of action such as this as an assault 
to which the [cl]ient did not give informed consent is 
of course a familiar and time-honoured method of doing 
so. However I venture to suggest with respect that its 
conceptual soundness is open to serious question and 
merits reconsideration by this court when an 
appropriate case arises. To the average person, and I 
suspect to many a lawyer, it is a strange notion that 
the surgical intervention of a medical practitioner 
whose sole object is to alleviate the pain or 
discomfort of the [cl]ient, and who has explained to 
the [cl]ient what is intended to be done and obtained 
the [cl] ient' s consent to it being done, should be 
pejoratively described and juristically characterised 
as an assault simply because the practitioner omitted 
to mention the existence of a risk considered to be 
material enough to have warranted disclosure and which, 
if disclosed, might have resulted in the [cl] ient 
withholding consent. It seems to me to be inherent in 
~';",A surgical intervention in which the vestibular and 
cochlear nerves are severed (in this case to relieve chronic 
tinnitus and vertigo). 
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the notion that even if the risk does not eventuate and 
the surgical intervention is successful, the 
practitioner's conduct would nonetheless have 
constituted an assault. That strikes me as a bizarre 
result which suggests that there is something about the 
approach which is unsound. There is no principle of law 
of which I am aware by which the characterisation as 
lawful or unlawful of an intentional act objectively 
involving the doing of bodily harm to another can be 
postponed until its consequences are known. Either it 
was an assault at the time of its commission or it was 
not. Events occurring ex post facto can logically have 
no bearing on the question. It is no answer to say that 
if the undisclosed risk does no~ eventuate no damage 
will have been caused. That has nothing to do with the 
characterisation of the medical practitioner's act in 
intervening surgically as lawful or unlawful. I mention 
this merely by way of example to explain why I consider 
that the validity of causes of action framed in this 
manner in circumstances similar to those which are said 
to exist in this case requires re-examination. ( I 
emphasise the latter qualification; I leave aside cases 
in which mala fides is involved such as cases of 
deliberate fraud and deliberate misrepresentation of 
what is entailed in order to obtain consent which wouid 
otherwise not be forthcoming.)" 
Claasen and Verschoor296 refer to the position in England, in the 
words of Bristow J 297 : "Once the [cl] ient is informed in broad 
terms of the nature of the procedure which is intended, and gives 
her consent, that consent is real, and the cause of action on 
which to base a claim for failure to go into risks and 
_:,,.;Claassen NJB & Verschoor T Medical Negligence in South 
Africa Pretoria: Digma (1992) at 73. 
2
'
0 rn Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 All ER 257. 
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implications is negligence, not trespass." These authors298 note 
that in 1960 the Kansas Supreme Court became the first American 
court to decide that a medical practitioner 1 s liability for 
failure to inform a client of the risks and alternatives 
regarding a proposed therapy, must be based on negligence rather 
than battery299 • Subsequently, they refer to the position in 
Canada, citing Laskin CJ~0 as follows: 
"In my opinion, actions qf battery in respect of 
surgical or other medical treatment should be confined 
to cases where surgery or treatment has been performed 
or given to which there has been no consent at all or 
where, emergency situations aside, surgery or treatment 
has been performed ..... beyond that to which there was 
consent ..... in my view, unless there has been a 
misrepresentation or fraud to secure consent to 
treatment, a failure to disclose the attendant risks, 
however serious, should go to negligence rather than 
battery." 
It is submitted that this view is correct: a distinction should 
be drawn between the scenario where consent is absent or 
intentionally insufficient (ie material information is 
intentionally withheld), on the one hand, and accidently 
(innocently or negligently) insufficient, on the other hand. 
Accordingly, if a psychiatrist, for instance, intentionally 
withholds material information in obtaining a competent client's 
consent to treatment, this would constitute mens rea that could 
-''"Claassen & Verschoor op cit 73. 
~'"~See fn 285 supra: "battery" has been incorporated into the 
concept 11 assault 11 in South African law. 
'
00 In Reibl v Hughes (1981) 114 DLR 3d 1. 
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range from dolus directus301 to dolus eventualis302 • When the 
psychiatrist then proceeds with (physical303 ) treatment, knowing 
that the consent is absent or might be insufficient, such an 
infringement of the client's corpus can appropriately be classed 
as assault. 304 If, however, a clinician is under , the erroneous 
impression that the consent is sufficient, in other words that 
all material facts have been disclosed in obtaining the client's 
consent, where the reasonable clinician in his or her position 
! 
would have known those facts to be material and accordingly 
disclosed them, one is dealing with a situation of negligence. It 
is submitted that this infringement of the client's corpus lacks 
rn
1Direct intent, where X aims to achieve something 
("oogmerksopset"). 
rn:::Where X foresees the possibility that something might be 
the case (eg that he or she might not have adequately informed 
Y), or a result (eg the death of Y), and X continues reconciling 
him- or herself to that possibility. See Snyman CR Criminal Law 
(4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (2002) 181-185. Botha JA in S v 
Beukes 1988 1 SA 511 (A) states: "[Translated from the original 
Afrikaans] If there was such a possibility, it is invariably 
inferred, from the fact that he proceeded with his conduct, that 
he took the consequence into the bargain. It would thus seem that 
the second element would normally be satisfied only if the 
accused foresaw the consequence as a reasonable possibility. Is 
it then necessary still to formulate two criteria for dolus 
eventualis, or does the requirem~nt that the accused must have 
foreseen the possibility as reasonable, suffice? I maintain that 
[setting] two criteria does serve a purpose [emphasis added]." 
The judge then proceeds to give examples illustrating why the 
second criterion for dolus eventualis should be retained. As the 
law stands, dolus eventualis thus consists in the foresight of 
a reasonable possibility (cognitive criterion) with subsequent 
conduct that manifests a taking into the bargain or 
reconciliation to that possibility (volitional criterion). Jansen 
JA in S v Ngubane 1985 (3) SA 677 (A) also refers to "con-
senting", "reconciling" or "taking into the bargain". Some 
authors, such as Loubser MM & Rabie MA "Defining dolus 
eventualis: a voluntative element?" SACJ (1988) 435-436, contend 
that the second criterion is superf 1 uous. It is tempting to 
comment on this debate, especially with reference to the example 
in fn 348 infra; however, the discussion of the intricacies 
involved is beyond the scope of the present dissertation. 
111 ~As has been stated, it would have to involve a physical 
infringement (or immediate threat thereof) to constitute assault. 
i
04 Unless, of course, there is some other ground of 
justification for the intervention. 
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animus iniuriandi, and should thus not be construed as assault. 
Rather, it is a negligent violation of bodily and/or psycho-
logical integrity, which is delictually actionable but does not 
attract criminal liability. 305 
4 Unauthorised Administration (Negotiorum Gestio) 
According to the suggested clarification of the legal position 
regarding unauthorised administration306 , if a doctor had proceeded 
with an intervention against the express prior will of a client, 
but it later appears that the client would at the time have 
consented, there would be no actual assault, but only, 
potentially, attempted assault in criminal law. 307 The doctor could 
'
0
"It is notable that in Castell v De Greef 1994 ( 4) SA 408 
( C) , Ackermann J (as he then was) emphasised that the South 
African situation is different from that of the Anglo-American 
systems - whereas breach of the duty to disclose mostly seems to 
raise the issue of negligence in those systems (eg in England and 
Australia), such a breach raises the issue of whether there is 
justification in terms of volent~ non fit iniuria (see ibid 420, 
423, 425). This does not, however, necessarily imply that the 
issue of negligence cannot arise after it has been established 
that the conduct was objectively unjustified and thus wrongful. 
After that finding, the culpability of the person who is the 
author of the wrongful conduct must still be assessed. The mere 
fact that volenti non fit iniuria is the first focus of the 
investigation does not mean that negligence cannot also feature -
it does not mean that one can summarily also infer animus 
iniuriandi. It can thus be concluded that infringement of bodily 
integrity without consent does not inevitably constitute assault. 
In addition to lack of justification, intent (imperatively with 
consciousness of wrongfulness, see fn 282 supra) must also be 
established. 
'
0
';See chapter IV, 3. 1 supra. 
Amit is doubtful, however, that charges would be pressed if 
the doctor saved the life of someone who actually. wanted to be 
saved at the time. Nevertheless, he or she could be charged and 
convicted to uphold the principle that one cannot attempt to 
violate a person's corpus ostensibly against his or her valid 
will. On the other hand, a court might regard mild disciplinary 
action per illustration as mor·e appropriate, and esteem it 
sufficient to sound the message that the doctor would have been 
convicted of assault had the unlikely turn of events not ensued. 
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thus still incur criminal liability on the basis of attempt, but 
could incur no delictual liability.~8 
Van Oosten309 points out that a doctor's erroneous belief that an 
emergency exists or that the client would have consented to the 
intervention, would result in his or her acting in putative 
unauthorised administration as an excuse, rather than 
unauthorised administration as justification. This means that the 
practitioner's conduct is wrongful, but he or she is excused for 
his or her bona f ide310 , and reasonable, mistake of fact (error 
f acti). 
If the mistake is bona fide, but unreasonable, ie the reasonable 
doctor in the same position would not so have erred, he or she 
would have acted negligently. The doctor might then incur 
delictual liability on the basis of the action for pain and 
suffering and/or the actio legis Aquiliae for patrimonial loss 
resulting from the negligent violation. Of course, if the mistake 
is not bona fide, and thus not actually a real mistake, the 
practitioner's intent would aiso found the delictual actio 
iniuriarum and perhaps result in criminal liability for assault. 
'
08Nevertheless, from the point of view of practical proof, 
a prior prohibition on the part of a client would create a 
virtually irrefutable impression that the client would 
accordingly not have consented at the time. It is only the 
client's own honest testimony in this regard that would forfeit 
his or her delictual claim. As indicated, however, he or she 
would still not necessarily release the doctor from criminal 
liability. · 
30
''van Oosten FFW "Some Reflections on Emergen~ies as 
Justification for Medical Intervention" in Ahrens HJ, Bar C, 
Fischer G, Spickhoff A, Taupitz,. J (Eds) Festschrift fiir Erwin 
Deutsch Koln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG (1999) 684. 
nuThere would be no assault, since intent is lacking (due 
to a bona fide error facti resulting in absence of consciousness 
of wrongfulness). 
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5 Necessity 
5.1 Public and Private Necessity 
In the context of public and private necessity, the erroneous 
belief that a justifying emergency exists would similarly result 
in a clinician's ac;ting in putative necessity as an excuse, 
rather than justification. The same principles as described above 
for putative negotiorum gestio apply to the effect of the 
reasonableness or bona tides of the alleged error facti. 
5.2 Therapeutic Necessity311 
It is submitted that, if in the type of situation discussed3", it 
appears eX pOSt faCtO that the person IS judgment WaS not impaired 
at all or that treatment was not in fact urgently necessary, but 
any reasonable clinician would have been convinced of those 
apparent circumstances, putative therapeutic necessity can 
operate as an excuse. 
6 Therapeutic Privilege 
If a clinician errs as to being justified in withholding material 
information (invoking therapeutic privilege), the client's 
consent would not be lawfully sufficiently informed, and thus 
objectively invalid. As discussed above, the result is an 
objective violation of the client's corpus. The question then 
arises whether "putative therapeutic privilege" as excuse might 
operate. 
It is extremely doubtful that a clinician would be successful in 
raising putative therapeutic privilege as excuse, since the 
mThe meaning of therapeutic necessity (as opposed to 
therapeutic privilege) is discussed in chapter IV 3.2.2 supra. 
'LChapter IV, 3. 2. 2. 2 supra. 
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"privilege" itself is inherently. controversial. F~r therapeutic 
privilege to justify withholding information, it would have to be 
clear that the disclosure would be significantly harmful. 313 There 
should be absolutely minimal scope for error in this regard. It 
is, accordingly, submitted that if it can be demonstrated that 
therapeutic privilege was not justified, this would necessarily 
imply negligence on the part of a clinician who errs in this 
regard. Nevertheless, the bona fide error facti still negatives 
intent. 314 The result is thus only a negligent violation of corpus, 
and not assault. 
Once the issue of whether therapeutic privilege was justified or 
not has been resolved, the question as to negligence would thus 
be answered, and the plaintiff would have to prove no more. The 
burden of proof would initially be on the plaintiff to show that 
there was no informed consent. Then the defendant would raise the 
defence of therapeutic privilege. If he or she fails to prove its 
being justified, it is submitted that a necessary inference of 
negligence can be drawn. 315 If, however, the plaintiff wishes to 
n'Cf chapter IV, 3. 3 supra. 
n
4See 2. 3 supra. 
w.It is notable that this is not an application of res ipsa 
loquitur ("the matter speaks for itself") as featured in the 
courts. A thorough analysis of the application of res ipsa 
loqui tur in the medical context features in Carstens PA "Die 
toepassing van res ipsa loquitur in gevalle van mediese 
nalatigheid" De Jure (1999) 19-28. According to Carstens, res 
ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence that entitles the court to 
draw a provisional inference of negligence, based on an 
"absolute" (according to the dictum by Blum J in Pringle v 
Administrator Transvaal 1990 2 SA 379 (W)). This "absolute" 
apparently means that if unjustified conduct is causally 
connected to a certain harmful result, the situatioh must be such 
that the "only conclusion" that can be reached is that there must 
have been negligence involved. The anomaly that arises, it is 
submitted, is that the defendant then still has the opportunity 
to rebut (the so-called 11 weerleggingslas 11 - "onus to rebut") 
(Carstens ibid). It is submitted that the use of the term 
"absolute" is thus inappropriate. "Absolute" would be 
irrebuttable. This is clearly not the case with the application 
of res ipsa loquitur. Carstens maintains that there is not a true 
shift in "burden of proof", in other words, the defendant is not 
required to prove that he or she was not negligent; he or she 
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show that the defendant knew that the therapeutic privilege was 
not justified, the plaintiff would have to prove intent, hence 
establishing an assault316 and/or other intentional violation. 
7 Hypothetical Case Scenarios 
To illustrate some of the above and other principles, some 
hypothetical scenarios are here sketched. These will then be 
ref erred to at points throughout the remainder of the 
dissertation (in addition to the actual cases refer.red to later). 
The basic facts are here sketched; various hypothetical outcomes 
(based on the present author's opinion, taking into account 
principles of law and the approacp of the South Af~ican courts to 
related situations) are provided at later stages to illustrate 
different points. 
7.1 Scenario 1 
X, a productive accountant, suffering from severe 
depression, consul ts a psychiatrist. After trying a 
number of antidepressant medicines to 
(the psychiatrist) suggests the 
( electroconvulsi ve therapy) . She is 
no avail, 
use of 
concerned 
she 
ECT 
that 
mentioning the chance of some loss of memory and 
headaches around the time of the ECT, will dissuade him 
merely has give a "satisfactory" explanation of his or her 
conduct so as to rebut the prima facie inference. Oarstens (ibid 
25) asserts that this "necessarily has the effect that a 
physician would then have to off er medical evidence to show that 
his conduct was, medically speaking, acceptable [translated form 
the original Afrikaans J ". According to Carstens, if the physician 
fails to rebut, negligence is established. The rule here 
suggested for "putative therapeutic privilege" is clearly 
different: negligence is suggested to be a necessary inference. 
For a very extensive analysis of res ipsa loquitur in medical 
law, see Van den Reever P The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur 
to Medical Negligence Cases: A Comparative Survey (LLD thesis, 
University of Pretoria, 2002). 
11
'In the case of a physical intervention. 
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(the client) from consenting to what she esteems to be 
very necessary· treatment. She thus conceals this 
information, and the client consequently consents. ECT 
is accordingly performed a number of times. 
7.2 Scenario two 
Suppose the same set of facts, except that the client 
has some cardiovascular problems, creating ~ risk of 
myocardial infarction (and hence death) during the ECT. 
The psychiatrist is almost certain that if she were to 
reveal this risk, the client would not consent to the 
. ' 
treatment. She harbours the reasonable medical opinion 
that the need for the treatment outweighs the fairly 
remote risk317 involved, considering the marked 
deterioration in the client's depressive condition. 
7.3 Scenario three 
X consults a psychiatrist regarding what he (the 
psychiatrist) subsequently identifies as a dysthymic 
condition. 318 The psychiatrist strongly suspects that 
317 In terms of South African law, however, if a risk of a 
significant consequence (such as death) is present, it must be 
disclosed even if it is fairly remote. See Van Oosten FFW The 
Doctrine of Informed Consent in Medical Law (LLD thesis, Unisa, 
1990) 48-50. 
W<To provide an idea of the nature of a dysthymic condition, 
the following from the American Psychiatric Association's 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of [Clinical Biopsychosocial 
Conditions) IV-TR Washington: APA ( 2000): "The essential feature 
of [a] [d]ysthymic [condition] is chronically depressed mood that 
occurs for most of the day more days than not for at least 2 
years (Criterion A). Individuals with [a] [d]ysthymic [condition] 
describe their mood as sad or 'down in the dumps' . During periods 
of depressed mood, at least two of the following additional 
symptoms are present: poor appetite or overeating, insomnia or 
hypersomnia, low energy or fatigue, low self-esteem, poor 
concentration or difficulty making decisions, and feelings of 
hopelessness (Criterion B). Individuals may note the prominent 
presence of low interest and self-criticism, often seeing 
themselves as uninteresting or incapable. [ T] hese symptoms ... 
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significant events that took place during her (the 
client's) childhood precipitated and are sustaining her 
condition. She does not seem to recall any such "major" 
events, apart from her childhood being "relatively 
unhappy". She acknowledges that she does become quite 
anxious when talking about her childhood. She expresses 
that she is not ready to discuss all the emotions that 
she experiences in her relationships with various 
family members. She maintains that she wants to focus 
on the problems which she is experiencing in current 
relationships with friends and colleagues. To her mind, 
her reservations and tensions regarding those rela-
tionships are a major source of continuing despair. The 
psychiatrist surmises that she probably harbours 
repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse, but does 
not disclose this suspicion so as to avoid placing 
suggestions in her mind. He believes that the only way 
to discover the source of the problem is to recover 
those repressed memories. During a session, he offers 
her a "sedative" to "ease her anxiety" while talking 
about the past weekend's interactions with certain 
family members. In actual fact, he administers a 
recently developed drug akin to sodium amytal, designed 
to facilitate revealing repressed material in a trance-
like state. He fears that this is the only way, since 
he knows that she would not be comfortable enough with 
this to consent to it. During the session, it clearly 
emerges that she was sexually abused on numerous 
occasions by her father. 
7.4 Scenario four 
A client consults a psychiatrist regarding his specific 
phobia involving dogs. She is convinced that flooding 
become much a part of the individual's day-to-day ~xperience (eg 
'I've always been this way', •that's just how I am')." 
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is the most suitable technique to use. 319 She does not 
mention an alternative technique, systematic desensi-
tisation, to him. She also omits to warn him that this 
technique may be quite traumatic, since she does not 
want him to enter therapy with that idea in mind. She 
explains as much as she sees fit. On the basis of the 
information, he "consents". 
7.5 Scenario five 
In a state in which active euthanasia is lawful in 
accordance ·with statutory provisions, a physician 
administers a lethal dose of a substance, causing a 
suffering, terminally ill person a painless death. Ex 
post facto it emerges that there was no valid consent 
for the active euthanasia. 
8 Examples Illustrating the Consequences of Interv~ntion without 
Justification in terms of South African Law 
8.1 Introduction 
The table under 8.3 illustrates some of the legal consequences of 
intervention without justification in the various hypothetical 
situations described above. In addition to the delictual and 
criminal consequences there indicated, some general remarks 
regarding contractual liability are indicated. 
31
"This technique encourages the client "to confront the 
feared situation directly, without a gradual build-up as in 
systematic desensitization or graded exposure. No relaxation 
exercises are used, as in systematic desensitization. The 
[client] experiences fear, which gradually subsides after a 
time ... Many [cl]ients refuse flooding because of the 
psychological discomfort involved." See Kaplan HI, Sadock BJ and 
Grebb J Synopsis of Psychiatry (7 ed) Baltimore: Williams and 
Wilkins (1994) 854. 
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8.2 Contractual Liability 
Every non-consensual intervention that materially affects the 
consensus that is essential to the establishment of any contract, 
will render void ab ini tio, or voidable320 , any contract that might 
have existed between the parties. 321 If the contract is null and 
void, the client would not be liable for payment of fees. If he 
or she has already paid, he or she could claim restitution. 322 If 
other patrimonial damage has been suffered, he or she could not 
claim for that ex contractu, however, since there legally never 
was a contract. If, on the other hand, the contract is voidable, 
the client can choose to uphold it, and can then sue in terms 
thereof for patrimonial loss.ll3 Since a claim ex delicto provides 
wider compensation, however, this would invariably be the better 
option.· 
Nevertheless, claims should be instituted providing for both 
options, viz a claim based on contract and/or a claim based on 
delict. In this way, one can accommodate the possibility of the 
failure of the delictual claim. Moreover, it is also possible to 
recover different losses with contractual and delictual remedies 
concurrently.ll4 A client could, for instance, rec6ver the money 
he or she paid for the treatment in step with contractual 
'_:
0 If a there ha·s been a material misrepresentation, it is 
general contract law that the person in respect of whom the 
misrepresentation was made has the option of enforcing or voiding 
the contract; see Nagel CJ (Ed) Commercial Law Johannesburg: Lex 
Patria (1994) 50. 
1 ~ 1 It is notable that reimbursement of one acting in 
unauthorised administration would also not be forthcoming if he 
or she was not actually justified in doing so. 
J:.::.:Ie contractual negative interesse, see fn 325 and chapter 
VIII, 3, infra. 
'~'Cf chapter VI I I, 3 infra. 
'_:
4 See Van Aswegen A "Co:r:icurrence of Contractual and 
Delictual Claims and the Determination of Delictual Wrongfulness" 
THRHR (1994) at 150. 
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negative interessens while the remainder of his or .her loss could 
be claimed for in step with delictual negative interesse. 326 
It is appropriate now to turn to the table 
possible delictual and criminal consequences 
intervention. 327 
reflecting the 
of unjustified 
8.3 Delictual and Criminal Liability 
The following column headings apply throughout: 
Status 
of 
Inter-
vent ion 
Legal effect 
where the 
intervention 
is 
intentionally 
Legal effect 
where the 
intervention 
is 
intentionally 
Legal effect 
where the 
intervention 
is 
negligently 
Legal effect 
where the 
intervention 
is negligently 
non-consensual 
non-consensual non-consensual non-consensual (or otherwise 
(or otherwise (or otherwise (or otherwise unjustified), 
unjustified), unjustified), unjustified), and does 
and does not and does and does not result in the 
result in the result in the result in the death of the 
death of the death of the death of the client 
client client client 
;~"·re ( s) he is placed in the position in which ( s) he would 
have been had the contract never been concluded (thus the money 
would not have been paid). 
'~':Ie ( s) he is placed in the position in which ( s) he would 
have been, had the delict never been perpetrated. The actions can 
be combined, provided that they are used to claim for different 
losses; see Van Aswegen (op cit)~ 
'_,:
7 Based on the present author' s opinion, taking into account 
principles of law and the approach of the South African courts 
to related situations. 
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Violates Delictual: Not a Delictual: Not a 
psycho- actio reasonable action for reasonable 
logical iniuriarum possibility330 pain and possibility 
integri- available for suffering 
ty (but intentional might be 
is medi- violation of available for 
cally psychological negligent 
perfect- integrity and violation of 
ly invasion of psychological 
success- pr i vacy328 ; integrity331 ; 
ful) 
Criminal: Criminal: 
Crimen None 
iniuria329 
<:::Hsuppose, in scenario 3 supra, the client endures the trauma of 
confronting her father, has many disturbing thoughts and feelings around that 
time, but within a month has adjusted and makes a full recovery from her 
dysthymic condition. Her relationships flourish and she becomes more 
productive than she ever thought she could be. Due to the fact that consent 
was lacking, she could still avail herself of the actio iniuriarum to satisfy 
her for the violation of her psychological integrity and privacy. However, 
because her patrimonial position improved and she endured less pain and 
suffering than she would have but for the intervention, the action for pain 
and suffering and the actio legis Aquiliae would not be viable. 
'~' 1suppose, in scenario 3 supra, she initially suffers considerable 
embarrassment/humiliation at the psychiatrist's laying bare of her sexual 
encounters with her father (nevertheless the outcome is as in fn 328 statim 
supra). As discussed, the intentional invasion of her privacy, and the 
humiliation that she suffered might constitute crimen iniuria, due to the 
violation of "privacy" and/or "dignity". See fn 291 supra. 
"
0
rt is inconceivable that the successful outcome of any psychiatric 
intervention would be death. 
"
1
suppose, in scenario 4 supra, he experiences considerable discomfort 
during repeated sessions, but eventuallJ conquers his specific phobia in good 
time. When telling a new friend, who happens to be a psychologist, she 
mentions the alternative treatment. He feels that he would much have preferred 
that process, and feels "wronged" by the fact that no mention of this was made 
to him. Assuming that the reasonable psychiatrist would have made the 
disclosure, the psychiatrist negligently violated his psychological integrity. 
If it is conceivable that the alternative treatment could have been 
efficacious without the pain and suffering, the action may be viable. 
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Violates Delictual: Delictual: Delictual: Delictual: 
bodily actio action avails action for action avails 
integri- iniuriarum dependants for pain and dependants for 
ty (but available for the death of suffering the death of 
is assaul t 332 ; their might be their 
perfect- breadwinner334 ; available for breadwinner337 ; 
ly Criminal: negligent 
success- Assault333 Criminal: violation of Criminal: 
ful) Murder335 bodily Culpable 
integrity336 homicide338 
;,i· 
-suppose, in scenario 1 supra, the client merely suffers some mild 
headaches and hardly any memory loss surrounding the ECT, and his depression 
is alleviated. He could still avail himself of the actio iniuriarum to satisfy 
him for the assault. Due. to the fact that his patrimonial position improves 
(he is able to work more, free from depression) and he endured less pain and 
suffering than he would have but for the intervention, the action for pain and 
suffering and the actio 1egis Aquiliae would, however, not be viable. 
~ 3AWith reference to scenario 1, it is unlikely but not impossible that 
such intentional violation of his corpus could warrant a charge of criminal 
assault. Nevertheless, technically it has all the elements of criminal 
assault. See fn 285 supra. 
JA
4The only conceivable "successful" intervention that results in death, 
would be euthanasia. Hence, with reference to scenario 5, suppose the state 
is South Africa, and the person had dependants for whom he or she was a 
breadwinner; those dependants can claim compensation for damnum iniuria datum 
due to the loss of their breadwinner. See Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser 
PJ Law of Delict (4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (2001) 282-289. 
130Without valid consent and with the requisite intention, the physician 
commits murder. Of course, since South Africa does not at this time accept 
active euthanasia as lawful, informed consent in this regard could never be 
valid (being legally contra bonos mores), thus intentional active euthanasia 
would inevitably constitute murder; see eg S v Hartmann 1975 (3) SA 532 (C). 
iii; 
···Suppose, in scenario 1 supra, she bona fide (but unreasonably) 
believes that she has disclosed all material facts regarding the ECT. She then 
negligently violates his psychological integrity (due to negligently not 
obtaining informed consent). It is inconceivable that the action for pain and 
suffering would be available for the minor headaches, however. If negligence 
were sufficient for the actio iniuriarum, satisfaction would have been 
appropriate in this case (see fn 280 supra). 
With reference to scenario 5 and fn 335, suppose the doctor bona fide 
(but unreasonably) believed that the consent is valid, he or she shall have 
negligently occasioned the wrongful death. The action for dependants is 
viable. 
Violates Delictual: 
psycho- actio 
logical iniuriarum 
integri- actio leg is 
ty (is Aquiliae; 
up to and action for 
medical pain and 
standard suffering339 
but is Criminal: 
unsuc- Crimen 
cessful) iniuria340 
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1 
rnWith reference ·to fn 335: suppose the doctor bona fide (but 
unreasonably) believes that the consent is valid. Although he acts 
intentionally, in the colourless sense (ie without awareness of wrongfulness) 
in respect of the death, he is negligent in respect of its wrongfulness - it 
is submitted that the result could be a verdict of culpable homicide. 
il''with reference to fn 328 supra, suppose the dysthymic condition 
persists. Since the dysthymic condition is now coupled with additional 
trauma, her productivity decreases tremendously, and she suffers patrimonial 
loss. All patrimonial loss due to the wrongful treatment is recoverable with 
the actio legis Aquiliae. Moreover, the additional pain and suffering she has 
endured can give rise to the action for pain and suffering .. It is submitted 
that the fact that the treatment as such was not negligent offers no defence. 
Of course, the actio iniuriarum is still (cf fn 328) available. 
340The situation is the same as in fn 329 supra. 
J
41Still with reference to scenario 3, suppose the trauma coupled with 
subsequent major depression clearly causes the client, who is a breadwinner, 
to commit suicide. Even though the suicide might not have been reasonably 
foreseeable and the treatment as such was not negligent, it is submitted that 
the action is still viable due to the fact that his intentional violation 
factually and legally (l~t it be assumed - a court may regard the connection 
as too remote or the suicide as a novus actus interveniens) caused her death. 
14 ' 
-However, a charge of murder is unlikely due to the likely problems 
in respect of establishing legal causation. The fact that the victim has died 
does not extinguish the charge of crimen iniuria. 
141Suppose, with reference to scenario 4, that she bona fide (but 
unreasonably) believes that the consent was valid. The treatment is 
unsuccessful and the trauma causes him to become so phobic that he cannot 
leave his home. He suffers tremendous despair and patrimonial loss. These 
actions clearly avail him, even though the treatment itself was not 
negligently administered (let it be assumed). 
'
44 The situation is the same as in fn 341 supra, except that it is here 
his negligence that is factually and legally causally connected to her death. 
Violates Delictual: 
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i4 r., • Suppose, in scenario 1 supra, the client suffers severe headaches and 
marked memory loss, and his depressive condition is virtually unchanged. He 
could not only avail himself of the actio iniuriarum to satisfy him for the 
assault, but also, due to the fact that his patrimonial position worsens (he 
is unable to work due to the headaches and memory loss, coupled with 
depression), the actio legis Aguiliae would be available. Moreover, he 
endures considerably more pain and suffering than he would have but for the 
intervention; thus, the action for pain and suffering would be viable. 
34
,;Due to the increased gravity of harm (compared to the situation in fn 
332), a charge of criminal assault would be more likely. 
!4
7With reference to scenario 2, suppose that he had two dependants for 
whom he was the breadwinner. Even assuming that the treatment itself was not 
negligent, the intentional non-disclosure is nevertheless causally connected 
to the wrongful death of their breadwinner. The action would be available. 
'
4HWith reference to scenario 2, she foresaw the reasonable possibility 
that he might die as a result of the treatment, and nevertheless proceeded. 
Of course, she did everything she could to guard against that occurrence, 
however. Whether this is a case of murder would depend on the formulation of 
dolus eventualis. If the volitional criterion (see fn 302 supra) is 
"consenting", "reconciling" or "taking into the bargain", then she quite 
possibly complies therewith. Normally, it would be the client's consent that 
justifies her conduct; without that consent, what remains is her subjective 
foresight of the possibility of death and continued conduct regardless. If one 
omits the volitional criterion altogether, as some contend should be the case 
(see fn 302 supra), she would certainly act with dolus eventualis. 
i4'.'If the court finds that the requirements for murder have not been met, 
assault might be a competent verdict. The possibility of culpable homicide, 
however, .demands some debate, the. intricacies involved in which are beyond the 
scope of the present dissertation. 
;""'with reference to scenario 1, suppose the damage he suffers is that 
in fn 345, these actions would certainly avail him. 
Violates Delictual: 
psycho- actio 
logical iniuriarum, 
integri- actio legis 
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standard all available 
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''·
1
rt is not impossible that, in addition to crimen iniuria, a court 
might, depending on the severity of the negligence of the treatment, establish 
culpable homicide. Once again, the intent in respect of unjustified 
intervention is probably not sufficiently closely connected to the death to 
warrant a conviction of murder. The court would then have to find negligence 
in respect of the death to be able to convict of culpable homicide. 
1 '·~Due to the fact that the treatment is not up to medical standard, it 
is not impossible that a court might find that the negligence in respect of 
justification and treatment (if gross), and also in respect of the resultant 
death, warrants a conviction of culpable homicide. 
134 
CHAPTER VI 
LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO INTERVENE 
1 Introduction 
According to 
independent 
Strauss353 , 
contractor 
a doctor in private practice354 is an 
who may (apart from in emergency 
situations) accept or refuse clients at his or her discretion.~5 
However, failing to perform an operation agreed upon (breach of 
contract), which failure has caused financial loss356 for the 
client, can found a malpractice claim. 357 Where a psychiatrist has 
agreed on a certain intervention, and fails to honour such 
agreement, it might thus constitute malpractice. Moreover, 
especially358 in the light of section 27(3) of the Constitution, 
which states that no one may be refused emergency treatment, even 
private practi tioners359 may be expected not unreasonably to refuse 
'"·'·strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law: a Selection of 
Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: Van Schaik (1991) 189. 
'''~Doctors at state facilities cannot ordinarily refuse 
persons who present there; see ibid. 
'·' 
0 Pergament echoes that: 11 As a general rule, a therapist in 
private practice may choose whomever she wishes to treat." 
Pergament D "Internet Psychotherapy: Current Status and Future 
Regulation" Journal of Law-Medicine 8 Health Natrix 233 (1998). 
-'"l;Administrator of Natal v Edouard 1990 (3) SA 581 (A). 
i~See Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law: A Selection 
of Practical Issues (3 ed) Pretoria: J L Van Schaik (1991) 243. 
',',HBefore the Constitution,. the common law had already 
compelled practitioners to act positively in certain situations; 
see ibid 23-27. See also the locus classicus regarding the legal 
duty to act positively, Minister of Police v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 
590 (A). 
'''·section 8 ( 2) of the Constitution has the effect that 
natural and juristic persons ( ie not just the state and its 
organs) are, 11 where appropriate 11 , bound by the fundamental rights 
in its chapter 2 - so-called 11 horizontal functioning". 
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to attend to someone in dire need. 360 
Other notable instances where psychiatrists may be held liable 
for not intervening in the appropriate manner in respect of their 
existing clients361 , 'are: not preventing a suicidal client from 
committing suicide by commitment, supervision and/or restraint, 
and not preventing a dangerous client from harming members of the 
public by commitment, supervision and/or restraint. These 
instances will be discussed in this brief chapter. 
2 Suicide or Self-injury on the Part of the Client 
2.1 Grounds for Liability 
Kruger362 asserts that, in terms of South African law, the hospital 
and treating psychiatrist of a particular client, owe a special 
legal duty to him or her if he or she is suicidal. Should there 
be a dereliction of such a duty, liability for the death of such 
a client will follow if the hospital and/or psychiatrist is/are 
found to have been negligent in omitting to prevent his or her 
death. 
According to Perlin363 , it is established law in the United States 
that a psychiatrist (or facility) has a duty to apply reasonable 
care and skill to prevent a client, whom a psychiatrist knows or 
ought to know may injure himself or herself, from doing so. He 
cautions that keeping too close an eye or too tight a rein on 
clients might, on the other hand, conflict with the right to 
''''Such practitioners do still have the right to be 
remunerated, of course. 
,,,-~In other words, those in respect of whom they have already 
undertaken treatment· on a continuous basis. 
''-Kruger A Mental Health Law Durban: Butterworths (1980). 
··;·Perlin ML Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal Vol 
3 (2 ed) Lexis publishing (2000) 383-385. 
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treatment in the least restrictive alternative setting. 3 " Still 
in the context of the United States, Reisner et al3~ aver that 
where a client commits suicide, the next of kin may assert a 
claim against the therapist for malpractice, alleging, for 
instance, that the therapist elected an improper mode of therapy366 
or that he or she did not commit the client or place him or her 
under close supervision. 
Liability for suicide may be particularly appropriate where a 
therapist fails to take necessary precautions when he or she has 
clear knowledge of a client's suicidal propensities. 367 Reisner et 
al 3~ caution, however, that "suicide prediction is notoriously 
unreliable. Various studies have shown that suicide prediction by 
experts is likely to grossly overpredict suicide, resulting in 
numerous 'false positives', ie prediction that individuals will 
commit suicide, when in fact they would not. Thus, the widespread 
use of civil commit~ent to prevent suicide would, as one court 
has noted, result in numerous [cl]ients who are not suicide risks 
being subjected to a loss of freedom." 
"'
4In this regard he refers to the case of Youngberg v Romeo 
50 US LW 4681 (US June 18 1982). The principle of 'the least 
restrictive alternative' is a commonly referred to and generally 
accepted one. Reisner R, Slobogin C and Rai A Law and the Mental 
Health System: Civil and Criminal Aspects (3 ed) St Paul: West 
Group (1999) 719 note, however, that it is "[s]till unresolved, 
at least by the United States Supreme Court, .. whether the least 
restrictive alternative doctrine has constitutional status". 
3
"';This would technically not, however, be failure to 
intervene, but rather negligent treatment. According to Reisner 
et al (ibid), such a claim might follow the negligent treatment 
of a client who entered therapy having suicidal impulses coupled 
with depression, where the negligence manifested in the 
therapist's failure to consider antidepressant medication, 
instead relying entirely on psychotherapy. See Osheroff v 
Chestnut Lodge 62 Md App 519, 490 A2d 720 (1985) in Reisner et 
al ibid 148 et seq. 
''-See Reisner R, Slobogin C and Rai A Law and the Mental 
Health System: Civil and Criminal Aspects (3 ed) St Paul: West 
Group (1999) 165. 
,,:"Ibid. 
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It is notable that this may be somewhat of a proverbial tightrope 
for a psychiatrist to walk: depriving a person of his or her 
freedom constitutes a significant curtailment of basic rights. 369 
If a psychiatrist unjustifiably facilitates the commitment of an 
apparently dangerous or suicidal person, who should actually not 
have been committed, that could also constitute malpractice. 370 
Moreover, if a psychiatrist unjustifiably and unreasonably 
restrains an individual under his or her care 1 it violates 
corpus371 and also libertas, constituting malpractice. 372 In the 
context of preventing harm, there may thus be a risk of being too 
cautious in that regard and· unjustifiably committing an 
individual. The matter of improper commitment hence warrants 
brief attention. 
~~·,. . 
· ''Apart from the fact that freedom is one of the corner-
stones of the South African Constitution and democracy, the 
personality interest libertas has long enjoyed legal protection. 
See Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Law of Delict (4 ed) 
Durban: Butterworths (2001) 335-336. 
17
''See, for instance, Kruger A Mental Health Law Durban: 
Butterworths ( 1980), who states: 11 [I] f it appears that the 
magistrate bona fide believed that the necessary medical grounds 
were present for commitment - in other words where the magistrate 
was misled by the reports of medical practitioners - an action 
in deli ct may lie against the practitioner. 11 Krug'er notes that 
a client detained under the Mental Health Act 18 of 1973, or a 
relative or guardian of such client, may at any time request a 
court to investigate the grounds of his or her detention. The 
court may subsequently make such.order as it deems fit. 
msee chapter V, 2.2 et seq, supra, regarding assault and 
negligent violation of corpus. Perlin ML Mental Disability Law: 
Civil and Criminal Vol 3 (2 ed) Lexis publishing (2000) at 370, 
also mentions assault and battery constituted by using excessive 
force to restrain or control a client. In South African law the 
psychiatrist would have to have at least dolus eventualis in 
respect of the fact that the force is excessive and thus 
wrongful, for that to constitute an assault. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of dolus or animus iniuriandi, he or she could still be 
held delictually liable for negligent violation of corpus and 
wrongful deprivation of liberty (where the form of restraint 
renders this appropriate). 
'
7
-see Neethling et al (op cit 335): "The libertas (bodily 
freedom) is protected not only against the total deprivation of 
liberty but against any limitation of a person's freedom of 
movement or action." 
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2.2 The Consequences of Improper Commitment 
Both inappropriate voluntary373 and involuntary374 commitment can 
be very harmful to the client and can attract legal liability. As 
has been stated, 375 an action ex delicto could lie against a 
q 
1This can be problematic if an incompetent person is 
allowed "voluntarily" to commit himself or herself. At the time 
a person considers signing the irvoluntary" admission document, 
the psychiatrist authorising admission (in South Africa the 
responsible person is the "superintendent", who is not 
necessarily a psychiatrist; see section 3 of the Mental Health 
Act 18 of 1973) must ensure that the person is competent. In the 
American case Zinermon v Burch 494 US 113 (1990), the hospital 
staff noted that upon "voluntarily" admitting himself, Darrell 
Burch was confused, unable to give reasons for his hospitali-
sation, and believed that he was 11 in heaven". Progress reports 
by psychiatrist Marlus Zinermon reflected his condition upon 
admission, describing him as "disoriented, semi-mute, confused, 
and bizarre in appearance and thought, uncooperative at the 
initial interview, extremely psychotic, and apparently paranoid 
and hallucinating"; see the discussion of this case in Stone DH 
"The Benefits of Voluntary Inpatient Psychiatric Hospitalization: 
Myth or Reality?" 9 B U Pub Int L J (Fall, 1999) 25, 35-36. He 
reports: "Darrell E. Burch, the named patient in the case, 
alleged that the Florida state mental hospital viol~ted state law 
by admitting him as a voluntary patient when they 'knew or should 
have known that [he] was incapable of voluntary, knowing, 
understanding and informed consent' to his admission. Burch 
further alleged that the hospital's failure to initiate Florida's 
involuntary placement procedure denied him constitutionally 
guaranteed procedural safeguards. The Court held that the 
hospital should have only allowed patients who were competent to 
consent to voluntary admission .... The Court recognized that Mr 
Burch was confined, imprisoned, and subjected to involuntary 
commitment and treatment for 149 days without the benefit of 
counsel or a hearing ... Burch's five-month stay, without hearing 
or attorney consultation, demonstrates an obvious due process 
violation." 
n
4Ie where a person is committed against his or her will or 
without his or her consent. Some issues in the context of primary 
and secondary health care, involving involuntary admissions to 
psychiatric hospitals, are discussed in Allan A, Allan MM and Van 
der Merwe PL "Inappropriate Involuntary Admissions to Psychiatric 
Hospitals" The South African Medical Journal ( 1999) 89 1303-1307. 
These authors theorise about the factors that might contribute 
to inappropriate involuntary admissions in South Africa, but 
assert that more research is required before clear conclusions 
can be reached. 
See fn 370 supra. 
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practitioner and/or institution negligently (or intentionally376 ) 
allowing improper commitment. 
Under the influence of English law, South African l·aw has adopted 
the specific form of iniuria, "wrongful deprivation of liberty". 377 
The effect of the influence of English law is that the courts do 
not require intent or negligence to found liability. 378 It is 
submitted, however, that in the context of wrongful commitment, 
it would be unreasonable to apply strict liability.~9 Especially 
considering that liability can arise on both sides of the 
spectrum, 380 it is doubtful that a court would hold a practitioner 
or institution liable without there having been at least 
n.;Intentional improper commitment is also not impossible -
this would be even more serious an act. 
_mSee Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Law of Delict 
(4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (2001) 335. They note that "[t]he 
existence of such deprivation must be judged objectively. Where 
a person thinks or believes that he is being held captive while 
this is not in fact the case, infringement of ·his physical 
liberty does not occur. On the other hand, a person need not be 
aware of the fact he is being deprived of his liberty for the 
personality infringement to be present. 11 This would be relevant 
in cases where a psychotic persQn may well be "unaware" of the 
deprivation. 
nHibid 336 • 
57
,'The psychiatric context is different from the context in 
which the action would usually feature. The rationale for strict 
liability for wrongful deprivation of liberty involves the 
inequalities between private individuals and public servants, 
normally in the context of "false imprisonment" or "wrongful 
arrest". See ibid 335, 372. 
'·H
1
'Ie if a person is unreasonably not committed, and causes 
damage to himself or herself or others, liability can also arise. 
It is notable that where a client is prematurely released and 
causes harm to a third party, the releasing institution may be 
held liable, as Kruger (op cit) asserts, if it can be shown that 
the client should not have been released, and had proper care 
been taken, he or she would not have been released. In respect 
of both commitment and discharge, Kruger emphasises that 
practitioners should not be so "afraid" of lawsuits that they 
refuse to certify persons who should really be certified or 
detain persons unnecessarily. In both cases, such "defensive" 
conduct could attract liability for not preventing harm to the 
public or the client, or wrongful detention, respectively. 
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negligence involved. The threat of strict liability would do 
nothing more than encumber an already difficult t~sk. Liability 
on the ground of negligence would be sufficient to sound the 
importance of taking care in this regard. The South African 
courts have the discretion to de~elop the common law taking such 
policy considerations into 
instancesY 1 - as this would be. 
account, especially in novel 
Returning specifically to the commitment of a client who 
discloses suicidal ideation or displays suicidal tendencies: 
apart from the possible legal perils just discussed, on a 
therapeutic level, the invocation of civil commitment poses the 
risk that "the client-therapist relationship, which relies on 
trust, may be ruptured, making it less likely that the therapist 
will be in a position thereafter to provide effective 
treatment". 382 
2.3 Conclusion 
2.3.1 The Crux: Due Professional Care and Skill 
Successfully negotiating the tension between not keeping close 
enough supervision or physical control (such as commitment or 
restraint383 ) on the one hand, and keeping too close control on the 
181See, generally, Van Aswegen A "Policy Considerations in 
the Law of Delict" THRHR (1993) 171. 
'"~see Reisner R, Slobogin C and Rai A Law and the Mental 
Health System: Civil and Criminal Aspects (3 ed) St Paul: West 
Group (1999) 165. 
"''rt is notable that 11 chemical restraint" is q.lso possible. 
This involves the use of medication to restrain a person who 
might pose a threat of harm to himself or herself or others. 
Serious violations of corpus and libertas can be perpetrated 
where this mechanism is abused, eg to "punish" a difficult 
committed person or for the mere sake of convenience. All persons 
working in such institutions should consider it their duty to be 
sensitive to the possibility that a frustrated colleague might 
be applying more restraint than necessary. The law cannot protect 
people if their plights are not brought to its attention; it is 
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other (resulting in a wrongful deprivation of lliberty and/or 
violation of corpus), depends simply384 and entirely on the 
application of the care and skill that a reasonable practitioner 
in the same position would have applied. 
2.3.2 An Application 
With reference to scenario 3385 , suppose informed consent had been 
duly obtained, and the treatment was performed up to medical 
standard. Still, the treatment is unsuccessful, and the trauma 
coupled with subsequent major depression clearly causes the 
client to become suicidal. Suppose also that there are a number 
of threats of suicide, and one or two attempts. If the suicide is 
reasonably foreseeable and the reasonable psychiatrist would have 
taken steps to prevent it, it is submitted that the actio legis 
Aquiliae avails her dependants, provided also that the court 
adjudicates affirmatively on the matter of legal causation. 96 
imperatively up to those who are "on the ground" to assist the 
law (and professional bodies) in safeguarding the integrity of 
their practices and profession. 
384It may be simple to state (cf fn 277 supra), but certainly 
not so simple to establish or prove. It is precisely this fact 
that urges practitioners to insure themselves against mal-
practice suits. 
Hi' chapter v, 7. 3 supra. 
'·t"cf fn 341 supra. In the American case Weathers v Pilkinton 
T App SW 2d 75 (1988), the matter of "proximate cause" and 
liability for suicide is featured. The following extract from 
that case may have some value in guiding a South African court: 
"[Majority judgment:] [W] e conclude that where a defendant 
injures another either wilfully or negligently an? as a result 
of the injury, the injured person commits suicide the act of 
suicide is, as a matter of law, an intervening independent cause 
if the decedent knew and understood the nature of his or her act 
or the act resulted from a moderately intelligent power of 
choice .... Therefore, we are of the opinion that the result in 
this case turns on the question of whether there is evidence in 
the record from which the jury might conclude that on the date 
of his death Mr Weathers did not know and underst~nd the nature 
of his suicidal act and, therefore, did not have a wilful and 
intelligent purpose to accomplish it ... 11 Tatum, Special Judge, 
dissenting, contends as follows: "I agree with the majority that 
there was evidence o·f negligence on the part of the defendant. 
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CHAPTER VII 
MALPRACTICE IN DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 
1 Introduction 
The basic meanings of intent and negligence have already been 
discussed387 , and those concepts have featured in the context of 
unjustified interventions, and also negligence in respect of a 
client's suicide. Intent or negligence relating to the actual 
quality of diagnosis and treatment will be focussed on in this 
chapter. 
2 Misdiagnosis 
2.1 Intentional Misdiagnosis 
According to Haroun and Morris, there may be a financial 
incentive for a psychiatrist intentionally to misdiagnose a 
I disagree that such negligence could not be found by a jury to 
be the proximate cause of the death of the decedent. The history 
of the previous attempts of the decedent to commit suicide is 
strong evidence that he was afflicted with a [CBC] that caused 
suicidal compulsions. It was for this reason that the decedent 
was placed in the care of the defendant, a health provider. It 
was the duty of the defendant to attempt to prevent the decedent 
from committing suicide ... In my view, suicide is not an 
intervening independent cause that will relieve a physician of 
liability or negligence when the patient had no power of choice. 
There was evidence in this case that the decedent acted with 
compulsion and not through a power of choice. As stated, the 
history of the decedent's previous attempts to commit suicide is 
circumstantial evidence sufficient to make a jury question as to 
whether the suicide was committed by 'intelligent power of 
choice' or by compulsion due to [CBC] . I repeat that this 
suicidal tendency or compulsion was specifically the ailment 
which the defendant. was entrusted to treat." See Reisner R, 
Slobogin C and Rai A Law and the Mental Health System: Civil and 
Criminal Aspects (3 ed) St Paul: West Group (1999) 168-170. 
IChapter V supra under 2.2 and 2.3. 
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condition. They aver that 11 a common diagnostic confusion 
surrounds individuals who present in a psychotic state". 388 The 
problem is that the psychosis may be a manifestation of a primary 
biological-psychological-social condition (such as schizophrenia) 
or may be a secondary substance-induced psychosis due to, for 
instance, amphetamines, cocaine, PCP (phencyclidine), or 
hallucinogens, such as LSD ( lysergic acid diethylamide) 389 • 
According to these clinicians, 390 the symptoms and signs are 
identical: 11 A psychiatrist, relying on a clinical interview 
alone, will not be able to distinguish a primary psychosis from 
a secondary psychosis. The most objective method to resolve this 
differential is to do a urine toxicology screen. But frequently 
the test is not ordered. The treating psychiatrist may have a 
financial incentive in not knowing so that he or she maintains 
diagnostic flexibility. Without a urine test, the doctor can 
diagnose the [cl] ient with psychotic disorder not otherwise 
specified (NOS). If. a urine test is ordered and the [cl]ient 
tests positive, the doctor may have to report that the psychosis 
was drug induced - and potentially not reimbursable through the 
[cl]ient's insurance." 
In terms of South African law, a psychiatrist who, in that 
situation, does not order the toxicology screen, acts with dolus 
eventualis in respect of misdiagnosis. The psychiatrist would 
inter alia391 be committing fraud against the client's insurer. 392 
jHHSee Haroun A M & Morris G H "Weaving a Tangled Web: The 
Deceptions of Psychiatrists" 10 ·J Contemp Legal Issues (1999) 
235. 
'w'See Kaplan H Sadock B and Grebb J Synopsis of Psychiatry 
(7 ed) Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins (1994) 429. 
""''Haroun & Morris op cit 235-236. 
'"
1Ie apart from ethical violations and potential harm to the 
client. 
'-The elements required for fraud are all present; see 
Snyman CR Criminal Law (4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (2002) 520-
529. 
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2.2 Negligent Misdiagnosis 
Slawson393 reports that the American Psychiatric Association 
authorised a study of more than 700 closed cases of psychiatric 
malpractice between 1974 and 1984. The most common complaints 
involved improper medication, improper treatment, and failure to 
diagnose a physical condition. 394 The last-mentioned type of error 
will here feature as an example of negligent misd~agnosis. 
In the South African context, 
the American situation, that 
often involve neglecting to 
Kruger3 e notes, with reference to 
cl~ims based on faulty diagnosis 
identify an underlying physical 
ailment. Perlin396 points out that there is a high percentage of 
undetected physical conditions in psychiatric clients, because 
inter alia they are likely to be in poorer physical health and 
receive poorer medical care. He contends that it is inevitable 
that there will be increased future litigation regarding 
psychiatrists' failure to perform an appropriate physical 
examination. 
It is submitted that psychiatrists must constantly be aware of 
the possibility that there might be a causative or merely 
concomitant physical condition, and must be sensitive to the 
possibility that another practitioner might need to be consulted. 
In line with HMM, specialists must know enough about one 
another's areas of expertise. to be able to collaborate 
efficiently and effectively. The psychiatrist does not have to 
have the skill to make a detailed diagnosis of every possible 
physical condition. He or she must, however, be able to recognise 
where an investigation into a possible physical condition is 
<•'slawson PF "Psychiatric malpractice: ten years loss 
experience" MedLaw (1989). 
""Kruger A Mental Health Law Durban: Butterworths (1980) 
'"'see Perlin ML Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal 
Vol 3 (2 ed) Lexis publishing (2000) 341. 
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indicated, and, hence, must refer the client to the relevant 
specialist. Failure to exercise due care and skill in this 
regard, would constitute malpractice. 
3 Improper Treatment 
3.1 Improper Pharmacotherapy 
Slawson397 reports improper medication as the most common 
psychiatric-malpractice complaint. According to Reisner et a1 398all 
classes of psychotropic medications can have side-effects, which 
commonly include dystonia (involuntary contraction or muscle 
spasm) and akathisia (restlessness sometimes associated with 
continuous leg movement). They assert that approximately ten to 
fifteen percent of persons treated with such medication develop 
one or both of these conditions, which, fortunately are 
reversible when the use of the medication is terminated. More 
troublesome is the fact that approximately ten to twenty percent 
of clients who are treated for more than one year with certain 
medications develop a condition known as "tardi ve dyskinesia 11 
(TD) 399 , which is sometimes irreversible. 400 
"'";Reisner R, Slobogin C and Rai A Law and the Mental Health 
System: Civil and Criminal Aspects (3 ed) St Paul: West Group 
(1999) 47. 
'"''TD is a condition that is "characterized by involuntary 
movements of the face, trunk, or extremities, and is often 
associated with the prolonged exposure to dopamine receptor drugs 
such as antipsychotic drugs. Involuntary movements include: 
frowning, blinking, grimacing, puckering, chewing, smacking, 
rolling of the tongue, foot tapping, and rocking of the hips ... 
The term 11 tardive 11 refers to the fact that the condition usually 
develops only after a prolonged antipsychotic drug regimen of at 
least six months, whereas 11 dyskinesia 11 refers to the involuntary 
movements resulting from the actual drug use." See Baker J 
"Tardive Dyskinesia: Reducing Medical Malpractice Exposure 
Through a Risk-benefit Analysis" DePaul J Heal th Care L (Summer, 
1997) 800. 
"'»'Ibid. 
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Baker401 reminds that a truism accepted by most clinicians, but 
often disregarded by both the lay and legal communilties402 is that 
"few drugs that help anybody will not hurt somebody, and all 
potent drugs, no matter how skillfully administered can cause 
untoward effects in some [cl]ients". He affirms that one of the 
more serious possible side-effects of antipsychotic medication is 
TD. Mentioning some of the typi~al antipsychotic drugs used in 
treatment, he reports that a study revealed that no one 
anti psychotic drug is superior, and that there are few data 
identifying specific drugs or drug classes in the development of 
TD. Some drugs, however, are believed not to cause TD, such as 
clozapine. 403 
4
'nBaker J 11 Tardive Dyskinesia: Reducing Medical Malpractice 
Exposure Through a Risk-benefit Analysis" DePaul J Health Care 
L (Summer, 1997) 799. 
40~Baker (ibid 824-823) makes some averments in this regard 
that once again highlight the importance of HMM: "[D]ivergent 
perception of the risks involved in the treatment of 
antipsychotic medication is yet another reason for,the perceived 
medical malpractice crisis and the tensions between the medical 
and legal communities. Thus, judges may tend to view clinicians' 
treatment decisions as reckless. The differences in risk 
perception are magnified by 'hindsight bias' , as judges in 
malpractice suits seek outcomes inevitably in retrospect. Judges 
become more risk adverse because they address treatment decisions 
retrospectively, while psychiatrists must make treatment 
decisions prospectively. Judges also become more risk adverse 
because the side effects of antipsychotic medication are visible 
in a courtroom, while the benefits of antipsychotic medication 
are not readily apparent. The anti-medicine rhetoric often found 
in legal literature, and the judicial misunderstanding of those 
medical facts involved in antipsychotic medication and tardive 
dyskinesia, must be altered. The legal community should be 
educated on the real risks of antipsychotic medication and TD and 
must also be informed of the great benefits provided by such 
medication. Judges and juries can learn through expert witnesses 
the true medical facts in order to make reasoned decisions, and 
the medical community should approach the problem of TD honestly 
in order to develop an educational dialogue between the two 
professions." 
~'''Clozapine may, on the other hand be associated with many 
other side-effects; see, for instance, Sher L "Pharmacogenetics 
and Anti psychotic Drugs" Lancet 356 ( 9226) : 342 7 /22 ( 2000): 
"Clozapine has been held up as the best antipsychotic drug for 
the management of resistant schizophrenia. However, clozapine has 
been a difficult drug for both [cl]ient and physician. The use 
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Baker404 furnishes some examples, based on American law, of bases 
for liability in this context: 
(1) Administering dosages of antipsychotic medication 
for the wrong reason or time period. 
(2) Negligent misdiagnosis resulting in the wrong 
prescription of. antipsychotic medication. 
(3) Failure to monitor the client's condition 
(4) Negligent treatment of TD when it has developed. 
( 5) Failure appropriately to reduce or discontinue 
medication. 
(6) Dangerous polypharmacy (the dangerous combination 
of multiple drugs). 
(7) Failure to seek expert consultation. 
(8) Failure to take heed of a client's medical history. 
(9) Failure to take into account risk factors such as 
of clozapine has been associated with multiple side effects 
including: agranulocytosis, leucopenia, increase in liver 
enzymes, neuroleptic malignant syndrome, delirium, seizures, 
tachycardia, hypotension, myocardi tis, cardiomyopathy, and sudden 
death. Clinically relevant side effects occur in 73% of [cl]ients 
treated with clozapine. Also, white-blood-cell monitoring is 
necessary ie [cl] ients need frequent blood ·tests. Safer 
antipsychotic drugs that do not require frequent blood testing 
are coming onto the market. It is not likely that clozapine will 
be widely used in the future. When we treat a severe [CBC] with 
a drug that can imp~ove the [cl]ient's quality of life, we should 
not, at the same time, put the 1cl]ient's physical health and 
life in danger. I suggest that pharmacogeneticists should focus 
on drugs that are likely to be used in the future." 
~ 1 jop cit 818. 
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age and gender405 
10) failure to obtain informed consent prior to 
administering antipsychotic medication. 
Perlin406 contends that improper pharmacotherapy is a potential 
minefield for the psychiatrist. He recommends407 that, at the very 
least, the dosage guidelines set forth in the physicians' desk 
reference (PDR) will be given considerable weight by the courts. 
Once again, the standard for negligence (both in South Africa and 
the United States) is the same, viz that of "the reasonable 
psychiatrist 11 • The following American cases, discussed by Baker408 , 
reflect instances where this standard was not met: 
1) Faigenbaum v Oakland Medical Center409 
"The plaintiff in Faigenbaum was ... suffering from 
depression and schizophrenia. Between the years of 1964 
and 1966, she was hospitalized for what may have been 
manic psychoses.caused by marital difficulties. At this 
time, she responded favorably to low doses of 
40
"Baker (op cit 807) notes the following: "The most 
implicated risk factor for TD, especially the more severe and 
persistent forms, is increased age. Many studies indicate there 
is a strong correlation between a [cl]ient's age and the 
prevalence and severity of TD. Therefore, clinicians must be 
extremely cautious when administering antipsychotic drugs to 
elderly [cl]ients and any side-effects should be carefully 
monitored. Clinicians should also warn [cl]ients of 'the following 
risk factors associated with TD: smoking, alcohol use, and the 
use of antidepressants. Diabetes melli tus has similarly been 
identified as a possible risk factor." 
40
'Perlin M L Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal Vol 
3 (2 ed) Lexis publishing (2000) 350. 
407 Ibid 353. 
"''Op cit 830-832. 
''"373 N W 2d 161 (Mich Ct App 1985). 
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chlorpromazine. She was again hospitalized in 1976, 
suffering from 'manic-depression' , chronic undiffe-
rentiated schizophrenia, and 1 hysterical neurosis 1 , and 
she was prescr~bed chlorpromazine. Hospitalized for 
nearly one year, the [cl] ient developed a movement 
disorder, incorrectly diagnosed by a staff neurologist 
as Huntington's Chorea, rather than TD. As a result of 
the misdiagnosis, the hospital physicians continued to 
administer antipsychotic drugs for one year until the 
[cl]ient•s family demanded the medication be 
discontinued. In determining whether the hospital was 
negligent in treating the [cl] ient, the Faigenbaum 
court concluded that the hospital physicians 
incorrectly diagnosed the [cl]ient•s condition, failed 
to monitor the [cl]ient•s· condition properly, and 
negligently continued to administer antipsychotic 
medication after she displayed clear symptoms of TD. 
The trial court, therefore, awarded a $ 1 million 
judgment in favpr of the [cl]ient. 11 
2) Hedin v United States 410 
11 [T]he plaintiff received ... treatment from a VA 
hospital for a period of seventeen months, during which 
time he saw no physician and continued to receive 
antipsychotic drugs through the mail. In determining 
whether the VA physicians were negligent in failing to 
monitor the plaintiff's condition, the court noted that 
the physicians prescribed' an excessive amount of 
anti psychotic drugs over a prolonged period of time. As 
it turned out, however, the VA ultimately admitted that 
the prescribed doses were excessive, the plaintiff's 
condition was . not adequately monitored, and the 
plaintiff's condition had been previously diagnosed as 
L',No 5-83-3 (D Minn Jan 4, 1985). 
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untreatable. Therefore, the sole issue before the court 
was the amount of damages. The court thereafter awarded 
the plaintiff nearly$ 3 million, including a $ 30,000 
loss of consortium award to his ex-wife." 
3) Vincent v Walz 411 
11 [T]he plaintiff was prescribed Mellaril for menopausal 
symptoms and maintained the 
years until she developed 
prescription 
symptoms of 
for 
TD. 
seven 
Trial 
proceeded on the sole issue of damages, after a default 
judgment was entered against the defendant-physician 
for failing to answer the complaint in a timely manner. 
The jury ultimately awarded the plaintiff $ 1.25 
million in damages." 
It is evident that the awards in these cases were rather high. 
Such high awards are not featured in the South African courts. 
The focus in the awarding of damages in South African law is on 
compensating a person for the actual loss suffered, and where 
appropriate, providing solatium (satisfaction) to "satisfy" the 
aggrieved plaintiff for damage to his or her personality 
interests (for which real compensation cannot be provided) . 
Solatium does not reach the proportions of the amo~nts awarded as 
"punitive damages" in the United States, however. Nevertheless, 
psychiatrists in South Africa must exercise great care in their 
use of medication. Both too much4~ and too little (or none) 4" can 
give rise to liability. Once again, the reasonable psychiatrist 
must carefully and skilfully negotiate the proverbial tightrope. 
411No 86-3710 (DeKalb Ct Sup Ct, Jan 14, 1988). 
4LAs the above cases illustrate. 
,>where the reasonable psychiatrist would have provided the 
necessary dosage of medication, and it is not provided, causing 
the client to suffer damage, it would constitute malpractice. 
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3.2 Improper Psychotherapy 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Unlike most medical interventions, psychotherapy involves no (or, 
imperatively, little414 ) physical contact with the client. The 
"abstract" nature of psychotherapy has been said to have made it 
more difficult to base malpractice claims thereon. 415 Perlin416 
opines, however, that verbal psychotherapy now appears to be a 
fertile field for future psychiatric malpractice litigation. 
3.2.2 Negligence and the Respectable-Minority Doctrine 
Once again, the yardstick for determining negligence in 
psychotherapy would be that of the reasonable psychotherapist in 
the class of practitioners to which he or she belongs. A matter 
that is of particular relevance in this regard is the so-called 
"respectable-minority doctrine". Reisner et a1 417 introduce this 
doctrine as follows: 
"A [cl]ient who has received treatment involving the 
use of a particular technique may, if the outcome is 
unsatisfactory, claim that the physician or therapist 
was negligent in not utilizing a more effective 
treatment modality. Such claim of negligence in the 
selection of treatment may ~e advanced, moreover, even 
where the physician or therapist obtained the informed 
consent of the [cl] ient. . . Generally, claims that 
physicians or therapists have utilized the wrong 
4uSee Hammer v Rosen (discussed statim infra) and the 
discussion on undue familiarity in chapter VIII infra. 
4 FPerlin ML Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal Vol 
3 (2 ed) Lexis publishing (2000) 361. 
n Ibid 363. 
4 ~~Reisner R, Slobogin C and Rai A Law and the Mental Heal th 
System: Civil and Criminal Aspects (3 ed) St Paul: West Group 
(1999) 147. 
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therapeutic technique or failed to use the most 
effective one will, as with all other aspects of 
performance, be measured by the standard of due care, 
ie, what members of the profession would customarily do 
under the circumstances. While a finding that the 
therapeutic approach used was not •customary', does not 
necessarily lead to liability, proof of conformity to 
custom generally precludes a finding of liability. 
Thus, whether a particular ~reatment is •customary• or 
1 accepted 1 by the profession may well be dispositive of 
the issue of liability. Proof that a particular 
procedure is customary does not, however, require that 
it be used by a majority of practitioners. In fact, in 
a number of jurisdictions, a defense is established by 
a showing that a particular treatment approach is 
supported by a •respectable minority• of those in the 
field. 11 
An example of where an uncustomary technique did not meet the 
respectable-minority criterion is the American case of Hammer v 
Rosen418 , where the psychiatrist, Dr J N Rosen, had earned a 
reputation for success in the treatment of schizophrenic persons 
using a technique, which 11 ••• was highly personalized, but which 
was consented to by the spouse, n~xt of kin, or legal guardian of 
each patient ... Dr. Rosen might touch certain patients from time 
to time with differing degrees of force, depending upon the 
mental condition and needs of the patient, in order to 
effectively and fully explore and utilize the possibilities and 
potentialities which his method offered. 11419 The court heard no 
evidence by which to conclude that this technique was acceptable. 
A claim for malpractice was sustained. 00 
41 H7 NY 2d 76, 198 N Y S 2d 65, 165 N E 2d 756 (1960). 
41
'See Reisner et al (op cit 155). 
u·see also Snyman JL Die Siviele Opneming van Geesteson-
gesteldes: Regte en Regsbeskerming van die Betrokkene (LLD 
thesis, Unisa, 1981) 569-570. 
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3.2.3 High-risk Psychotherapy 
3.2.3.1 Introduction: Recovered Memory Therapy 
Though a certain therapy might be accepted in psychiatry/ 
psychology, it might still be potentially problematic in the 
negligence context - some techniques are inherently more risky 
than others. Reisner et al 421 discuss one such therapy, recovered 
memory therapy. 422 They report that in the United States, since 
1990, the use of this technique has led to 105 malpractice suits, 
of which forty-two .were settled out court (notably with one 
settlement leading to the payment of 10,2 million dollars to the 
client and her family). Moreover, it is notable that of the nine 
cases that went to trial, all resulted in a verdict for the 
plaintiff, and forty-three cases were still pending by July 
19 98. 423 
4210p cit 156-165. 
4 .::~Also featured in the hypothetical scenario 3 supra. Bowman 
CG "The Manipulation of Legal. Remedies to Deter Sui ts by 
Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse" 92 NW UL Rev 1481 (Summer, 
1998) 1482-1483, explains as follows: "'Discovery' in the sexual 
abuse context can occur in one of two ways, depending upon 
whether the plaintiff's memory of the abuse was continuous or 
recovered. Courts and commentators have styled these 1 Type I' and 
'Type II' situations: in Type I cases, the victim never forgot 
the sexual abuse, but either failed to understand the connection 
between the abuse and her injuries or was not psychologically 
able to sue until much later; in Type II cases, on the other 
hand, the victim's memory of the abuse was repressed and then 
later recovered. In both of these situations, most victims of 
abuse had no legal remedy in the past, and consequently most 
perpetrators were never held accountable for their actions unless 
they were caught and criminally prosecuted at the time of the 
abuse - a vast minority of all cases. Reacting to this perceived 
injustice, the majority of states now provide by statute some 
form of delayed discovery rule for victims of childhood sexual 
abuse. As a result, numerous suits have entered the legal system 
that previously would have been barred by the statute of 
limitations.'' She cautions that "[t]here is substantial debate 
within both the scientific and legal communities as to the 
existence and reliability of del~yed-recall memories". 
L'Reisner et al (op cit 156). 
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3. 2. 3. 2 Malpractice Claims on the Part of the Client in the 
Context of Recovered Memory Therapy 
The recent American case, Bloom v Braun and Others424 , involves the 
therapy in question. The plaintit'f, Rhonda Bloom, based her claim 
on the following (as per Bronstein J 65 ): 
11 In her complaint, Bloom alleged that Dr Braun was 
involved with· a unique psychotherapy program 
specializing in diagnosing a multiple personality 
disorder [termed 'Dissociative Identity Disorder' by 
the DSM since 1994 (DSM-IV426 ), partly due to the fact 
that it is not an axis-II 'personality disorder' but an 
axis-I 'dissociative disorder']. She also alleged that 
Dr Braun was an expert in uncovering repressed memories 
of satanic ritual abuse ... Bloom alleged that defendants 
misrepresented as fact that satanic ritual abuse was 
proven to exist and that since her mother had recovered 
memories of participating in such rituals, she was also 
a victim/participant in the activity ... She also alleged 
that defendants were aware that the imagery she 
experienced was confabulated and a product of their 
therapy, yet they did not inform her that the memories 
and the resultant [dissociative condition] were 
actually caused by their therapy. She also alleged that 
she was lulled into not discovering her psychiatric 
injuries inflicted ... by defendants' misrepresenta-
tions ... Bloom's complaint identified her injuries as: 
aggravation of preexisting depression; great 
humiliation and embarrassment; a belief [that] she was 
a product of incest between her mother and grandfather; 
self-hatred and a pattern of self-mutilation and 
4 ~'No 1-99-3992, 317 Ill App·3d 720; 739 Ne 2d 925 (2000). 
~~'Ibid 722-724. 
c,:American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV Washington: APA ( 1994). 
155 
cutting; abortion of a fetus because she believed it 
would be promised to the cult; irrational paranoid fear 
for her safety; sleep dysfunction, including sleeping 
with weapons under her pillow; severance of her 
relationship with her mother; and living in emotionally 
abusive and violent relationships." 
In casu the court found that the statute of limitations had run -
thus it did not entertain the merits of the case. Nevertheless, 
the case illustrates the type of cause of action to which such 
therapy may give rise. In this case, the focus was on the 
injuries endured by the client herself. 07 Under 3.2.3.3 statim 
infra, a case illustrating liability towards third parties in 
this context is briefly discussed. 
As a further illustration of actions on the client's part, with 
reference to Scenarios 3 and 4428 
' 
suppose that valid informed 
consent had been obtained. If the techniques were subsequently 
applied negligently, such malpractice would, in terms of South 
African law, potentially give rise to the actio legis Aquiliae 
and action for pain and suffering. 09 
3.2.3.3 Malpractice Claims on the Part of Third Parties in the 
Context of Recovered Memory Therapy 
To illustrate the type of malpractice suit that could be brought 
by accused third persons against therapists, a summary430 of the 
427 It is clear that liability for "psychological harm" would 
be a major factor in such a case in the South Afr'ican context. 
See chapter v, 2 supra. 
4 ~HSupra chapter V, 7. 3 and 7. 4. 
L'·see supra chapter V. 
411
'Combining the accounts of Bowman CG "The Manipulation of 
Legal Remedies to Deter Suits by Survivors of Childhood Sexual 
Abuse" 92 NW U.L. Rev 1481 (Northwestern University Law Review) 
(Summer, 1998) 1486-1487 and Slovenko R "The Duties of Therapists 
to Third Parties" i'n Joubert JJ (Ed) Essays in Honour of -
Huldigingsbundel vir SA Strauss Pretoria: Unisa (1995) 218. 
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well-known American case Ramona v Isabella, Rose & Western 
Medical Center431 is provided: 
Holly Ramona had sought therapy for an eating problem. 
Her therapists · suggested that her problem might be 
caused by childhood sexual abuse that she had 
repressed. She was told that if she recovered memories 
of abuse under sodium amytal, these would be accurate. 
Such memories were subsequently "uncovered". Her 
father, G, the alleged abuser, was summoned to a 
meeting where a confrontation and the presentation of 
a charge against him occurred. Subsequently he was 
granted standing to sue the therapist even though Holly 
(the client) was completely satisfied with the therapy. 
He claimed for damages based on: the accusation of 
abuse, causing his wife to divorce him, causing his 
other daughters to become estranged from him, and 
causing his employer to terminate his employment. 
Slovenko reports that, in their verdict, the jury 
concluded that ·11 ( 1) the defendants were negligent in 
providing health care to Holly Ramona by implanting or 
reinforcing false memories that the plaintiff [G] had 
molested her as a child; (2) the defendants caused the 
plaintiff to be personally confronted with the 
accusation that he had molested Holly Ramona; (3) ... the 
plaintiff suffered [damage] that [was] caused by the 
negligence of the defendants". 4D 
In the United States, the quest~on has subsequently been asked 
whether the decision opens the door to litigation by any person 
who is aggrieved by an interpretation made by a therapist in 
respect of a client. In this regard, Slovenko emphasises the fact 
411Ramona v Isabella, Rose & Western Medical Center case no 
c 61898 (1994). 
4 
'-see Slovenko op cit 220. 
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that, in the Ramona case, the "therapists operated on the basis 
of unsupported beliefs and urged the [cl]ient to blame someone 
for her problems". 433 . Indeed, a major factor leading to liability 
in casu was the manner in which the confrontation and legal 
action against G was encouraged and arranged. Slovenko notes that 
a resolution of the American Medical Association requires 
"external validation" to establish the authenticity of the 
history of a client's trauma. He asserts that in "revival 11 of 
memory of sexual abuse, it is incumbent upon therapists, given 
its impact on others, to secure corroborating evidence. He 
further reports that "Dr Paul Appelbaum, representing the 
American Psychiatric Association, opined that it might be 
salutary if therapists were found liable in negligence to serve 
as a chastening lesson 11 • 4~ 
Once again, the reasonable psychotherapist finds the balance 
between going to the lengths required by therapy in the client's 
best interest, and not going too far, exceeding the boundaries 
of prudent practice and jeopardising the interests of third 
parties or, inadvertently, those of the client. The reasonable 
psychotherapist will not be so 11 defensive 11 as to compromise a 
client's path to wholeness, which may perhaps require a 
confrontation with a third party, nor will he or she 
irresponsibly make suggestions to the client. 435 The reasonable 
psychotherapist must bear the interests of all in mind and be 
cautious in exercising the considerable influence that he or she 
may have on the lives of others. 
4
"See Slovenko op cit 219. 
4 '~Ibid 220. Bowman (op cit) contends that "[e]ven where the 
client's best interest seems to dictate a confrontation with her 
abuser, a therapist abreast of the latest legal developments may 
be reluctant to encourage a confrontation or to be present if it 
does take place (as happened in the Ramona case), and may counsel 
against the filing of any legal action". 
4 
•. -Thus not impetuously urging a client to engage in 
confrontations based on dubious facts. If, for instance, a client 
elects to confront the possible abuser, the therapist can only 
but assertively urge against it (if appropriate). 
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CHAPTER VIII 
UNDUE FAMILIARITY AND ABANDONMENT 
1 Introduction 
This brief chapter examines potential liability on two poles of 
yet another set of extremes. On the one hand, if a psychiatrist 
becomes too intimately involved with a client, it could 
constitute malpractice. On the other hand, if a psychiatrist is 
not involved enough (or unreasonably terminates involvement), it 
could likewise constitute malpractice. 
2 Undue Familiarity 
This could range from innocently inappropriate conduct to 
intentional sexual exploitation of clients. The transference 
phenomenon has often been implicated as a major factor in this 
context. 436 The types of instances involving negligent undue 
H·rn the context of psychiatric malpractice in the form of 
sexual exploitation, Sanbar et al note the following: "As therapy 
progresses, unconscious feelings of conflict, fears, and desires 
originating from important relations in the [cl]ient's past are 
said to be 'transferred' to the therapist in the present. Known 
as the 'transference' phenomenon, this experience is a common 
occurrence in psychotherapy and often provides a therapist with 
valuable information to analyze and interpret. Because of the 
transference phenomenon, a [cl]ient becomes vulnerable to the 
emotions being experienced, for example, love feelings. The 
therapist, therefore, must conduct the treatment with sensi ti vi ty 
and care. A similar ·phenomenon, known as •countertransference' 
also may occur in therapy. This occurs when a therapist 
experiences unconscious conflicts and feelings toward a [cl] ient. 
As with [cl] ient transferences, countertransference feelings 
should be recognized as important therapeutic information and 
analyzed in order to gain insight into how to better understand 
the [cl] ient." These authors note that "in addition to sexual 
activity, other types of behavior that demonstrate a manipulation 
of the transference phenomenon or therapeutic relation may be 
subject to civil liability". See Sanbar S, Gibovsy A, Firestone 
MH Legal Medicine (3 ed) St Louis: Mosby (1995) 604, 605. 
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familiarity and intentional undue familiarity will next be dealt 
with respectively. 
2.1 Negligent Undue Familiarity 
Strauss and Strydom437 discuss the much-referred-to older English 
case of Landau v Werner438 , where a psychiatrist 1 s client had 
"fallen in love with him 11 (a pr9duct of transference) and told 
him that, for this reason, she did not want to continue her 
therapy. The psychiatrist, however, believed that she was in need 
of further therapy, and repeatedly took her to restaurants and 
visited her at her home. After a few months, her condition 
deteriorated to such an extent that she could not work. The 
authors439 report that, confirming the judgment of the lower court, 
the court of appeal held the psychiatrist liable to pay damages 
of £6000 for "negligent psychotherapy". 
Any situation in which a psychiatrist becomes inappropriately 
closely involved with a client might constitute negligent therapy 
on the basis of undue familiarity. The question would once again 
be whether the reasonable psychotherapist would have erred in 
blurring the imperative therapeutic boundaries. If expert 
evidence convinces a court that.the reasonable psychotherapist 
would have applied caution and skill in avoiding the blurring of 
boundaries, and a defendant did not, that defendant will be found 
to have been negligent. 
4 nStrauss SA & Strydom MJ Die Suid-Afrikaanse Geneeskundige 
Reg Pretoria: Van Schaik (1967) at 300. 
4 10 105 Sol J 25 7, appeal dismissed, 105 Sol J 1008 (QB 1961) . 
See Snyman JL Die Siviele Opneming van Geestesongesteldes: Regte 
en Regsbeskerming van.die Betrokkene (LLD thesis, Unisa, 1981) 
580. See also Claassen NJB & Verschoor T Medical Negligence in 
South Africa Pretoria: Digma (1992) at 24, where the case is 
erroneously referred to as being American. 
~<'.·Strauss & Strydom op cit 300. 
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2.2 Intentional Undue Familiarity 
In the United States, a leading case in this regard is Roy v 
Hartogs440 • In casu R alleged that she was induced to have sexual 
intercourse with H as part of her prescribed therapy. R claimed 
that, as a result, she was so emotionally injured that she had to 
seek hospitalisation. In their discussion of the case, Reisner et 
a1 441 report that the trial court ls award of damages was upheld: 
"By alleging his client's mental and emotional status was 
adversely affected by this deceptive and damaging treatment, 
plaintiff's counsel asserted a viable cause of action." 
In Roy v Hartogs442 expert testimony affirmed that there are 
"absolutely no circumstances which merit a psychiatrist to engage 
in sex with his [client]". Sanbar et a1 443 maintain that there 
still remain some therapists who attempt to rationalise their 
actions. They note that some of the most common arguments, all of 
which have thus far been rejected by the American courts, include 
that the client consented to the sexual activity, that the sexual 
activity was not a part of treatment (thus an independent 
relationship) or that the treatment had been terminated before 
the sexual relationship commenced. 
Any situation, even after termination of treatment, where a 
therapist abuses his or her influence, taking sexual advantage of 
a client or ex-client, is unacceptable. Presently, in South 
African law, one would have to argue along the lines of invalid 
consent (due to its not being "free and voluntary", but rather, 
in fact, heavily influenced) to establish delictual or criminal 
440 85 Misc 2d 891, 381 N Y S 2d 58 7 ( 1976). 
441Reisner R, Slobogin C and Rai A Law and the Mental Health 
System: Civil and Criminal Aspects (3 ed) St Paul: West Group 
(1999) 174. 
4LSupra. 
~ 4 isanbar S, Gibovsy A & Firestone MH Legal Medicine ( 3 ed) 
St Louis: Mosby (1995) 605. 
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liability. Labuschagne 444 points out that South African statutory 
law does not cover sexual contact between psych0therapist and 
client (apart from instances where the client is mo're than mildly 
mentally retarded445 ). Such contact has been statutorily 
criminalised in some countries, such as Germany. Labuschagne 
generally concludes that, in view of the relationship of 
dependency of a client with his or her therapist and the scope 
for abuse that this creates, South Africa should statutorily 
criminalise the intentional abuse of that relationship for sexual 
gain. The 
insufficient. 
absence~of-consent concept is, to his mind, 
Indeed, it would simplify matters and be more 
realistic if such provisions were to be incorporated. 
3 Abandonment 
Perlin446 asserts that it is standard malpractice law that a 
physician who abandons a client who is in need of further 
treatment, without giving that client reasonable time to find an 
alternative provider, has breached his or her duty to the client. 
Strauss447 affirms that once a client has been accepted for medical 
444Labuschagne JMT "Seksuele Kontak Tussen Psigoterapeut en 
Patient: Opmerkinge oor die Strafregtelike Beskerming van 
Psigoseksuele Outonomie" TRW 25 2 (2000) 59-60. 
44
'presently, "mild mental retardation" would be the correct 
term for what more or less used to amount to a "moron". The 
Sexual offences Act 23 of 1957 criminalises sexual intercourse 
with a female "imbecile or idiot". These two remarkably archaic 
categories used to represent individuals whose intellectual 
abilities would now be placed in three categories: moderate, 
severe and profound mental retardation, which categories cover 
IQ below 50-55. Labuschagne (ibid 59) contends that the fact that 
only female persons are protected is unconstitutional. This 
contention is indubitably valid. Moreover, as has been stated ( fn 
35 supra), the continued use of such archaic (and. colloquially 
laughable) terminology mocks the fitness of law. 
44
'Perlin ML Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal Vol 
3 (2 ed) Lexis publishing (2000) 368. 
ff
7Strauss SA "Ethics in the Treatment of Mental Patients: 
Some Aspects" in Van Wyk C & Van Oosten H (Eds) Nihil Obstat: 
Feesbundel vir WJ Hosten/Essays in Honour of WJ Hosten (1996) 
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treatment on a continuous basis, he or she may not simply be 
abandoned. He448 contends that the psychiatric situation is largely 
the same as the general medical one just described, with the 
following two possible points of difference, however: 
(a) the psychiatric client may be emotionally more 
dependant on the therapist than other medical clients; 
( b) the condition of the client may be such as to 
render a contractual relationship between the 
psychiatrist and the client impossible. In this case, 
Strauss asserts, a reasonable arrangement in the best 
interest of the client should be negotiated with his or 
her spouse, parent, curator personae or other legal 
representative. 
Depending on the circumstances, abandonment could constitute a 
breach of contract and/or profess~onal negligence. 449 Unlike in the 
situation in chapter 5, where voiding the contract would result 
in a restitution action only450 , in the case of abandonment, the 
action in contract would arise from breach of contract. In this 
case, the contract is not voided, but upheld. The client can thus 
choose to sue in terms of the contract, availing himself or 
herself of one of the following contractual remedies: specific 
performance451 or cancellation452 , and, in both cases, also 
189. 
44 Hibid • 
44
"Ibid 188. 
4
"'
0This is a case of contractual negative interesse: the law 
attempts to place the plaintiff in the position in which he or 
she would have been, had no contract been concluded and acted on. 
As has been indicated, the recovery is limited to patrimonial 
loss. 
451Where the practitioner would be compelled to perform 
properly in terms of the contract, as he or.she undertook to do. 
It would be ill-advised, however, considering the fragility of 
the therapeutic alliance, to opt for this contractual remedy in 
the case of abandonment. Indeed, specific performance involving 
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damages453 , where compensable damage has been suffered. With 
cancellation, the client could claim restitution, thus the sum 
total of his or her performance ( ie all moneys paid to the 
psychiatrist) and claim for other patrimonial damage suffered due 
to the breach of contract (such as loss of earnings due to 
deterioration in his or her condition caused by the abandonment). 
Once again, it is advisable that the client should base his or 
her claim on both contract and delict, concurrently or in the 
alternative. 454 
Instances that may give rise to actions for malpractice based on 
abandonment, include: where the therapist is absent and fails to 
highly personal services is at the best of times not a very 
effective remedy. 
40~This option would entitle the client to cancel the 
contract and claim for all patrimonial loss due to the breach of 
contract. Here a plaintiff can choose to rely on positive or 
negative interesse. Viljoen JA remarks in Sommer V Wilding 1984 
(3) SA 647 (A) that n~gative interesse is normally claimed in the 
case of fraud or misrepresentation in a contractual context (as 
indeed was the case in some examples in chapter V). Nienaber J, 
in Probert v Baker 1983 (3) SA 229 (D), argues as follows: "Can 
a claim for resti tutionary damages be advanced for breach of 
contract in contradistinction to, say fraudulent misrepre-
sentation? In my opinion it can, provided only that the contract 
has been duly cancelled by the aggrieved party. Cancellation of 
the contract does not of course preclude a claim for damages 
computed on the basis of positive interesse. That much is trite. 
The aggrieved party is perfectly entitled to cast his eyes 
forward to the position he would have occupied had the contract 
been fulfilled. But it may suit his purpose to look backwards 
instead, to the position in which he would have been if no 
contract had been entered into at all. By the very act of 
cancelling the contract the aggrieved party is trying to sever 
all contractual links and to divest himself of the consequences 
of the contract. There would be no inconsistency in granting him 
the right, at his election, to turn the clock backward instead 
of forward in an effort to restore the status quo by means of a 
claim for damages." See Visser PJ and Potgieter JM The Law of 
Damages through the Cases (2 ed) Cape Town: Juta & Cb Ltd (1998) 
138, 150. 
·•1:-, See Nagel CJ (Ed) Commercial Law Johannesburg: Lex Patria 
(1994) 108. 
4
"'
4As discussed supra, chapter V, 8. 2. 
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provide adequate backup services455 , and where the therapist fails 
to respond to his or her client's emergency calls456 ,, thinking, for 
instance that the client is manipulating him or her, and that he 
or she has to keep his or her distance and "not get too 
involved". This once again illustrates the tightrope of not being 
too involved and not being involved enough. 
Perlin457 points out that the corollary to the psychotherapist's 
duty of not abandoning his or her client is to terminate 
treatment when it appears to be ineffective or dan9erous. 458 If a 
psychotherapist unreasonably continues treatment where the 
reasonable psychotherapist would have referred the client to 
someone else, that, on the other ~and, would be psychotherapeutic 
malpractice. 
4
'"''Perlin M L Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal Vol 
3 (2 ed) Lexis publishing (2000)' 369. 
4
'" Ibid. 
4
:'
0 There are other circumstances in which a therapist may 
(rather than must) terminate treatment where the client would 
like to continue. One notable instance would be breach of 
contract on the part of the client, eg where the client over a 
fairly lengthy period of time fails to pay the therapist's fees. 
Nevertheless, the termination must be effected in an 
appropriately sensitive manner that is legally and ethically 
acceptable. The exact measures required would inevitably depend 
on the circumstances. 
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CHAPTER IX 
BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE DUTY TO WARN 
1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses yet another tightrope that the reasonable 
psychiatrist has to negotiate. On the one hand, liability can 
arise from breach of confidentiality and/or an action for 
defamation, whilst on ~he other hand, liability can arise from 
not disclosing information necessary to warn a person or group of 
persons of imminent danger. The various factors involved in this 
potentially treacherous balancing act, are here examined. 
2 The Importance of Confidentiality 
Confidentiality involves information shared by one person with 
another when there is a relationship of trust between them. The 
duty of professionals to maintain confidentiality is of ancient 
origin, and is recognised in numerous modern declarations. 459 
According to Clark460 , in considering American case law and 
judicial commentaries, it is clear that the extent to which a 
professional may be held liable in certain situations for 
disclosure or non-disclosure of confidential information, is a 
controversial issue. Nevertheless, there has emerged a clear duty 
to warn persons of danger in certain situations461 , and it is trite 
4
'·''strauss SA "Ethics in the Treatment of Mental Patients: 
Some Aspects" in Vari Wyk C & Van Oosten H (Eds) Nihil Obstat: 
Feesbundel vir WJ Hosten/Essays in Honour of WJ Hosten (1996) 
185. See also, for instance, the International Code of Medical 
Ethics (as amended in Venice, 1983). 
4
';°Clark JW "Confidential Communications in A Professional 
Context: Attorney, Physician, and Social Worker" The Journal of 
the Legal Profession (2000) 80. 
~' 1As firmly established in the landmark American case 
Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California, which has 
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that a judicial officer can order a psychotherapist to disclose 
certain information in court. 462 
A concern raised 
confidentiality is 
in respect of 
that unless 
this "relative" 
clients are 
nature 
assured 
of 
of 
confidentiality, they may be reluctant to communicate salient 
been referred to in South Africa (see infra under 3), and also 
in other countries around the world; see, for instance, Tomkin 
D & Hanafin P Irish Medical Law Dublin: Sweet & Maxwell (1995) 
57. Slovenko asserts that no decision has caused more concern in 
the psychiatric community than that decision of the California 
Supreme Court. He points out that the case was actually heard 
twice: "Tarasoff I" 118 Cal Rptr 129, 529 P 2d 334 (1974) 
(vacated) and "Tarasoff II" 17 Cal 3d 425, 131 Cal Rptr 14, 551 
P 2d 334 (1976); see Slovenko R "The Duties of Therapists to 
Third Parties" in 'Joubert JJ (Ed) Essays in Honour of 
Huldigingsbundel vir SA Strauss Pretoria: Unisa ( 1995) 211. 
Grabois EW "The Liability of Psychotherapists for Breach of 
Confidentiality" 12 J L & Health 39 (Cleveland State University 
Journal of Law and Health) (1997/1998) 72-73, notes that "in the 
case of Mcintosh v Milano, in which a psychiatrist failed to warn 
the plaintiff that his [cl]ient had murderous intentions toward 
his deceased daughter, the court discussed confidentiality 
between the psychiatrist and the [cl]ient. The court said •a 
[cl]ient is entitled to freely discuss his symptoms and condition 
to his physician in confidence' and the court refers to Section 
9 of the Principles of Medical Ethics and the Hippocratic Oath. 
The court discusses that a psychiatrist must keep the [cl]ient•s 
thoughts and feelings confidential, but may have to disclose 
those thoughts and feelings when the [cl]ient or the community 
needs to be protected from imminent danger. 11 For a statutory duty 
to warn in South Africa, see sect"ion 13 of the Mental Health Act 
18 of 1973. 
4 ';~See Harms LTC, Gal gut B & Faris JA in Joubert WA (Ed) The 
Law of South Africa (Vol 17) Durban: Butterworths (1999) 187: 
"[A] practitioner must, under protest, give information regarding 
a [cl]ient in a court of law if so instructed by the presiding 
judicial officer." Clark (op cit) reports that, in 1973 the 
American Medical Association's (AMA) Code of Ethics was revised 
to state as follows: "A physician may not reveal the confidences 
entrusted to him in the course of medical attendance, or the 
deficiencies he may observe in the character of [cl] ients, unless 
he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in 
order to protect the welfare of the indi victual or of the 
community." Clark affirms that "[t] he governing body of the 
American Medical Association is the AMA's Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs. The council's main responsibility is to 
interpret the AMA principles with most recent revision of the AMA 
Code of Ethics adopted in 1981. The statements on confidentiality 
are still maintained." 
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personal information and thoughts. According to Grabois463 , this 
silence can then all but totally defeat the purpose of 
psychotherapeutic treatment, and render it ineffectual. She 
contends that communications between a client and psychotherapist 
are, . by their very nature, confidential, with 'clients often 
revealing thoughts that they have revealed to no one else. She 
further maintains that clients who "express hidden thoughts and 
desires generally expect that such information will be kept 
confidential". 464 The thought of having such deeply personal 
information revealed may well discourage clients from the free 
and open expression so essential to efficacious therapy. 
3 Instances in Which Confidence May or Must Be Overridden 
The first and foremost situation in which confidence may be 
overridden is with the consent of the person whose confidence is 
kept. Although it is theoretically possible for a court to order 
disclosure (without consent) in a particular case, it can, as 
will be discussed, do so only under limited circumstances. The 
chances that the information that any given client discloses 
during therapy will end up being revealed in a court of law, are 
actually very remote. In both South Africa and the United 
States4e, the clinician is ethically required to urge upon the 
court his or her confidential relationship to his or her client, 
and strenuously to object to his or her disclosing any 
information - only if the court rejects his or her objection, 
4
'' '·Grabois (op cit 50). See also Harms LTC, Galgut B & Faris 
JA in Joubert WA (Ed) The Law of South Africa (Vol 17) Durban: 
Butterworths ( 1999) 187: "Ethically and legally psychiatrists and 
psychologists are required to keep their [cl]ients' confidences 
and it has been said that secrecy is the sine qua non of the 
practice of psychiatry. A psychiatrist must have a [cl]ient's 
complete confidence, otherwise he cannot help the [cl]ient." 
4
'''Ibid. 
4
''°Clark JW "Confidential Communications in A Professional 
Context: Attorney, Physician, and Social Worker" The Journal of 
the Legal Profession (2000) 80. · 
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does he or she have to reveal the information. 466 
The instances in which a therapist would be justified in 
disclosing information to protect the interests of third parties, 
are similarly limited. The typification of the justification in 
terms of South African law would be ( pri vate467 ) necessi ty468 , or 
duty469 • Due to the high premium placed on confidentiality, the 
instances in which confidence may be broken must be appropriately 
extreme in nature. The following cases illustrate some situations 
in which breach of confidentiality was justified and one in which 
it was not. 
1) Case 1: 
Strauss470 mentions a 1994 South African disciplinary 
case, whose facts are as follows: Dr X had been 
separately consulted by a divorcee, Mrs L, and her ex-
husband Mr L. At one stage, she presented with a black 
eye after allegedly having .been assaulted by her ex-
husband. She handed Dr X a letter by her ex-husband to 
her, which featured allegations that she had been 
4 ': 1~The consequence in both civil and criminal proceedings of 
then still refusing to reveal the information is that the 
psychiatrist will be guilty of contempt of court. In criminal 
matters he or she may be sentenced to continuous periods of 
imprisonment of two years or five years, depending on the nature 
of the crime allegedly perpetrated by the accused. See Harms LTC, 
Galgut B & Faris JA in Joubert WA (Ed)The Law of South Africa 
(Vol 17) Durban: Butterworths (1999) 188. 
4
';
7 See fn 241 supra. 
4c"This would be an instance where the interests of one party 
are infringed (the client's right to privacy and/or good name) 
for the protection of those of another. See supra chapter IV. 
4
';',see chapter IV, 3. 5 supra. 
471
'Strauss SA "Ethics in the Treatment of Mental Patients: 
Some Aspects" in Van Wyk C & Van Oosten H (Eds) Nihil Obstat: 
Feesbundel vir WJ Hosten/Essays in Honour of WJ Hosten (1996) 
185. 
169 
grossly promiscuous during their married life and after 
the divorce. Dr X gave her a brief note to the effect 
that her ex-husband appeared to be su~fering from a 
paranoid disturbance and probably had to be certified. 
The note was apparently intended for use by the 
district surgeon with a view to an eventual application 
for a committal 'order. The disciplinary committee found 
that Dr X had made no attempt to make contact with Mr 
L before issuing the note, and recommended that Dr X be 
found guilty of disgraceful conduct in the form of 
breach of confidentiality. In her submission to the 
(then) South African Medical and Dental Council, Dr X's 
attorneys attacked the committee's finding on the 
ground that her conduct had been reasonable;, although 
there had been a conflict of interest between her two 
clients (Mr and Mrs L), she had acted reasonably in an 
emergency situation by disc~osing information in order 
to avert a danger to Mrs L. Dr X's attorneys referred 
to Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California 
in support of her case. The SAMDC, accordingly, set 
aside the committee's finding. 
2) Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California471 
"[P] had met weekly for a total of eight sessions with 
Dr Laurence Moore [M], a clinical psychologist at ... the 
University hospital. He revealed thoughts of harming 
even killing, a young woman, readily identifiable as 
Tatiana Tarasoff, who had rejected him. [M], with the 
concurrence of a colleague, concluded that [P] should 
be committed for observation ... and ... notified the 
campus police that [P] was dangerous and should be 
n"supra ( fn 461); here as summarised by Slovenko R "The 
Duties of Therapists.to Third Parties" in Joubert JJ (Ed) Essays 
in Honour of - Huldigingsbundel vir SA Strauss Pretoria: Unisa 
(1995) 211. 
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committed. The campus police questioned [P] and they 
also talked to other people familiar with qim. They 
warned him to stay away from the girl. They concluded 
that commitment was not necessary. [P] never returned 
to the clinic, perhaps because he felt his trust with 
[M] had been betrayed. Two months later, when Tatiana 
returned from vacation he stabbed her to death." 
Slovenko affirms that the effect of the Tarasof f ruling is that 
there is a duty on therapists to protect potential third-party 
victims, provided that they are "readily identifiable". 472 It is 
not possible for the psychiatrist readily to predict dangerous 
behaviour in any given client. 473 Only where there is a reasonably 
foreseeable risk to a readily identifiable third party (such as 
the one brought to light by the direct statement of intention as 
in the Tarasoff case), the therapist must take reasonable steps 
to prevent that harm form eventuating. 474 The Tarasoff court 
conceded that what is reasonably necessary to protect such third 
parties, can be determined only on a case-by-case basis. 475 
47 ~It is notable that the 
actually settled out of court. 
that, had it gone to trial, the 
had in fact discharged the duty 
case as such was eventually 
Slovenko (op cit 212) contends 
court could have found that [M] 
by notifying the campus police. 
47
'See Mason and McCall-Smith Law and Medical Ethics (5 ed) 
Butterworths: Edinburgh (1999) 504: "[T]he p,rediction of 
dangerousness is an imprecise and, perhaps, fruitless 
exercise." See also Strauss SA "The P~rson with Schizophrenia 
and Criminal Justice: Some Aspects" CILSA (1996) 286, who echoes 
that the prediction of violence is extremely difficult. Pergament 
D "Internet Psychotherapy: Current Status and Future Regulation" 
Journal of Law-Medicine 8 Health Matrix 233 (1998) at 257, 
contends that "[g]enerally the courts conclude that the interests 
of society to be protected against the violent acts of [cl]ients 
outweigh the concerns of confidentiality, overcommitment, and 
difficulty of predicting violent acts". 
4 '~The similarity to the general formulation of the test for 
negligence in South African law (see chapter V, 2.2 supra), is 
readily evident. 
_,,Ibid 214. 
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3) MacDonald v Clinger476 
"[T]he plaintiff sued his psychiatrist, from whom he 
had received psychotherapeutic treatment, for 
disclosing personal information to the plaintiff's wife 
without his consent. The court held the parties had a 
relationship that gave rise to an implied covenant 
which, when breached, was actionable. The court found 
the breach of contract action of the plaintiff 
inadequate for a recovery for his mental distress, loss 
of employment and deterioration of his marriage ... [T] he 
court held that the [cl] if7nt who was the plaintiff 
should not be limited to a breach of contract action. 
Otherwise, the plaintiff would be limited to damages of 
an economic loss flowing directly from the breach, and 
could not recover for 'mental distress, loss of 
employment, and for the deterioration of his marriage' . 
The court believed that the relationship of a 
psychotherapist and his [cl]ient is not just a 
contractual one, but there is 1 an additional duty 
springing from but extraneous to the contract and that 
the breach of such duty is actionable in tort'. It is 
an action in tort for a breach of a duty of 
confidentiality and trust." 477 
From the above cases, it is clear that in both South Africa and 
the United States, the psychiatrist may be caught between two 
fires, as it were: he or she must disclose information in certain 
situations, or he or she may be held liable; on the other hand, 
:n,;446 NY S 2d 801 (Sup Ct 1982); as discussed by Grabois 
(op cit 67-70). 
" 7 ~Apart from illustrating an instance in which breach of 
confidentiality was not justified, this case reflects some 
similarities in the principles governing contractual damages in 
the United States and South Africa. 
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if he or she is· unjustified in disclosing confidential 
information, he or she may be held liable. 
Harms et a1 478 affirm that a psychiatrist who breaches a client's 
confidence may be guilty of malpractice. Instances that they cite 
in which the law recognises that a psychiatrist may 11 breach11479 a 
client's confidence, include: 
1) The client consents to disclosure. 
2) A court of law orders the disclosure. 480 
3) An Act of parliament requires the disclosure. 
4) There is a ~egal obligation on the practitioner to 
make a disclosure. 481 
4 The Consequences of Unjustified and Culpable Disclosure of 
Information in terms of South African Law 
The ordinary delictual principles governing infringement of 
dignitas based on disclosure apply to breach of confidentiality 
478Harms LTC, Galgut B & Faris JA in Joubert WA (Ed)The Law 
of South Africa (Vol 17) Durban: Butterworths (1999) 185. 
47
"It is submitted that the use of the term "breach" in 
respect of the first instance listed, is inappropriate. If a 
client consents to disclosure, it seems unsound to state that one 
"breaches" his or he~ confidence upon disclosure. 
w'Harms et al (ibid 187) expand on this as follows: "[W]here 
psychiatric evidence resulting in a breach of confidence is 
essential to the administration of justice, the court will 
require such evidence to be led; for instance: .. where the 
[cl]ient puts his mental condition in issue as part of a claim 
or defence; ... where it is necessary to establish the mental 
capacity of a testator; or ... in child custody suits." 
481This is where the Tarasoff-type situation would feature. 
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in the psychiatrist-client situation. Once again, contractual 
remedies are available for breach of contract. The same 
principles discussed supra4 " apply. 
Where information concerning a client is distributed in a manner 
which infringes his or her f ama (reputation or good name) 483 , such 
an infringement could also constitute defamation. 484 The ordinary 
' defences to a claim based on defamation apply. 485 
48:::See chapter v, 8 and chapter VIII, 3. 
48 
'·see Neethling. J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Law of Delict 
(4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (2001) 337. 
4840nce again, if the infringement is significant enough, it 
could constitute criminal defamation in addition to private-law 
defamation; see Snyman CR Criminal Law (4 ed) Durban: 
Butterworths (2002) 459-461. The elements of the crime are as 
follows: " (a) the publication ( b) of a defamatory allegation 
concerning another which is (c) serious and which is made (d) 
unlawfully and ( e) intentionally" (ibid 459). With regard to 
private-law defamation, see Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser 
PJ Law of Delict (4 ed) Durban: Butterworths (200l) 338-350. 
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
1 Synoptic Overview 
In chapter I, the concept "Holistic Multidisciplinary Management" 
("HMM") is introduced as a macrocosmic adaption of principles of 
project management. 486 This approach provides the framework for the 
dissertation. 
The HMM approach places particular emphasis on the fact that 
sound terminology and definitions facilitate and enhance 
interdisciplinary communication and collaboration. A central 
submission is that, where practically possible, terms and 
definitions should be shared and contemporaneously developed with 
reference to the advancements in various fields. At the heart of 
the approach lies interdisciplinary cross-pollination. There 
should be the underlying strategic purpose in any 
multidisciplinary venture that, apart from solving the specific 
problem at hand, the process should be aligned with the general 
aim of interdisciplinary development and continuous improvement 
of interactions and results. 
In chapter II, clinical psychiatry is placed in context. 487 The 
concept central to clinical psychiatry, "psychopathology" /"mental 
disorder" is examined. For various reasons 488 , the term "clinical 
biopsychosocial condition" ( "CBC" ) is suggested as a viable 
~"''.It is there ventured that this may be defined as "an 
application of adapted and refined principles of management, 
tailored to promote effective and efficient interaction between 
various disciplines in a manner which enriches all those 
involved, and identifies and implements integrative, holistic 
solutions". 
407 It is concluded that clinical psychiatry may be defined 
as "the medical speciality concerned with the diagnosis and 
treatment of clinical biopsychosocial conditions". 
'rlkSee chapter I I, 2. 2. 
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alternative to "mental disorder". Moreover, the use of the term 
I 
"client" is suggested to be better for an individual's sense of 
well-being than "patient". 489 It is concluded that psychiatry and 
law should both employ termino~ogy that is sensitive to the 
people whom they serve, and is soundly harmonious on the 
interdisciplinary level. The more congruence and mutual 
understanding ·there could be between law and the clinical 
sciences, the better subtle distinctions could be drawn. The 
definitions themselves should be shared as far as possible 1 
although the purpose for which they are applied may be vastly 
different. 
In chapter III, the interface between law and psychiatry is 
briefly elucidated. It is concluded that the interface houses 
forensic psychiatry490 and psychiatric jurisprudence. The term 
"psychiatric jurisprudence" is broad enough to encompass all 
areas where law and legal philosophy may affect psychiatry. The 
part of psychiatric jurisprudence on which this dissertation 
focusses, is "psychiatric malpra~tice491 law", which falls under 
"medical law". After careful analysis of the meaning of the word 
"medical 11492 , medical law is defined as "the law applied in the 
context of heal th-care provision, consumption and expertise 11 • 
This definition is subsequently brought into interdisciplinary 
perspective so as to ensure that it is harmonious, in step with 
HMM. It is concluded that the general principles of medical 
malpractice law apply to psychiatric malpractice, although the 
issues involved in psychiatric practice are, in many cases, quite 
48
''see fn 69. 
490Defined as "the integrative branch of psychiatry where 
there is specialised application of psychiatry· in a legal 
context". 
"''
1Malpractice is defined as "professional conduct which 
falls outside the limits of acceptable practice in that 
profession". 
4
''-It is concluded that "medical 11 is broad enough to 
encompass all heal th-care professionals. See chapter I II 3. 2. 1. 1, 
where "medical" is subdivided into "mainstream medical", "allied 
medical" and "alternative medical". 
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different from those involved in other areas of medical practice, 
and thus demand special attentiop. 
In chapter IV, the grounds of justification for medical 
intervention are examined. Informed consent is maintained as 
fundamental, and it is suggested that advance directives be 
recognised in principle. It is further submitted, however, that 
the system involved in advance directives must be managed well. 
Next, emergency as justification for intervention, is discussed. 
Two main categories are advanced: unauthorised administration and 
necessity. The latter category is suggested to be divided into 
three subcategories, viz public necessity, private necessity and 
therapeutic necessity. 4" 
The last-mentioned concept 
involuntary (in the sense 
is suggested to refer 
of "against the will") 
to the 
medical 
intervention as such, whereas ."therapeutic privilege" should 
refer to the situation of withholding information. It is 
submitted that this distinction is warranted, since there is a 
significant difference between performing a procedure on a client 
against his or her will, and withholding certain information 
regarding the client's condition. It is concluded that the former 
is most appositely classified as therapeutic necessity, whilst 
the latter is most appositely classified as therapeutic 
privilege. Therapeutic privilege as a possible justification in 
extreme cases, is then discussed. Subsequently, 
duty as grounds of justification are briefly 
Finally, a table that synoptically highlights 
authority and 
touched upon. 
some of the 
differences and similarities between the variotls grounds of 
justification, is provided. 
In chapter V, the consequences ·of intervention without justi-
4
'H 11 Public necessity" being where community interests are 
protected, "private necessity" being where another individual's 
(or limited group of individuals') interests are protected, and 
"therapeutic necessity" being where the treated individual's 
interests are protected (while at the same time infringing his 
or her autonomy). See chapter IV, 3.2. 
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fication are explored. In respect of consent for a physical 
intervention, it is concluded that a distinction should be drawn 
between the scenario where consent is absent or intentionally 
insufficient (ie material information is intentionally withheld), 
on the one hand, and negligently insufficient, on the other hand. 
The former infringement of the client's corpus can appropriately 
be classed as assault, whilst the latter494 does not amount to 
assault - it is a situation of negligence. 4 " 
In the latter part of chapter V, a number of hypothetical case 
scenarios in the psychiatric context are sketched to be used to 
illustrate the legal consequences of lack of justification in 
various instances. The available contractual and delictual 
actions are dealt with, and possible criminal liability 
discussed. It is suggested that (private-law) claims be 
instituted based on both contract and delict, in appropriate 
circumstances, to maximise potential recovery for loss suffered. 496 
Chapters VI to IX deal with specific types of conduct that can 
constitute psychiatric malpractice. A common theme that emerges 
in the various contexts covered, is that the psychiatrist must 
negotiate various therapeutic tightropes, as it were. 
In chapter VI, the following tightrope is investigated: If a 
psychiatrist unjustifiably facilitates the commitment of a person 
who should not have been committed, that could constitute 
malpractice. Moreover, if a psychiatrist unju~tifiably and 
unreasonably restrains an individual under his or her care, it 
could constitute malpractice. On the other hand, if a 
4
'!
4 Ie a clinician is under the erroneous impression that the 
consent is sufficient, in other words that all material facts 
have been disclosed in obtaining the client's consent, where the 
reasonable clinician in his or her position would have known 
those facts to be material and accordingly would have disclosed 
them. 
4
'''·see chapter v, 3. 
~·· See chapter V, 8. 2 and chapter VI I I, 3. 
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psychiatrist fails to commit or restrain an indiviaual who could 
harm himself or herself (especially in the case[ of potential 
suicide), or harm others, that could give rise to liability. 
Chapter VI I examines the tightropes involved in negligent therapy 
as such. In respect of medication (pharmacotherapy), both too 
much and too little (or none) can give rise to liability. Where 
the reasonable psychiatrist would have provided the necessary 
dosage of medication, and it is not provided, causing the client 
to suffer damage, it would constitute malpractice~ On the other 
hand, administering excessive medication can cause conditions 
such as tardi ve dyskinesia497 , and give rise to liability. In 
respect of psychotherapy, using .recovered memory therapy as an 
example, it is illustrated how the reasonable psychiatrist must 
find the balance between going to the lengths required by good 
therapy in the client's best interest, and not going too far, 
exceeding the boundaries of prudent practice and jeopardising the 
interests of third parties or, inadvertently, those of the 
client. 
Chapter VIII examines the tension between being too close or 
being too distant, undue familiarity and abandonment, 
respectively. On the one hand, if a psychiatrist becomes too 
intimately involved with a client, it could constitute 
malpractice. On the other hand, if a psychiatrist is not involved 
enough (or unreasonably terminates involvement), it could 
likewise constitute malpractice. Moreover, if a psychiatrist does 
not terminate therapy where the therapy is clearly not 
progressing in the client's best interests498 , that could 
constitute malpractice. 
Chapter IX addresses the two fires - metaphorically speaking -
represented by breach of confidentiality and the duty to warn 
~··'see chapter VII, 3.1. 
~ ' 0 Such termination must, of course, occur in the appropriate 
manner, including possibly referring the client to someone best 
suited to his or her needs. 
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third parties. On the one hand, liability can arise from breach 
of confidentiality and/or an action for defamation, whilst on the 
other hand, liability can arise from not disclosing information 
necessary to warn a person or group of persons of imminent 
danger. 
2 Conclusion 
In all the above instances, the standard with which a 
psychiatrist must comply is· that of "the reasonable 
psychiatrist". The law can establish and enforce that standard 
only with the assistance of the specialists in psychiatry - they 
are the ones who determine the standard. The reasonable 
psychiatrist is e~pected to be just that: reasonable. 499 
Psychiatric malpractice law should actually be regarded very 
positively by psychiatrists, since it is inter alia this area of 
law which serves to ensure the respectability of their area of 
expertise. In the desirable situation where psychiatrists are 
held justly accountable for their actions, it would cultivate a 
climate of warranted trust in their conduct' and promote the 
general positive perception of the field as a whole. 
Many consumers of psychiatric services do not have the capacity 
to protect their interests with sufficient competence. They, more 
than any other medical consumers; must be protected from harm by 
both the medical community and the law. 500 In step with HMM, this 
49
''Practically, it should be borne in mind that a client 
bringing suit against a therapist will generally bear the burden 
of proof. He or she would have to prove "on a balance of 
probabilities" that the psychiatrist acted unreasonably, leading 
expert testimony in that regard. Similarly, the state would, in 
criminal cases, have to prove "beyond reasonable doubt" the 
elements of the crime with which the therapist is charged (one 
of which may be negligence). It should be noted that it is very 
important that careful records of treatment be kept at all times. 
When it comes to responding in defence, inadequate records can 
place a practitioner in a very vulnerable position indeed. 
Indeed, the law cannot protect people if their plights are 
not brought to its attention; it is imperatively up to those who 
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should not be a situation of "law v medicine", wher1e medicine and 
law work against each other to find balance and best serve the 
community. Rather, law and medicine must work together to the 
benefit of all, including the psychiatric specialists themselves. 
The potential impact of defensive medical practices can be 
avoided only if mutual understanding and integrated functioning 
are promoted and translated into practice. 
To reiterate one of the core conclusions of HMM: the most 
significant beneficiaries of holistic multidisciplinary 
development and integrated practice are those whom various 
disciplines serve. The benefits of the effects of successful HMM 
can be of dire importance to those who rely, sometimes with their 
very lives, on those to whom multidisciplinary efficiency and 
effectiveness have been entrusted. Law and psychiatry must 
imperatively work together to fulfil the roles with which the 
community has entrusted them, and must cohesively endeavour to 
further their inevitable common cause: the interests of society 
and its members. 
are "on the ground" to assist the law (and professional bodies) 
in safeguarding the integrity of their practices and profession. 
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